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Preface
While interests in issues pertaining to happiness have been long-standing, we have
witnessed recently an increasing focus by both scholars and members of the general
public. ‘Subjective well-being (SWB) is an extremely active area of research with
about 170,000 articles and books published on the topic in the past 15 years’ (Diener
et al. 2018, Abstract). Not only psychologists (e.g. Kahneman et al. 1999, Diener
et al. 2010, 2018) and sociologists (e.g. Veenhoven 1984, 1993, 2010, 2017), but
also economists have made substantial investigations.1 After about 2–3 decades of
gestation since the first publication on happiness issues by an economist (Easterlin
1974), contributions from economists has mushroomed over the last two decades
or so.2 I published a paper (Ng 1978) four years after Easterlin and continue to
maintain interest until now. In this book, I hope to show how an individual and a
society/country may increase happiness. Despite the fact that happiness has a genetic
element (Lykken & Tellegen 1996, Lyubomirsky & Layous 2013, Minkov & Bond
2017), it can be increased (Lyubomirsky 2005, Carrillo et al. 2020);3 one may even
learn or be trained to be happier (e.g. Loveday et al. 2018, Rowland & Curry 2018,
Ruch et al. 2018, Liu et al. 2020). At least for myself, my happiness has increased
by many times since its low (but still positive) during my early thirties. I hope that
many readers may learn from this book to achieve the same or even larger successes.
My advice is not just based on my personal experience, but also on the research
findings of many researchers from whom I have learned enormously. I believe that
this book is useful not only for an individual wishing to increase happiness, or for
a government willing to do good for the people, but also for a happiness researcher
and an economist if she wants her economics to contribute to social welfare. (On the
1 For a bibliometric analysis of the economics of happiness, see Dominko & Verbič (2019), which
shows, among others, a big surge after the global financial crisis in 2008.
2 Including: Frey & Stutzer (2002), Blanchflower & Oswald (2004), Layard (2006), Clark (2010),
Helliwell (2010, 2018), Oswald &Wu (2010), Benjamin et al. (2012, 2014), Graham (2012), 2017),
Blanchflower et al. (2013), Clark & Senik (2014), Aghion et al (2016), Cheng et al. (2017), Clark
et al. (2018), Glover & Helliwell (2019).
3 However, see Brown & Rohrer (2020) for a critical comment on Lyubomirsky (2005).
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other hand, the concern for the danger of a paternalistic government should also be
kept in mind; see, e.g. Frey 2018).
Preface vii
Highlights of the book include:
• A simple, intuitive definition of happiness without the confusion of the objective
and/or eudaimonic complications.
• Clarifications on somemistaken views on happiness, such as: happiness is relative,
differs between individuals, cannot be measured in a single dimension and cannot
be compared interpersonally.
• A sophisticatedmethod tomeasure happiness (including by survey questionnaire)
that is more reliable and interpersonally comparable is proposed.
• The philosophical position that happiness is ultimately speaking the only thing of
intrinsic value is strongly defended. This does not preclude important instrumental
values of happiness, including for health, success in career and family, productivity
or work performance (DiMaria et al. 2020, Luna-Arocas & Danvila-del-Valle
2020) and even in pro-environmental behaviour (e.g. Diener & Tay 2017, Schmitt
et al. 2017, Frey 2018, Wang & Kang 2018).
• An environmentally responsible happy nation index (ERHNI): A national success
indicator other than GDP.
• An evolutionary ultimate explanation for the delay in sleep-wake cycles of
teenagers, explaining the decline in happiness starting at around 12 years old
and the trough in happiness levels at middle ages, as well as an obvious way to
solve the problems by delaying the start hours of high schools.
• The East-Asian happiness gap.
• Twelve factors: attitude, balance, confidence, dignity, engagement, family/friends,
gratitude, health, ideal, joy, kindness, love, crucial for individual happiness.
• Important public policy considerations are discussed, taking into account recent
contributions in economics, environmental sciences and happiness studies.
• Arguments very different from, if not opposite to the traditional economistwisdom
like ‘big society, small government’, are advanced.
• A case for brain stimulation for pleasure is made.
• A case for reducing animal suffering.
Shanghai, China Yew-Kwang Ng
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Chapter 1
What is Happiness? Why is Happiness
Important?
Abstract The (net) happiness (or welfare) of an individual is the excess of her
positive affective feelings over negative ones. This subjective definition of happiness
is more consistent with common usage and analytically more useful. Over the past
century or so, both psychology and economics has gone through the anti-subjectivism
revolution (behaviorism in psychology and ordinalism in economics) but has come
back to largely accept subjectivism (cognitive psychology and recent interest of
economists on happiness issues).
1.1 What is Happiness?
Different people attain happiness in differentways. Someenjoy reading; some seldom
open a book. Some enjoy spending money; some enjoy owning wealth; others enjoy
non-material pursuits. Everyone wants to be happy. However, what is happiness?
A person is seldom very happy or very unhappy. Kwang may be enjoying the
music that he has been listening to all-day while working and also enjoying most
of the work he is doing. However, he also feels a little tired late in the afternoon
after working for seven hours. (So he almost never works at night as it decreases his
happiness.) As a biological organism, we feel good eating fresh and nutritious food
when hungry. This clearly has survival value. Thus, contrary to the pure subjectivist,
happiness is not completely subjective. The nice or bad feelings are subjective in
the sense that it is felt by a person subjectively. However, they do have a substantial
objective basis, although thismight be shaped by the different experiences of different
persons.
We feel bad when we are sick; virtually all others are like this, given the biological
need for survival. If someone enjoyed being sick, he would get ill more often and
have a lower chance of survival. His genes would not be passed on as successfully.
In time, such genes would cease to exist. Hence, no one derives positive feelings
from sickness. Thus, we can be quite confident that sickness makes the individual
feel bad. This is so despite the belief by Lu Xun (鲁迅 1881–1936), a very famous
Chinese writer in the first half of the twentieth century, who claimed that a small
© The Author(s) 2022
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Intensity of affective feelings 
Time 0 (Point of 
neutrality) 
Fig. 1.1 Amount of happiness illustrated
sickness is a blessing as it allows the person enjoyment from a few days off work.
The poor old Lu Xun must be very overworked!
The (net) happiness of an individual over any period of time is their nice feelings
(positive affective feelings, as the psychologist calls it) less their bad (negative)
feelings over that period, with both types of feelings weighted by their intensities and
duration. This is a subjective conception of happiness and needs some explanation.
Anyone must be capable of feeling to have happiness. Stone, water, and almost
certainly, all plants, do not have happiness. Only affective feelings are included, and
these are the feelings that the individual cares for positively or negatively, or that
make them feel good or bad. One may visually feel the difference in the color of a
book. However, if they do not care which color it is, their feeling of color here is not
affective. All affective feelings are included, including the more basic good and bad
feelings of smell, taste, sight, etc. and the more spiritual or sophisticated feelings of
proudness, delight, shame, worry, distress, etc.
The degrees or intensities of positive or negative affective feelings of an individual
over a given period of time may be represented by a curve such as the one in Fig. 1.1.
Then, the amount of (net) happiness this individual enjoys over this period is given
by the areas bounded by this curve above the line of neutrality minus the areas below
this line. This is what I view asmy happiness (over a given time interval) and I believe
that I am representative of most people in this respect. This is also the concept of
(objective) happiness preferred by Kahneman (1999) and sophisticatedly argued for
and analysed by Kahneman et al. (1997).1
1 For discussions of the various concepts of happiness, see, e.g. Veenhoven (1984, 2000), Kim-Prieto
et al. (2005), Brülde (2007), Haybron (2007). The subjective concept I use is what philosophers
called the hedonistic theory or what Haybron (2000) calls ‘psychological happiness’. This is distinct
from the ‘prudential happiness’ (or ‘eudaimonic’) and differs from the concept of happiness as life
satisfaction itself or something similar, e.g. ‘happiness as involving the realizing of global desires, a
life plan, requires a level of rationality to develop’ (Chekola 2007, p. 67). It is a pure affective view,
a mental-state concept, and internalist (in your head/mind). Using ‘happiness’ in this sense is most
consistent with the common usage of the term. For the various concepts of happiness, see Mulnix
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This affective or subjective definition of happiness is called ‘hedonic’ in philos-
ophy.However, for the general public, the termhedonismhas a tendency to bemistak-
enly interpreted as being exclusively or excessively concerned with current pleasure
such as to disregard the future or others. Thus, I try to avoid using ‘hedonic’. If prop-
erly interpreted in its philosophical sense, there is nothing wrong with hedonism.
What is wrong is harming others, not enjoying oneself.
Happiness is the most direct word and most commonly used. The meaning of
‘happiness’ is clear and precise andmisunderstanding isminimal. ‘Well-being’ could
be taken to be a variety ofmeanings, including physical well-being or economicwell-
being. Even if an additional adjective is added to become ‘subjective well-being’, it
is still less precise than ‘happiness’.2 It could still mean either overall happiness or
the more psychiatric sense of being free frommental illness. While ‘life satisfaction’
is also quite comprehensive and clear in meaning, it suffers from two fundamental
problems as discussed in Chap. 4. Thus, I strongly prefer to use the terminology of
‘happiness’ for the concept discussed above.
Different types of feelings may be qualitatively different; beautiful sights are
different from delicious tastes. However, in principle, we have no difficulty in
comparing different types of feelings in terms of their quantitative significance. True,
in practice, it may be difficult to compare the happiness significance of pushpins
versus poetry. We may not have enough information regarding how many people
really enjoy poetry and to what extent, etc. However, this is a matter of inadequate
information, not incomparability in principle. As for myself, I have no difficulty in
saying that I would give up pushpins rather than give up poetry (On the well-being
effects of practicing poetry, see Croom 2015).
Of course, we care and/or should care about things other than our own feelings,
such as the feelings of others, moral principles, etc. These relate to the happiness of
others and the happiness of ourselves and others in the future. For the happiness of
an individual in a given period, it consists of and only of their positive and negative
feelings, as described above.
This does not mean that, for any given period, an individual only cares about or
just maximizes their happiness in this period. Obviously, they take account of the
effects on their future happiness. It also does not mean they maximize their own
happiness only. Not only do I derive happiness by helping others to be happy (by
writing this book, for example), I (and any other person) may also be prepared to
sacrifice a little of our own happiness if the happiness of others may be increased
substantially (more on this in Chap. 2).
andMulnix (2015), Clark et al. (2018), Diener et al. (2018), Etzioni (2018), Helliwell (2018),Myers
and Diener (2018) (SWB or happiness includes not just narrow sense of pleasure but all positive
affective feelings like ‘contentment, delight, ecstasy, elation, enjoyment, euphoria, exhilaration,
exultation, gladness, gratification, gratitude, joy, liking, love, relief, satisfaction, Schadenfreude,
tranquility, and so on’ Moore 2013).
2 See Diener et al. (2003) on the concept of subjective well-being.
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Our definition of happiness here is purely subjective. Many scholars do not
subscribe to this concept, based on a variety of grounds, which are all unaccept-
able in my view. Here, let us discuss just two main (somewhat interrelated) grounds
for diverging from, or qualifying the purely subjective definition.
First, from Aristotle to Etzioni (2018), many knowledgeable scholars require, on
top of the component of subjective affective feelings, some consistencywithmorality
to qualify for happiness or eudaimonia. In my view, this unnecessarily confuses the
two very different concepts. Being happy and being moral are two quite different
concepts. One may be happy without being moral and one may be moral without
being happy. Lumping the two together leads to confusion. It may be socially very
desirable for us to encourage people to be moral, and/or convince them that one
important way to be happy is to be moral, etc., but the two are conceptually very
distinct. Essentially, to be immoral is to cause unnecessary unhappiness or reduction
in happiness on others. We should use happiness to define morality, not use morality
to define happiness. This latter is standing things on their head, and will likely lead
to unclear thinking.3
Examining the hedonic and eudaimonic well-being indicators in a nationally
representative longitudinal study of US adults, Pancheva et al. (2020, Abstract) show
that ‘the two accounts largely converged with about 70% of the sample observa-
tions registering high/low scores in both well-being dimensions’. Moreover, for the
minority (30%) of divergent patterns, they ‘revealed substantial changes over a 10-
year period with respondents registering low hedonic/high eudaimonic well-being
at time t having greater chances of upward movement toward improved well-being
compared to individuals who experienced high hedonic/low eudaimonic levels in the
first time period’. This supports our position that if account is taken of the effects in
the future and on others, only hedonic happiness needs be taken into account.
If we view Aristotle’s eudaimon as ‘an ethical doctrine that would provide guide-
lines for how to live’ (Ryff and Singer 2008, p.15), then it may be a very good guide,
especially from a social viewpoint. It may also be true that ‘striving to improve one’s
hedonic well-being fails in its aim, whereas striving to improve one’s eudaimonic
functioning succeeds’ (Sheldon et al. 2019). Similarly, even if a firm’s ultimate aim
is to maximize profits, it may be counter-productive to too directly, openly, and
exclusively focus on profits in all its activities; it may be more profits-efficient to
emphasize much on customer relation, employee’s welfare, and even market shares.
However, viewed as what is ultimately of value, non-hedonic concept of happiness
is debatable. Whether it is eudaimon, self-actualization, self-autonomy, etc., if the
resulting outcomes involve much more misery than happiness, such that net happi-
ness is a huge negative sum, it is not a desirable world in the ultimate or intrinsic
sense.
3 Thus I find the contrast between utility and morality, as discussed in the Discussion Forum on
Amitai Etzioni—Twenty years of ‘The Moral Dimension: Toward a New Economics’ in Socio-
Economic Review, 2008, 6:135–173, fails to recognize points made in this chapter and in Chap. 5,
and comes across as rather suspicious, if not shallow.
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To avoid misunderstanding, but at the risk of repetition, let us clarify one impor-
tant point. The need to take into account the effects on others and the future does not
mean that the happiness of any individual for any period has to be adjusted to take
into account these indirect effects. If we required such adjustment, it would become
something similar to Aristotle’s eudaimon. Rather, we take at face value the unad-
justed happiness of any individual in any given period as of intrinsic value. Thus, if
Mr. A enjoyed his binge drinking one evening, that happy feelingwas then of intrinsic
value. However, if his binge drinking led to his drunk driving that killed/wounded
Ms. B, the great suffering imposed on Ms. B or her big loss of future happiness
should be taken into account. Such accounting may thus lead us to agree that binge
drinking should be discouraged or even banned. This is justified on the bad effects
on others and in the future, not based on having to adjust Mr. A’s happy feelings
that evening. In other words, no distinction is made between personal happiness and
moral happiness (or eudaimon). Happiness is happiness. But the morality of a certain
act does not depend only on the effects on the happiness of the person concerned,
but also on the effects on others and on the future.
Secondly, many scholars want to add some objective component to the definition
of happiness. For example, as described by Adler et al. (2017a, pp. 24–5), ‘The
most salient objective approach among psychologists is the ‘eudaimonic’, or self-
realization paradigm,wherewell-being is construed as an on-going, dynamic process
of effortful living bymeans of engagement in activities perceived asmeaningful (e.g.,
Ryan and Deci 2001). Advocates of this approach maintain that living a life of virtue,
understood as developing the valuable parts of one’s human nature, or actualizing
one’s inherent potentials in the service of something greater, constitutes the good
life for an individual (Boniwell and Henry 2007; DelleFave et al. 2011). From this
perspective, positive experiences are not in themselves important for a good life, and
are relevant only insofar as they involving [sic] appreciating objectively worthwhile
ways of being or functioning’. Similarly, Adler et al. (2017a, p. 22) defines happiness
or well-being as ‘everything that makes a person’s life … goes well’ (italics original).
Some happiness researchers (e.g. Kahneman 1999; Di Tella et al. 2003; Közegi
and Rabin 2008; Layard and Nickell 2005; Layard 2010) are in favour of the hedonic
concept while others (e.g. Ryff 1989; Waterman 1993; Etzioni 2018) are in favour of
the eudaimonic concept. The majority seem to regard both as relevant. The problem
with the above ‘eudaimonic’, ‘prudential’, and/or ‘objective’ approach to the defini-
tion of happiness is that it confuses happiness with (objective) factors that are usually
conducive to happiness and elements that are usually important for the happiness in
the future and of others. To minimize violations to the common meaning of the
concept of happiness, and to be consistent with the universally accepted point (again
from Aristotle to Etzioni 2018) that happiness is intrinsically valuable (the contro-
versial part is that it is also the only thing that is intrinsically valuable, ultimately
speaking, a point to be discussed in Chap. 5), happiness must be subjective. However,
our subjective happiness is affected by a host of objective factors. The different ways
or methods we lead our lives may also have very different effects on our own health,
and hence our future happiness, as well as different effects on the happiness of others.
For example, a person may become happy getting drunk, but may do harm to his
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health (hence reducing happiness in the future) or cause harm on others by drink
driving, as mentioned above.
Aristotle was probably largely right that a life of contemplation and virtue, and
actualizing one’s inherent nature (Delle Fave et al. 2011) is the right way towellbeing
or happiness (Norton 1976), or that the usual result of eudaimonic action is hedonic
happiness (Kashdan et al. 2008). ‘At the opposite end, a selfish individual who has
little regard for another’s welfare and is primarily, or even exclusively, concerned
with the pursuit of his personal interest … will usually fail to achieve both his
own happiness and that of others’ (Ricard 2017, pp. 160–1). Lasting happiness is
associatedmore with selflessness rather than self-centeredness (Dambrun and Ricard
2011). Disinterested kindness to others provides profound satisfaction (Seligman
2002); kindness activities boost happiness (Dunn et al. 2008; Aknin et al. 2012,
Rowland and Curry 2018). All these wise observations and research results are very
important for individuals and societies in terms of promoting a good life.
However, as the basis for the definition of happiness, they only serve to confuse.
For example, they lead to such misleading assertions as ‘psychological wellbeing
cannot exist just in your own head: it is a combination of feeling good as well
as actually having meaning, engagement, good relationships, and accomplishment’
(Adler et al. 2017b, p. 122). It is simpler and clearer to regard your happiness or
psychological wellbeing as just existing in your own head, but your engagement,
relationships, accomplishment, etc. may affect your own future happiness and that
of others.
Adler et al. (2017b, p. 123) allege that the purely hedonic concept of happiness
(‘just in your head’) ‘stumbles fatally on the fact that human beings persist in having
children: couples without children are likely happier, subjectively, than childless [?!]
couples [with children], and so if all humans pursued… [such] subjective happiness,
the species would have died out long ago’. First, this seems to be inconsistent with
the finding that ‘having children increases mothers’ life satisfaction and happiness’
(Priebe 2020, Abstract). Even ignoring this inconsistency, the argument is clearly
due to the lack of consideration of the happiness of people/children in the future. A
life with children may be less happy but may be a better life as it gives rise to future
people with additional happiness. Thus, if happiness in the future is not ignored, the
hedonic concept of happiness does not ‘stumble’.4 It is also questionable that a life
with children is less happy.5
True, ‘Objective and subjective indicators of wellbeing are both important’
(Stiglitz et al. 2010, p. 15; see also Fleurbaey and Blanchet 2013; Jorgenson 2018).
However, the objective indicators are important only because: 1. They are indirect
4 On the relevance of future people, especially potential future people, see Ng (1989). On the other
‘stumbling’ allegation based on the Brave New World, see Chap. 2.
5 ‘For parents who have had children due to the generosity of family policies, having children
increases parent’s life satisfaction by 0.33–0.41 points on a 10 point scale. This effect is significantly
more pronounced when parents are over the age of 50. Yet, children’s effects on life satisfaction
and happiness is negative for single and full-time working parents. The positive effect of having
children on life satisfaction and happiness has substantially eroded over the EVS (European Values
Survey) waves which explains the reductions in the fertility rate in Europe’ (Ugur 2020, Abstract).
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indicators of subjective wellbeing; 2. They are important for subjective wellbeing
(i.e. happiness) in the future; 3. They are important for the subjective wellbeing
of others. One of the reasons the second factor may be important maybe because
they contribute to the prevention of government’s manipulation of ‘people’s prefer-
ences and/or knowledge’ (Unanue 2017, p. 75). Similar to this possible usefulness
of objective indicators of happiness, the ‘operational definition’ of happiness (Thin
et al. 2017, p. 40) may also be useful. However, properly understood, it should be
‘operational indicators’, not definitions of happiness. Also similarly, such factors as
capabilities, functioning, flourishing, etc. (see, e.g. Hasan 2019) are important also,
ultimately speaking, only for their contributions to welfare or happiness.
Consider: ‘Sen (1999, p. 14) provides some more realistic cases that may have
significant relevance to public policy. Sen thinks hedonism is problematic because
‘[a] person who is ill-fed, undernourished, unsheltered and ill can still be high up in
the scale of happiness or desire-fulfillment if he or she has learned to have realistic
desires and to take pleasure in small mercies.’ If such a person can be said to be doing
well, then there seems to be something problematic about hedonism. Our tendency
is to say that person has adapted as best as she can to poor life circumstances, and she
is making the best of a bad situation, but that does not mean she is doing well: The
destitute thrown into beggary, the vulnerable landless labourer precariously surviving
at the edge of subsistence, the over-worked domestic servant working around the
clock, the subdued and subjugated housewife reconciled to her role and her fate,
all tend to come to terms with their respective predicaments. (p. 15)’ (Hersch 2018,
p. 2234). In my view, such cases may well be very undesirable; however, this is so
because they tend to reduce happiness in the long run. Taking account of effects in
the future and on others will account for them. On the other hand, if they do not
[unlikely though] reduce happiness in the long run, they are not bad.
Despite the above explanations, some people may still prefer to have a different
conception of happiness. For example, consider two hypothetical scholars who both
died in an air crash at the same age. Madam A suffered from debilitating illness and
a broken family throughout much of her life, leading to her undergoing enormous
pain and distress. However, working long and exhausting hours, she made important
breakthroughs in knowledge and was awarded a Nobel prize just before her death.
Though she died happy, her unhappiness throughout her whole life clearly outweighs
her final happiness for a few days. Mr. B was a healthy and happily married man
who enjoyed life a lot. He also enjoyed his work and performed satisfactorily. Just
before his death, he learned that his expected promotion did not go through as it was
found that his only major contribution was contained in another publication years
before his. He died unhappy and his career was not a very successful one. However,
his final unhappiness for a few days is far exceeded by his high level of happiness
for a long time.
According to our conception of happiness, Madam A had an unhappy life while
Mr. B had a happy one. However, according to some other conception of happiness
(which emphasizes final satisfaction with one’s life), A had a happy life and B had
an unhappy one. Moreover, some, if not many, people may prefer to have a life like
A’s to one like B’s. Several issues are involved here.
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To simplify from the complication of interest earnings from savings, assume a
society with zero interest rate and zero inflation rate. Consider two persons similar in
all aspects except that X had a high annual income and consumption level ($80,000)
during the first half of his life which was unexpectedly halved in the second half of
life. In contrast, Y started with half the initial level of X’s (i.e. $40,000) for the first
half of his life but the level was unexpectedly doubled for the second half. Though
their income and consumption over the whole life are the same, Y probably had
a happier life, provided that the level of $40,000 per annum was not so low as to
make him malnourished. (Malnourishment in the first half may be worse than that
in the second half as it could affect one’s health for both halves.) Subject to this
proviso, most people also prefer to be in the situation of Y than X. When one has
been accustomed to a high level of consumption, one needs a high level to be happy.
Thus, subject to the absence of health-damaging under-consumption, it is better to
have a profile of increasing consumption level than one that is decreasing. However,
this consideration does not apply to the case of Madam A versus Mr. B where the
profiles are already stated in terms of happiness, not in terms of consumption.
Many people may have faulty telescopic faculty so as not to make full allowance
for the future, as believedbyPigou (1912, 1929, 1932, p. 25), awell-knowneconomist
early in the twentieth century.When one looks backward in time, events far backmay
also appear less important. But this is a similar mistake as having a faulty telescopic
faculty.
Madam A had a more successful life than Mr. B who had a happier life. The
difference is due to A’s much higher contribution to knowledge which, presumably,
would make others happier. Madam A may also have a higher life satisfaction than
B, at least at the end, but this is still not a happier life. A may prefer to have her
unhappy life over B’s happy life. She may rationally have this preference if she
believed that her contribution to knowledge would make others happier and if she
cared for the happiness of others. This care maymake life satisfaction (which is more
likely affected by one’s contribution to others) differ from the happiness of the same
person, as will be discussed further in Chap. 4.
True, despite the above explanations, some people may still opt to use a somewhat
different conception of happiness than the one we define above. However, the fact
that momentary experience sampling (Csikszentmihalyi and Hunter 2003) of happi-
ness and fatigue is predictive of cardiovascular disease progression, while overall
evaluation of life is not so predictive (Karmarck et al. 2007), support both the use
of momentary experience sampling as a method of measuring happiness and our
definition of happiness above. Moreover, most people will agree that the good and
bad feelings one has are important in affecting whether one is happy or not, even if
not exclusively. Thus, one does not have to agree with our conception of happiness
completely to find the rest of this book interesting and important.
In addition to the above two points, many scholars (including Sumner 1996;
Chekola 2007; Adler 2017b) want to include some cognitive element into happi-
ness or subjective well-being (SWB). Some define SWB as being inclusive of both
affective happiness and cognitive life satisfaction. I find this confusing, if not also
misleading. Using happiness, welfare and SWB as synonymous and defined in the
1.1 What is Happiness? 9
affective sense as discussed above, is most consistent with the common usage and
most useful analytically. Then, usually one’s life satisfaction (defined cognitively)
may largely be affected by one’s own happiness, but also by one’s belief in contri-
bution to society (ultimately and rationally, should be to happiness). Then, it is at
least conceptually possible for most or even all individuals in a society to be unhappy
(net happiness being negative) and yet still have high life satisfaction, as discussed
in more detail in Chap. 4. This may be due to each believing that she has made
huge contributions to the happiness of others. Yet, due to imperfect knowledge or
misfortunes, the believed (perhaps mistakenly) contributions did not really mate-
rialize into happiness for most individuals. At least in outcome, such a society of
unhappy individuals is miserable, despite high life satisfaction. Life satisfaction is
not meaningless and may be useful for certain purposes, including the potential to
affect happiness in the future. Happiness and life satisfaction also tend to be mutu-
ally reinforcing. However, ultimately, it is happiness that is of intrinsic value. Thus,
I prefer to focus mainly on happiness, especially when the two differ, as discussed
further in the next section and Chap. 4.
1.2 Why is Happiness Important?
Over the past century or more, psychology has gone through at least three important
phases of subjectivism, behaviorism, and cognitivism. Classical psychologists spoke
of mind, consciousness, and used introspection in their analysis. Then came the
Watson-Skinner behaviorist revolution which prohibited the analysis of anything
subjective: only actual behaviors were the proper subject matter of psychology.
This allowed psychology to make huge advances in becoming more scientific, but
concomitantly caused some to feel that it had ‘gone out of its mind…and lost all
consciousness’ (Chomsky 1959, p. 29). The reaction against the excesses of behav-
iorism resulted in the cognitive revolution which has been prevalent for the past few
decades, and which has made much headway.
Economics has gone through similar phases. Older economists (since theNeoclas-
sical revolution in the nineteen century) used more subjective terms like satisfaction,
marginal utility, and even happiness, pleasure, and pain. After the indifference-curve
or ordinalism revolution in the 1930s,modern economists are very adverse to themore
subjective concepts and very hostile to cardinal utility and interpersonal comparisons
of utility. (See Kaminitz 2018 on the histories and approaches on this by economists
and psychologists.) They prefer to use the more objective concepts like preference
and choice. In a very important sense, these changes represent an important method-
ological advance, making economic analysis to be based on more objective grounds.
However, the change or correction has been carried into excess, making economics
unable to tackle many important problems, divorced from fundamental concepts, and
even misleading. In my view, while we should prefer to use more objective concepts
when they are sufficient, we should not shy away from the more subjective concepts
and even their interpersonal comparison when they are needed.
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Perhaps we may date the commencement of the subjectivist counter-revolution to
the dominance of objectivism/ordinalism in economics at 1997, with the appearance
of three papers (Oswald 1997; Frank 1997; Ng 1997) on happiness in Economic
Journal, with Easterlin (1974) as the earliest forerunner. In the last 2–3 decades,
many top journals in economics have published papers on happiness studies and
economists are less reluctant to speak in terms of subjective concepts including
happiness, including its cardinal measurability and interpersonal comparability.
Happiness is more important than the objective concepts of choice, preference
and income (especially if narrowly interpreted and eschewing cardinal utility and
interpersonal comparison, as is the usual practice in modern economics) for at least
two reasons. First, happiness is the ultimate objective of most, if not all people (more
on this in Chap. 5). We want money (or anything else) only as a means to increase
our happiness. If having more money does not substantially increase our happiness
(Chap. 7), then money is not very important, but happiness is.
Secondly, for economically advanced countries (the number of which is
increasing) there is evidence suggesting that, for the whole of society, and in the
long run (in real purchasing power terms), money does not buy happiness, or at least
not much (Easterlin 1974; Veenhoven 1984; Argyle and Martin 1991, p. 80; Oswald
1997; Asadullah et al. 2018; Cheng et al. 2018; Luo et al. 2018). This is known as
the Easterlin paradox of unhappy growth, the failure of money or economic growth
to increase happiness (For the sister paradox of happy stagnation for Japan in the
last three decades, see Chap. 13). The reasons are not difficult to see. Once the
basic necessities and comforts of life are adequate, further consumption can actually
make us worse off due to problems like excessive fat and cholesterol and stress. Our
ways to increase happiness further then take on the largely competitive forms like
attempting to keep up with or surpassing the Joneses. From a social viewpoint, such
competition is a pure waste (Frank 1997). On top of this, production and consump-
tion to sustain the competition continue to impose substantial environmental costs,
making economic growth quite possibly happiness-decreasing (Ng and Wang 1993,
and Chap. 7). To avoid this sad outcome, a case can be made for increasing public
spending (contrary to the currently popular view against public expenditures among
economists) to safeguard the environment and to engage in research and develop-
ment that will increase welfare (Ng 2003). This is especially so since relative-income
effects makes the traditional estimate of optimal public spending sub-optimal (Ng
1987a). As the schoolmates of one’s child all receive expensive birthday gifts, one
feels the need to give as expensive gifts. Thus, the perceived importance of private
expenditures is inflated relative to that of public spending (Ng 2003 and Chaps. 14
and 15).
The return of both psychology and economics to largely accept subjectivism is
unavoidable and much to be welcome. Happiness is the ultimate and only intrinsic
value (Chap. 5) and it is subjective. The great British economist Arthur Pigou (1922)
regarded the study of economics (and arguably other studies as well, though we
should not insist on immediate effects) should be mainly for bearing fruits, not just
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Abstract The preference of an individual may differ from her happiness due
to imperfect information, a true concern for the welfare of others (non-affective
altruism), and imperfect rationality. In some exceptional circumstances, such as the
traditional Chinese custom of giving the deceased parent a decent burial and not to
disturb them by re-burial, some measures (like banning slavery and using a ceme-
tery for essential developments) may improve social welfare, even if against the
preferences of most, and perhaps all, people.
I define happiness, subjective well-being, and welfare of an individual as essentially
equivalent terms, with only two minor differences in usage. First, we tend to use
‘happiness’ to refer to the current feeling. If I see you singing and dancing gladly, I
tend to say that you are happy now. If I know that you are healthy and have a loving
spouse, nice children, good income, etc., I tend to conclude that your welfare must
be high, because you will likely be happy for a long time. Second, we tend to use
‘happy’, ‘happiness’ in a less formal way and ‘subjective well-being’ and ‘welfare’
in a more formal way. For example, as mentioned by Diener and Tay (2017, p. 90),
‘Subjective wellbeing, often called “happiness” in layperson terminology, refers to
peoples’ sense of wellness in their lives’. If we ignore the formality in usage and
holding the time period as given, I find that my happiness, subjective well-being, and
welfare must be exactly identical. If a person is unhappy through her whole life, her
welfare cannot be high; her subjective well-being cannot be positive.
Since most, if not all individuals care much about their own welfare, preference
and welfare normally go together (Benjamin et al. 2012). However, the preference
of an individual may differ from her happiness or welfare for the following three
reasons.
First, preferencemay differ fromwelfare due to ignorance and imperfect foresight.
While an individual may prefer x to y, believing he will be better off in x than in y, it
may turn out to be the other way around. This is the question of an ex-ante estimate
versus ex-post welfare.While the ex-ante concept is relevant for explaining behavior,
it is the ex-post one which is the actual welfare.
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Second, the preference of an individual may not only be affected by her own
welfare but may also be affected by her consideration for the welfare of other indi-
viduals. Thus, it is possible for a person to personally have a higher happiness level
in y than in x, yet herself prefers and chooses x over y because she believes that other
people are happier in x than in y. While it is true that the belief that other people
are happy may make her happy, these positive feelings may not be strong enough
to outweigh the loss that she has to suffer for changing from y to x. For example, a
person may vote for party x, knowing that she herself will be better off with party
y in government. The reason she votes for x is that she believes that the majority
of the people will be much better off with x. This itself may make her feel better
(affective altruism). However, this external benefit may not be important enough to
overbalance, in terms of her subjective happiness, her personal loss, say in income,
under x. She may yet vote for x due to her moral concern (non-affective altruism)
for the majority. To give an even more dramatic example, consider an individual
who expects to lead a very happy life. When her country is being invaded, she may
volunteer for a mission which will bring her the certainty of death. The prospect of
being a citizen of a conquered nation especially with the guilt conscience of failing
to volunteer for the mission may not be too bright. But overall she may still expect
to be fairly happy in leading such a life. Yet she chooses death for the sake of her
fellow countrymen. In this case, she is not maximizing her own welfare.
Some economists have difficulty in seeing the above distinction between prefer-
ence and welfare, saying that whenever an individual prefers x to y, she must be, or
at least believe herself to be happier in x than in y. This difficulty completely baffles
me. Clearly, a father (or mother) may sacrifice his (her) happiness for the welfare of
his (her) children. I cannot see why similar sacrifices cannot be made for a friend or
a relative, and further for a countryman, any human being, and finally, any sentient
creature.1
It may be doubted that the existence of true non-affective altruism is inconsistent
with Darwinian natural selection. However, as preferences are the result of both
cultural and genetic inheritance, one can demonstrate that pro-social traits could
have evolved under the joint influence of cultural and genetic transmission.2
If some readers still doubt the existence of truly non-affective altruism, they are
likely to be convinced that in fact they themselves possess some degree of non-
affective altruism by considering the following hypothetical choice. Like Einstein’s
thought experiments, such hypothetical exercises cannot be dismissed on the ground
1 For some interviews with some real-life altruists, see Monroe (1996), Part I. For a survey of some
evidence of true altruism, see Hoffman (1981). One type of evidence is that a person is more likely
to help others when he/she is the only person around, contrary to the egoistic explanation of helping
on the ground of approval gaining. Cf. Charness and Rabin (2002).
2 As shown byBoyd andRicherson (1985), Sober andWilson (1998), andBowles (2000).Moreover,
‘highly developed human capacities for insider-outsider distinctions and cultural uniformity within
communities greatly increase the likely importance of group selection of genetically transmitted
traits, and hence the evolutionary viability of group-beneficial traits’ (Bowles and Gintis 2000,
p. 1419). On the evolutionary basis of altruism towards one’s relatives, see Hamilton (1964) and
Bergstrom (1996).
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of being unrealistic. Suppose that you are asked by the Devil to press either button
A or B within 2 s. You know with certainty (for simplicity of comparison) that one
of the following will happen depending on which button you press. Within these
two seconds, you will be so preoccupied with pressing the right button such that
your welfare will be zero whichever button you press. After pressing, you will lose
memory of the present world and hence will not have feelings of guilt, warm-glow,
or the like, related to which button you press.
• A: You will go to Bliss with a welfare level of 1,000,000 trillion units. Everyone
else will go to Hell with a welfare level of minus 1,000,000 trillion units each.
• B: You will go to Bliss Minus with a welfare level of 999,999 trillion units.
Everyone else will go to Niceland with a welfare level of 999 trillion units each.
• C: If you do not press either button within the 2 s, you and everyone else will go
to Hell.
By construction, choosing A will maximize your welfare but most people will
choose B out of non-affective altruism. If you still think that you will choose A,
change Bliss Minus into a welfare level of 999,999.999 trillion units. If you still opt
for A, I have to concede that you are not altruistic non-affectively. But how could
you have the heart to condemn all others to Hell for a fractional increase in your own
welfare? (In my view, the existence and degree of non-affective altruism marks true
morality.)
Third, an individual may have irrational (or imperfectly rational) preferences. The
preference of an individual is here defined as irrational if he prefers x over y despite
the fact that his welfare is higher in y than in x, and his preference is unaffected by
considerations of the welfare of other individuals (any sentient creature can be an
individual here), or by ignorance or imperfect foresight. The definition of irrationality
here is so as to make the three factors discussed here exhaustive causes of divergence
between preference and welfare.
While few, if any individuals are perfectly ignorant and irrational, some degrees of
ignorance (or imperfect information) and imperfect rationality clearly apply to most
individuals.3 However, some alleged irrationalities could be simply due to errors,
computational limitations, and incorrect norm by the experimenters (Stanovich and
West 2000). There are a number of causes that may make preferences differ from
happiness other than ignorance and a concern for the welfare of others, and hence
they are irrational according to our definition here. The following two (may not
be completely independent) causes may both be explained, at least partly, by some
biological factors (On the biological basis of social behaviour, see, e.g. Wilson 1975;
Crawford & Kreps, 1998; Nicolosi and Maestrutti 2016).
First, there is a tendency for many people to discount the future too much or even
to ignore it completely. This is widely noted, including by economists. For example,
Pigou (1912, 1929, 1932, p. 25) called it the “faulty telescopic faculty”, Ramsey
(1928, p. 543) called it “weakness of imagination” about the future, and Harrod
3 See Cohen (1983), Evans and Over (1996), Kahneman and Tversky (2013), Stein (1996), Igaki
et al. (2019) for reviews of the relevant literature in philosophy and psychology.
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(1948, p. 40) regarded it as the “conquest of reason by passion”. A discount on future
consumption, income, and any other monetary value is rational as a dollar now can
be transformed into more than a dollar in the future. A discount on future utility may
still be rational if the realization of future utility is uncertain. (For healthy people, this
uncertainty is usually very small per annum.) Discounting the future for more than
these acceptable reasons is probably irrational. Amanifestation of this irrationality is
the insufficient amount of savings for old age, necessitating compulsory and heavily
subsidized superannuation schemes. I came across an extreme example of suchunder-
saving during a survey regarding how much people would be willing to save more
if the rate of interest were higher (Ng 1992). The question implicitly assumed that
everyone did some saving, as the answers were in terms of how many percentages
more onewould save. One subject declared that he did not save anything. I then asked
him to change the answers to be chosen from “saving 20% more” into “saving $20
more per month”. He said he could not be persuaded to save anything at whatever
interest rates (500% was mentioned). He only conceded willingness to save when I
said, “What if a dollar saved now will become a million dollars next year?” I was
careful enough to find out that this healthy-looking young man was not expecting
early death from a terminal disease or the like.
The behaviour of most other animals is largely determined by pre-programmed
instincts rather than the careful calculation of the present costs versus future benefits.
The storing of food by ants, the burial of nuts by squirrels, etc. are largely, if not
completely, instinctive. If calculated choices are made by animals, they are largely
confined to sizing up the current situation to decide the best move at the moment,
like fight or flight. The ability to anticipate the rewards in the fairly distant future
requires much more ‘reason’, ‘imagination’, and ‘telescopic faculty’ than normally
cost-effective to program in most other species. However, we know that we are
endowed with some such faculty. Nevertheless, since this advanced faculty is almost
completely absent in most other species, it is natural to expect that it is not fully
developed even in our own species. Moreover, different members of our species may
be endowed with different degrees of such faculty. The existence of a significant
proportion of members of our species which do not possess a full telescopic faculty
is thus not surprising.
Secondly, there are the excessive temptation of pleasure (especially present plea-
sure vs. future costs, hence related to the preceding cause) and the powerful biological
drives. After the evolution of flexible species (defined as one where the behavior of
its members is not completely determined by the automatic programmed responses
but also by choice), natural selection ensured that the flexible choices made were
largely consistent with fitness by endowing the flexible species with the reward-
penalty system. Thus, eating when hungry and mating with fertile members of the
opposite sex are rewarded with pleasure, and damages to the body are penalized with
pain. (This makes the flexible species also “rational” as defined in Ng 1996 which
shows that complex niches favor rational species which in turnmake the environment
more complex, leading to a virtuous cycle that accelerates the rate of evolution. This
partly explains the dramatic speed of evolution based mainly on random mutation
and natural selection, a speed doubted by creationists.) On top of the ex-post rewards
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and penalties, we are also endowed with inner drives to satisfy the fitness-enhancing
functions like mating. On the whole, these powerful temptations and drives work
in the right direction, making us do things that both enhance our biological fitness
and psychological welfare. However, since evolution is largely fitness-maximization
and the welfare-enhancing aspect is only indirectly to enhance fitness, some diver-
gence between our behavior and our welfare is unavoidable, as our behavior is not
completely determined by rational calculation, but also partly by programmed incli-
nation, including the drives. (See Ng 1995 on the divergence between fitness and
welfare maximization especially with respect to the number of offspring.)
It has also been shown that, ‘wanting’ or preference and ‘liking’ or welfare are
mediated by different neural systems in the brain and are psychologically dissociable
from each other. In other words, an individual may prefer something without liking
it or prefer something more strongly than could be justified by his liking for it, and
vice versa. In particular, neural sensitization of brain dopamine systems by addictive
drugs may create intense ‘wanting’ way beyond that which could be explained by
‘liking’ and the relieving of withdrawal symptoms. (See Berridge 1999 for a review.)
As an example of these powerful drives, adolescent girls and boys often engage
in careless sexual acts propelled by their sexual drive and the temptation of sexual
pleasure, even if there is a high risk to their long-term welfare, such as in the case
of unwanted pregnancies or the contraction of AIDS. While this is partly due to
ignorance, the role of biological drives cannot be denied.
Consider a specific example. Suppose that a person agrees that, for choices
involving risks, the correct thing to do is to maximize expected welfare (assuming no
effects on the welfare of others) and also actually do so for most choices. However,
for choices concerning sexual activities, he chooses x over y, although his expected
welfare is lower with x than with y and he knows this to be the case. Here, x may
involve having sex with many persons without clear knowledge (this knowledge is
assumed to be not feasible to obtain and hence not relevant) about whether they have
AIDS. His (expected) welfare-reducing choice of x may be due to his biological
inclination to seek many sexual encounters. He knows that doing so has a non-
insignificant chance of contracting AIDS and hence is welfare-reducing. He has all
the relevant feasible information and yet chooses (due to the powerful sex drive)
x that he knows to be of lower expected welfare. (This is not really a hypothetical
example. I am confident that, out of 100 normal adult males, at least 10 have actually
made such choices. If one wants more solid evidence, one may look at the frequency
of prostitution and extra-marital sex.) Should we call this preference informed as the
person has all the relevant feasible information, or uniformed because it is not in
agreement with his real interests?
The above two causes of irrational preference illustrate the point that, due either to
imperfection in our endowed faculty or the biological bias in favour of reproductive
fitness, we may do things not quite consistent with our welfare. The issue here is
that, for normative purposes, should we use welfare or actual preferences/behavior.
Clearly, we should use welfare instead of behaviour dictated by biological fitness. An
old Chinese dictum says, “Out of the three un-filial acts, not having offspring is the
greatest”. However, for the human species as a whole, we are certainly not getting
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smaller in population size. Moreover, a long-run social welfare function accounting
for the welfare of future generations should account for that. If we go for biological
fitness, we will prefer unlimited procreation even if that means that we will all be
suffering as compared to a smaller population with a higher aggregate welfare. ‘We’
are the feeling selves that care ultimately about our welfare (positive minus negative
affective feelings). We are not them, the unfeeling genes that, through random muta-
tion and natural selection, programmed us to maximize fitness. Unlike other species
who are almost completely controlled by their genes and the environment, we have
learned to change our fate by using such measures as birth controls. For normative
issues, it is our welfare, rather than the selected random dictates of the unfeeling
genes, that should count. (On a survey of different concepts of individual welfare,
see Ackerman et.al 1997; Diener et al. 2018.)
On top of the above two biological causes, there is another source of imperfect
rationality. An individual may stick rigidly to some habit, custom, ‘principles’, or
the like even if he knows that this is detrimental to his welfare and the welfare of
others even in the long run, taking into account all effects and repercussions.Customs,
rules, moral principles, etc. have a rational basis as theymay provide simple guides to
behaviour which may be, at least on the whole, conducive to social welfare. It would
be too cumbersome and time-consuming if an individual were to weigh the gain and
loss in terms of social welfare or his ownwelfare each time he has tomake a decision.
Thus he may stick to his routine, rules, principles, etc., without thinking about the
gain and loss. If this results occasionally in decisions inconsistent with promoting his
welfare and the welfare of others, it may be regarded as a cost in pursuing generally
good rules. If, say, there is a change in circumstances, the adherence to some rulesmay
result in persistent net losses inwelfare, taking everything into account. An individual
may stick to these ruleswithout knowing that they are no longer conducive towelfare.
Then the divergence between preference and welfare can be traced to ignorance. If
he knows this and yet sticks to the rules, he is irrational.
Many readers may disagree with the definition of irrationality adopted here. For
example, suppose a man sticks rigidly to the principle of honesty and would not tell
a lie even if that would save his life and contribute to the welfare of others, taking
everything into account. According to our definition here, he is acting irrationally.
To those (like Kant) who are willing to accept honesty as an ultimate good in itself,
he may not be irrational. (For our case against Kant’s categorical imperatives, see
Chap. 5.) But let us consider such questions as: Why shouldn’t a person tell a lie?
Shouldn’t one lie to protect his people from a cruel invading army? If we press
hard enough with such questions, I believe that most people would ultimately rely on
welfare as the justification for anymoral principles such as honesty. Personally, I take
the (weighted or unweighted) aggregate welfare of all sentient creatures, or a part
thereof, as the only rational ultimate end (my basic value judgment; more in Chap. 5),
and hence define irrationality accordingly. I know the controversial nature of this
definition. But fortunately, one does not have to agree on the definition of irrationality
given here to agree with the arguments presented in this book. If preferred, the word
‘irrational’ as used here could be taken to read ‘irrational according to the objective
of welfare maximization’.
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However, are moral principles really fundamental? Before the evolution or devel-
opment of morality and the like, we (perhaps still in the form of apes or even earlier
ones) had no moral or other principles, no concept of commitments and justice, etc.
Self-interest dominated entirely, although this does not exclude genetically endowed
apparent ‘altruism’ for the maximization of inclusive fitness. As we evolved and
increasingly relied on our high intelligence and social interaction for survival, the
instinct formoral feelings also evolvedwhich helped our survival by enhancing coop-
eration. This was enhanced by learning the importance of such moral practices as
honesty in improving our struggle against nature (includingwild animals) and against
competing human groups. No one can deny that the initial evolution/development of
morality must be purely instrumental (in enhancing either our welfare or our survival
and reproduction fitness) as there existed no morality to begin with. We then learned
and taught our children and students to value moral principles; this was first done to
increase the degree of adherence to these principles, and consequently, our welfare.
Eventually, some, if not most, people came to value these principles in themselves
(i.e. regarding them as of intrinsic values) by learning and probably also by instinct.
The evolution of such commitment enhancing devices as blushing can be fitness-
enhancing; see Frank (1987). Failing to see the ultimate value is a kind of illusion
fostered by learning (I dare not say indoctrination) and perhaps genetics. However, I
personally have great moral respect for people with such illusions. They most prob-
ably make better citizens, friends and colleagues. But illusions they are nevertheless,
at least at the ultimate analytical or critical level. While these illusions are on the
whole positive (in maintaining moral standards), they do have costs, for example, in
delaying the rejection of certain outdated moral principles.
While we recognize the three sources of divergence between welfare and utility
discussed above, it is convenient to ignore the divergence except when we come
to discuss problems (such as merit goods and the materialistic bias; Ng 2003 and
chapters below) where the divergence is important. In other words, in the absence
of specific evidence/considerations to the contrary, we assume that, as a rule, each
individual is the best judge of her own happiness/welfare and chooses to maximize
her welfare. Then the question of happiness/welfare measurability coincides with
that of utility measurability, as discussed in Chap. 6.
One real-world example where the violation of the preferences of people actually
improved their welfare happened decades ago (in mid 1960s) in Singapore under
Lee Kuan Yew’s government. Lee decided to expropriate a piece of land used as a
cemetery for certain public development without sufficient compensation. Existing
tombs there had to be evacuated for reburial elsewhere. Such an excavation is regarded
as an extreme disturbance of the peace of the dead and most survived children would
not take millions of US dollars to accept such excavations. Even if the government
had only to pay a small fraction of the amount people were willing to accept, the
public development would certainly have turned out to involve net negative benefits.
However, I certainly agree with Mr. Lee that the government should look after the
welfare of existing (and future) people rather than that of the dead, even if this has to
be in violation of the preferences of the people now. This welfare-improving decision
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in favour of development would not only certainly fail to pass the traditional cost-
benefit test based on preference, it would also likely fail to pass the public choice
test of democratic voting (also based on preference).
It is interesting to examine why preference fails in this case. First, it is partly due
to the external costs created by the tradition of excessive respect for the ‘peace of
the dead’. An individual failing to show due respect would run the risk of social
disrespect. Some due respect for the dead may serve some useful function but it has
become excessive due to a complex process of interaction, including the individually
rational but socially harmful strategy of pretending to be very respectful. If this
failure can be explained in the traditional analysis in terms of external costs, the
next failure cannot. Secondly, even abstracting away the danger of social disrespect,
individuals may have genuine preference for showing extremely high respect for the
peace of the dead due to cultural influence. They may genuinely feel the importance
of avoiding the excavation of the remains of their ancestors. However, if the decision
for compulsory acquisition was made by the government, they would accept it as
unavoidable and beyond their control and hence would suffer little loss in welfare.
It is thus more than a publicness problem. If the decision were put to a vote, most of
them may feel compelled by the respect for the dead to vote against excavation and
development. However, if the decision were made for them by the government, most
of themwould not feel too distressed. Thus, Lee’s decision almost certainly increased
social welfare despite being against the preferences of the people. (However, this
example has some degree of exceptionality and does not justify autocratic decisions
against the will of people in most cases.)
The Singapore example above is similar to the situation in ancient China (much
less so now, but still applicable to some extent). It was a compelling duty of children
to give a deceased parent a decent burial. Thus, one often reads in novels or watches
in films how a poor man willingly sold himself to become a slave for a few years in
order to give his deceased parent a decent burial. If the prevailing law does not allow
such servitude, such a person will not become a slave, improving his welfare, if not
his preference. If the law allows such a sale, he will feel unease without giving his
parent a decent burial; if the law does not allow it, he will regard it as beyond his
option and will have to contend with a simple burial, without much misgiving.
An interesting question arises as to the way we should classify the second factor
accounting for the divergence between preference and welfare discussed above,
according to our tripartite classification (imperfect knowledge, concern for the
welfare of others, and imperfect rationality). It may be thought that, provided we
include the dead under ‘others’, it should be classified as a concern for the welfare of
others. However, until we have more evidence to convince us otherwise, I think that
the dead are not capable of having welfare. Hence, it should be classified as imperfect
rationality. According to our definition of rationality, it is not (perfectly) rational to
have respect for the dead over and above contribution to the welfare of existing and
future sentients, and apart from such concerns as the fear of social ostracization.
As an individual typically cares greatly about her own happiness, an individual’s
satisfaction with life is highly correlated with her happiness. But, again, as one may
also care about one’s contribution to others, the two may differ, as further discussed
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in Chap. 4.Many researchers use subjectivewell-being (SWB) as encompassing both
happiness and life satisfaction (e.g. Adler 2017, p. 119). This is one of the reasons
that make them think of happiness as multi-dimensional. Throughout this book, I use
SWB or (individual) welfare as synonymous with happiness, and use life satisfaction
separately. I believe this is less confusing and more consistent with the meaning of
the various terms.
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Chapter 3
Some Conceptual Mistakes About
Happiness
Abstract Common mistakes regarding happiness such as: happiness cannot be
uni-dimensionally measured, happiness is relative, (the concept/nature of) happi-
ness differs over different individuals, happiness cannot be cardinally measured and
interpersonally compared (more in Chap. 5), etc. are refuted by considering the
evolutionary origin of happiness.
3.1 Why Do We Have Happiness?
Since, by definition, happiness is a subjective affective feeling, onemust be conscious
to be capable of happiness or unhappiness. A necessary condition for consciousness
is being alive. But being alive is not sufficient for being conscious. Living things are
defined by the capacity for reproduction. A species may be able to reproduce without
the capacity for consciousness.
Consciousness is a principal function of a (sufficiently advanced) brain. For
humans, while our brain accounts for about 2–3% of our body weight, it consumes
no less than 20% of our total energy consumption (and 85% of that of a sleeping
newborn baby). Though many of our brain functions are at the sub-conscious or
non-conscious levels, it is clear that consciousness must also be energy-requiring if
not more so than our sub/non-conscious functions. We lose consciousness when our
brain is not sufficiently supplied with blood. Thus, consciousness must contribute to
fitness (for survival and reproduction) and this contribution must more than offset
its disproportionate energy requirement for it to survive natural selection (or God’s
economizing).
How does consciousness contribute to fitness of the organism? It can do so only
by affecting its activities. For example, if you are conscious of the imminent attack
of a tiger but take no action to run away, such consciousness does not contribute
to fitness. But why do we have consciousness that require a lot of energy, and have
consciousness that affect activities?Why do we not directly affect the required activ-
ities (like running away) without the interim stage of consciousness? These direct
actions/reactions are probably true for many lower forms of animals. It is also true for
our reflex actions like the arm withdrawal reflex when our fingers are burned. This
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is the function of our spinal cord. The withdrawal happened before our conscious
awareness of the withdrawal. Since actions without the mediation of consciousness
are clearly feasible, why do we have consciousness then?
The answer is that for complex enough situations, evolution does not know in
advance what actions are good for fitness. For the arm withdrawal reflex, in virtually
99.99% of cases, the best response is to withdraw. Thus, hard-wired arm withdrawal
without the mediation of consciousness is best for fitness here. However, the same
may not be true formore complex situations.Moreover, the evolution ofmore species
made the environment more complex and hence made simple hard-wired behavioral
patterns less fitness appropriate. In a complex situation, the number of all possible
combinations of different factors that may affect the appropriate action is astronom-
ical. It thus became too costly to program all the appropriate actions for the huge
number of different possible contingencies.
No one knows how consciousness evolved from living things without conscious-
ness. In fact, no one knows how consciousness is possible at all. This hard problem
of ‘from the material to the mental’ is called the world knot and has been debated
for more than a thousand years without conclusion. Two and a half decades ago,
a well-known philosopher, Dennett (1995) published a book called Consciousness
Explained. The title was probably made by the publishers instead of the author. I
doubt that Dennett himself was arrogant enough to believe that he had consciousness
explained. The title is eye-catching. I read and understand the whole book without
having consciousness explained to me by even 0.01%! (Not counting our intuitive
grasp of what consciousness is without already doing any reading.) Of course, I
myself cannot explain it by even 0.000001%.
Once consciousness emerges, it serves the important function of making flexible
choices. Instead of just relying on purely hard-wired instincts, on-the-spot decisions
after the sizing up of the situation may also play a role. For example, if you see
another animal, you may decide whether to ‘fight’, so that if you win, you get to eat
it to enhance your survival; or ‘flight’ to avoid being eaten up yourself. This increases
the fitness of those species capable of such conscious choices, especially when the
environments became more complex. However, how did evolution/God ensure that
conscious species use their conscious capacity to increase rather than decrease their
fitness? This was achieved by endowing the conscious species capable of flexible
choices to have affective feelings of happiness and unhappiness, pleasure and pain,
or enjoyment and suffering. Activities consistent with survival and reproduction are
rewarded with pleasure; opposite activities are penalized with pain. Thus, we find
fresh, nutritious food very tasty, especially whenwe are hungry. Themaximization of
net happiness (excess of pleasure over pain) then serves as the criterion for a trade-off
between different activities and motives, making pleasure the ‘common currency’
(Cabanac 1992); see also (Broom 2001; Ng 1995) on the evolution of pleasure and
pain. From this, we may also infer that dogs, cats, and many other animals (all those
capable of making flexible choices) also enjoy eating when hungry. Not only is
interpersonal comparison of happiness possible (though with difficulties if precision
is required), even interspecies comparison is also possible. (For more details, see Ng
1995, 2015; Carpendale 2015.)
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On the other hand, the emergence of more species capable of making flexible
choices made the environment more complex. This further created a pressure for the
evolution of more rational species. This virtuous cycle partly (but still inadequately)
explains the fast evolution on Earth to the level of Homo sapiens from non-living
things in no more than about 4 billion years (Ng 1996).
My argument more than a quarter century ago, as outlined briefly above, has been
supported by recent studies on the emergence of consciousness and affective feelings
(‘affective neuroscience’), which show that fundamentally similar brain structures
support affective reactions in both animals (from amniotes to primates) and humans
(e.g. Mashour and Alkire 2013; Blakemore and Vuilleumier 2017). ‘There is now
abundant experimental evidence indicating that all mammals (possibly many other
vertebrates; in fact even invertebrates like crayfish have been found to have worries;
see Fossat et al. 2014) have negatively and positively-valenced emotional networks
concentrated in homologous brain regions that mediate affective experiences when
animals are emotionally aroused. … These brain circuits are situated in homologous
subcortical brain regions in all vertebrates tested. Thus, if one activates FEAR arousal
circuits in rats, cats or primates, all exhibit similar fear responses’ (Panksepp 2011;
Abstract; see also Berridge and Kringelbach 2011; Jorge and Vuilleumier 2013;
Lewis et al. 2014; Rickard and Vella-Brodrick 2014).
Knowing the evolutionary-biological basis of our capability for happiness helps
us to understand happiness issuesmore deeply and helps us avoid some very common
mistakes about happiness, as discussed in the next section.
3.2 Common Mistakes About Happiness
With our concept of happiness or welfare clarified, we now consider some common
mistakes. First, many people, including happiness researchers, believe that happiness
ismulti-dimensional and cannot be reduced to, andmeasured in a single dimension. It
must be conceded that a variety of factors affect happiness; the multi-dimensionality
of happiness in this sense is clearly valid. Also, even happy feelings themselves may
differ greatly. For one thing, our sense of deliciousness in taste is quite different from
our sense of beauty in sight, and similarly for other different senses. Philosophers
call them different qualia. The mistake concerns only the point that different happy
feelings cannot be reduced into a single dimension to be comparable in terms of total
amount, e.g. ‘happiness is multi-dimensional and may not be fully assessed by one
measure’ (Holder and Klassen 2010, p. 426).
The saying ‘you cannot compare apples and pears’ has of course some validity.
For example, youmay be able to compare apples and pears in weight, but people care
not just about their weights but also their prices, their tastes, their nutritional values,
etc. Moreover, different individuals have different preferences in these factors. Thus,
in this sense, saying that ‘you cannot compare apples and pears’ is correct, at least
to some extent. However, we must not be absolute in this and regard apples and
pears (or some other two items) as totally incomparable. Given a specific aspect
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of interest, and given sufficient information, we can compare apples and pears. For
example, if we just want to compare their relative nutritional values per dollar worth,
we can do the comparison if we have enough information about their prices per kg
and nutritional values per kg.
Similarly, different happy (and unhappy) feelings may be compared in terms
of their significance for total happiness. Our definition of happiness above is one
dimensional. For any given interval of time, the (net) happiness of an individual is
measured uni-dimensionally by the areas above the line of neutrality minus the areas
below that line, as illustrated in Fig. 1 discussed above (Chap. 1). A question arises
as to whether an individual really can compare her different affective feelings in a
single dimension, such as illustrated in Fig. 1. That an individual must largely be
able (but subject to some imperfection as is true for all capabilities) to make such
a comparison is ensured by the evolutionary origin of happiness, discussed in the
previous section.
An individual in a species capable of flexible choice is often confronted with an
either-or choice. If pleasure and pain are to guidefitnessmaximization, different types
of such affective feelings must be capable of being translated into a uni-dimensional
scale to allow comparison and choice consistent with fitness maximization. The
pleasure of eating and that of having sex may be quite different in qualia, but an
individual or a fox has to be able to compare them in a one-dimensional scale to
guide the choice between fighting for mating with a female and chasing to eat a
chicken. A lexicographical ordering like sex before food will not do. When you are
too hungry, you cannot perform in sex! Food before sex will also not do; when you
are not too hungry, forgoing a good opportunity tomatemay reduce your fitnessmore
than forgoing a meal. As the degree of hungriness varies continuously, you must be
able to compare on a one-dimensional scale to choose in a way consistent with fitness
maximization. What contributes to fitness (survival and reproduction) more should
also yieldmore happiness to ensure that choices based onwelfaremaximization by an
individual of a rational species are also roughly consistent with fitness maximization
(Ng 1995, 2015).
The second common but questionable concept is that ‘happiness is relative’. This
is correct in some sense as happiness is affected by relative comparison. However,
many believe that “the state of ‘happiness’ [itself] is relative” (Chester 2008), which
makes the scientific study of happiness almost impossible, if such beliefs are strictly
adhered to. A similarly questionable belief is that happiness and/or ‘the concept of
happiness differs from person to person’ (Guillen-Royo and Velazco 2012, p. 264);
see also McGregor and Goldsmith (1998), Uchida (2010).
Consider, ‘When younger, happiness stems more from excitement; however, as
one gets older, happiness stems more from feeling peaceful’ (Mogilner et al. 2011).
Moagilner interprets this as evidence for the ‘Shifting Meaning of Happiness’.
However, it is just that the factors affecting one’s happiness may differ for different
people with the passage of time and age.
This interesting finding of Mogilner et al. is likely to be universal as well and the
reason is likely to be biological. As shown byNg (1991), due to the cumulative nature
of knowledge, it is more important for the young to learn more as their accumulated
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knowledge is still relatively low and the added knowledge could be used longer;
due to the complementarity nature of learning and being adventurous, it is more
important for the young to be willing to be adventurous and risk-taking. Thus, we
are programmed to derive high happiness from the excitement of taking adventures
and risks when young. When we are old, learning is no longer very important; it is
then more important to avoid risks and hence, older people derive more happiness
from peacefulness.
Even within a species like Homo sapiens, due to differences in individual consti-
tution, experience, culture, education, etc., different individuals may achieve happi-
ness differently and the same factors may affect the happiness of different indi-
viduals differently. However, even in this respect, individual differences have been
exaggerated. Thus, after reviewing substantial research results, a veteran happiness
researcher (Veenhoven 2010a, p. 617) concludes, ‘These findings fit the theory that
happiness depends very much on the degree to which living conditions fit universal
human needs (liveability theory). They do not fit the theory that happiness depends
on culturally variable wants (comparison theory) or that happiness is geared by
cultural-specific ideas about life (folklore theory).’ (Italics original; bold and under-
line added; see also (Veenhoven 2010b)). Similarly, the finding on the importance
of good government for happiness ‘is apparently independent of culture’ (Ott 2010);
the same is true for many other aspects of happiness (e.g. Agbo and Ome 2017).
Another piece of evidence in favour of universality and that cultural differences
are not that important is that the many differences between immigrants and local
residents are largely reduced, if not eliminated, in just one generation (Yann et al.
2010). Esser (2006, p. 38) concludes that ‘the second generation [of immigrants]
virtually makes a jump to assimilation … and this finding is stable across all immi-
grant groups, all cohorts and all periodic fluctuations.’ Different but relatedmeasures
also show similar cross-country similarity (e.g. see Torsheim et al. 2012). It is thus
unsurprising that, ‘Even if we classify individual affective feelings into different
classes such as instinctive, social, and we-world, total happiness may still be repre-
sented uni-dimensionally’ (Yu and Jiang 2012, p. 977, note 14; 于席正&江莉莉
2012). Also, empirically, ‘There is increasing evidence that uni-dimensional well-
being models often report comparable and sometimes better fit to multi-dimensional
and hierarchical models’ (Burns 2020, Abstract).
As different members of the same species, we share many basic biological simi-
larities, including what make us happy and unhappy. Strictly speaking, it is also a
mistake (but a lesser one) to say that happiness is relative. Happiness and unhappi-
ness/pain are absolute. However, relative standing, comparisons both to others and
to one’s own past, and adaptation are very important in affecting happiness, leading
people to misleadingly say that ‘happiness is relative’. These and other important
factors affecting happiness are discussed further in later chapters. Other question-
able beliefs such as happiness is not measurable, happiness cannot be cardinally
measured, happiness is not interpersonally comparable are discussed in Chap. 6.
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Chapter 4
Happiness or Life Satisfaction?
Abstract Life satisfaction is likely to be more (than happiness) liable to be affected
by shifts in the aspiration level, reducing the comparability of the resulting indices.
Life satisfaction and/or preference may differ from happiness due to a positive valu-
ation on the contribution to or a concern for the happiness of others. In the presence
of such a divergence, levels of life satisfaction may be misleading.
While not denying the usefulness of different concepts like life satisfaction and
subjective well-being, this chapter argues that happiness should be preferred in most
cases, particularly with respect to what individuals and the society should really be
interested in ultimately. Life satisfaction is more liable to a shift in the aspiration
level, reducing the comparability of the resulting indices (e.g. Keller 2019). Life
satisfaction and/or preference may also differ from happiness due to a concern for
the happiness of others. [In the next chapter, a moral philosophical argument in
favour of happiness as the only rational ultimate objective is given. All proposed
qualifications to this principle can be explained by the effects on the happiness in the
future or of others (hence really no qualification) or that their apparent acceptability is
due to our imperfect rationality. In Chap. 6, simple ways to improve the accuracy and
interpersonal and intertemporal comparability of happiness measurement include
using happiness instead of life satisfaction (or other concepts), pinning down the
dividing line of the zero amount of net happiness, using an interpersonally valid unit
based on the just perceivable increment of happiness, and the complementary use of
this method for small samples and the traditional methods for large samples.]
As defined above, our concept of happiness (or SWB or welfare) is subjective
(‘hedonic’ in the philosophical sense), rather than attitudinal, as is the concept of
life satisfaction. In other words, it is what one actually feels good (and minus the
bad feelings to get ‘net happiness’), irrespective of what one regards. Some authors
define happiness or SWB as inclusive of the attitudinal aspect.1 In my view, it is less
1 For example, Sumner (1996) advance an authentic (informed and autonomous) happiness theory
of well-being that has been hotly debated (e.g. Bognar 2010; Tupa 2010; Petersen andRyberg 2014).
Feldman (2004) advances an ‘intrinsic attitudinal hedonism’ theory of the good life. The intrinsic
vs. extrinsic distinction becomes irrelevant if we dispense with the ‘attitudinal’ requirement and go
for happiness in the sense of feeling rather than life satisfaction.
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confusing to call such attitudinal concepts of ‘happiness’ as life satisfaction. Even
with the appropriate terminology, there is still the question of which one is more
appropriate or important.
We do not have to choose only one of the two and give up the other. Different
concepts may serve different purposes and be appropriate or important in different
issues. For example, a political party concerned with election victory may be more
concerned with people’s preference than their welfare, and may thus be more inter-
ested in their life satisfaction than their actual feeling of happiness. A statesman
or philosopher concerned with people’s true welfare may find happiness more rele-
vant than life satisfaction. Also, sincewe should be concernedwith long-termwelfare
than just the short-term ones, we should also recognize that life satisfaction nowmay
affect happiness in the future. If we abstract from this consideration of effects on
future values, or take both concepts (happiness vs. life satisfaction) as both the long-
term or a-temporal ones, there are at least two important considerations that make
happiness the intrinsically more important concept than life satisfaction. Happiness
should be preferred in most cases and particularly with respect to what individuals
and the society should really be interested in ultimately. This is related to normative
valuation and different persons may have different views. It is difficult if not impos-
sible to have full agreement here. Nevertheless, the views expressed here may be
persuasive to some readers. In particular, the two problems of using life satisfaction
are discussed in this chapter and the point that it is happiness that is of intrinsic value
ultimately is argued in the next chapter.
Since happiness is the ultimate objective in life for most people (and argued to
be the only thing of intrinsic value ultimately in the next chapter), life satisfaction
is very closely related to happiness. This is supported by the fact that surveys give
very similar results whether happiness or life satisfaction is used. However, life
satisfaction may yet differ from happiness. Here, we are not concerned with the
practical difficulties both from the researcher side and from the side of the subjects
in measuring and in forming judgements regarding happiness and life satisfaction,
especially the later. It is well-known that such judgments ‘are constructions drawn
on the spot on the basis of currently available information and circumstances, and
thus they are highly unstable and sensitive to changes in the context of inquiry’
(Alexandrova 2005, p. 303; also Stundziene 2019). As summarized by Schwarz and
Strack (1999), such reports vary with the order of the questions asked, the time
of inquiry, the mood of the subject, etc. This unreliability is probably the main
reason why Kahneman (1999) prefers the use of ‘objective’ (a somewhat misleading
term since happiness itself is subjective by nature; better understood as ‘objectively
measured’) happiness,measuredby the temporal integral ofmoment-basedhappiness
reports. Here, especially for this and the next paragraphs, the practical problems of
reporting and measurement inaccuracy are abstracted away. (For a meta-study of
reliability, see Vassar 2008.) Also, Haybron (2007) argue convincingly that ‘our
attitudes toward our lives can reflect various virtues and vices, such as gratitude,
fortitude, ambition, pride, complacency, smugness, softness, low self-regard, etc.’
(p.107) and are rather arbitrarily affected by the norm and perspective taken. Even
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in the absence of these difficulties, happiness and life satisfaction in themselves may
still differ.2
For simplicity, consider a simply hypothetical example of 1,000 individuals. (Like
Einstein’s thought experiments, such examples need not be realistic. In fact, delib-
erate exaggeration from reality is made to drive home the point.) All individuals
believe that the only ultimately valuable thing is happiness. However, they are not
self-centred and care also for the happiness of other individuals. Thus, they do not just
pursue their own happiness but also try to do things that can increase the happiness
of others. Evolutionary biology suggests that we are probably so programmed as our
sociability is a trait that increases our fitness for survival and reproduction. In fact,
even the gene that gives those who possess it a high in helping others has been found;
see Bachner-Melman et al., 2005.3 This, however, does not negate the importance
of upbringing and social influences. On some insights on happiness issues from the
evolutionary biological perspective, see Ng 2015. Then it is hypothetically possible
for the following extreme case (exaggerated to emphasize the point) to happen.
Each individual sacrifices much time, effort, and happiness to do something
believed to be good for the society. Due to ignorance, unlucky events, etc., their
admirable effort does not pay off. They all end up really unhappy (negative affective
feelings more than offset positive ones in aggregate) despite some positive feelings
of doing something good for the society. If anyone of them is asked how happy
they are, each will say fairly unhappy. However, if asked for life satisfaction, each
may say reasonably satisfied, because each believe that what she has done for the
society makes her life worthwhile. She is so much satisfied with doing something
good for the society that this offsets her own unhappiness. This feeling itself is likely
to increase her happiness, but not by enough to make the net happiness positive.
For example, suppose that A, one of these individuals, believes that her good
work increases the happiness of each and every other individual by 10 (what unit
happiness is measured in is irrelevant to the point being made here; the measurability
and interpersonal comparability of happiness are discussed in Chap. 5), giving a total
contribution of 9990 to others. This belief increases her net happiness from minus
100 to minus 30. Though she is still unhappy in her own subjective feelings, she
thinks that her life is worthy as she has contributed 9990 to the happiness of others.
If asked about life satisfaction, she may well say that she is satisfied, though she
also says that her happiness is negative. If all the 1,000 individuals are in somewhat
similar situations like A, we may get a high degree of life satisfaction and low
happiness. Since happiness is really all these individuals ultimately value, the index
of life satisfaction may well be misleading in such cases where the two diverge
significantly from each other. In this example, the divergence is partly due to the
existence of altruism. Other things being equal, the higher the degree of altruism, the
larger is the potential divergence between happiness and life satisfaction.
2 Thus our argument here resonates with Haybron’s point that ‘Life satisfaction in inherently ill-
suited to serve as a proxy for well-being’ (p. 113). Certain peoples, like the Australian aborigines,
may be easier satisfied with life for any given level of happiness; see Biddle (2014).
3 On the two-way causality of volunteering and happiness, see Lawton et al. (2020).
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There is another problem with the concept and measurement of life satisfaction.
Though this problem also applies to those of happiness and subjective well-being,
the extent of the problem is more serious for life satisfaction. Consider the finding
that the average index of life satisfaction for a country such as the U.S. has remained
largely unchanged over the last seventy years or so. Can we really be confident that
happiness has not increased? Consider a popular method of obtaining the index of
life satisfaction. A subject is asked to rate her own index of life satisfaction from
the range 0–10, with 0 signifies the least satisfied life and 10 the most satisfied life,
taking everything into account. The average index of a country may have remained at
say 7. However, it is possible that people fifty years ago were more moderate in their
aspiration not only in terms of objective things like income or consumption levels,
but also more moderate in terms of subjective happiness. For simplicity, suppose we
can use an interpersonal and intertemporal comparable unit of happiness (on which
see Chap. 5). Suppose that an average person fifty years ago enjoyed a net happiness
level of 700 units and rated herself a life satisfaction index of 7. Now, suppose that
an average person enjoys a net happiness level of 1,400 units but still rates herself
a life satisfaction index of 7, since her aspired level of happiness is much higher.
If so, then an unchanged life satisfaction index may actually hide a doubling in net
happiness level. (For some evidence of such a shifting standard and the discussion
of related issues, see Hagerty 2003 and Diener and Lucas 2001.)
The above problem may also exist even if the concept of happiness or subjective
well-being is used instead, at least for most methods of measurement used currently,
including the 0–10 or 0–100 self-anchoring scale. Even if subjects are asked to tick
either one of say: very happy, pretty happy, not too happy, and unhappy, the same
problem exists. Thus, it may be the case that, people now typically report themselves
as ‘pretty happy’ if their net happiness level is within say the range of 600 to 800
units, while people fifty years ago typically report themselves as ‘very happy’ for the
same range. However, it is likely that, using the concept of life satisfaction makes
this problem of changing subjective aspiration more pronounced. This is so because
‘satisfaction’ is more a concept of relative gratification in relation to the aspiration
level. Happiness and subjective well-being are less so, though not completely.
Let me illustrate the point by reporting on the actual situation of a person I know
best, myself. For simplicity and to isolate the current issue from the previous issue of
the effect of contribution to the happiness of others in affecting one’s life satisfaction,
let us abstract away any effect on others. If asked to rate my happiness and life
satisfaction levels nowwithin the scale of 0–10, I will probably rate both as 9 and tick
the box ‘very happy’. If I am also asked now to ratemy happiness and life satisfaction
levels four decades ago, I will give 6 to happiness level but 8 to life satisfaction.
Since I am the same person who experienced my happiness and life satisfaction
both now and four decades ago, subject to some imperfection in recollection, I can
compare these levels cardinally.4 (Despite my age, I still have a good memory; I can
still recite many poems, some of many hundred words each.) Thus, I can confidently
4 Seidlitz and Diener (1993) found that memory deteriorated proportionally for both positive and
negative events over a one-year interval. Assuming that this is true for longer period, my current
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say that my (net) happiness level now is at least four times that of four decades ago.
I may well be inaccurate in my memory but this does not affect the argument here. A
change in the correct multiple to 3 or 6 does not change the point to be made. Taking
the mid point 5 to be a level of zero net happiness, putting my net happiness level
four decades ago as 6 and the current level as 9 provides a roughly correct reflection
of the fourfold difference. [ (9–5) = 4 (6–5).] While I am also more satisfied with
life now than four decades ago, the increase is certainly much less than doubled,
not to mention a three or fourfold increase. This difference between the changes
in happiness and in life satisfaction is mainly because four decades ago I was also
fairly satisfied; not having experienced a much higher level of happiness, I was fairly
satisfied with a net happiness level I now describe as 6. The value of 8 is a good
description of my level of life satisfaction then compared to the value of 9 now. But
this small increase from 8 to 9 in life satisfaction hides the actual larger than three
or fourfold increase in happiness.
Though I now putmy net happiness level four decades ago as 6 andmy level of life
satisfaction then as 8, if I were asked four decades ago for reports on the situation at
that time, I would probably have reported 8 for both happiness and life satisfaction.
I now describe that lower happiness level as 6 only in comparison to my current
much higher happiness level. If we normalize the amount of my (net) happiness four
decades ago as 100 (in some subjective unit, not out of 10), my happiness amount
now is 400. Suppose my happiness level were to decrease back to 100 five years from
now in 2025. If someone asks me in 2025, I will probably report my happiness level
as 6 and life satisfaction as also 6. Having experienced the high happiness level at
400, the same level of happiness of 100 that would led me to report a life satisfaction
of 8 four decades ago, will in 2025 lead me to report a life satisfaction of only 6.
A more important point is this. If my happiness level will be 150 in 2025, I will
probably report in 2025 that my happiness level as 6.5 and my life satisfaction level
as also 6.5. The crucial comparison now is: Would I prefer:
• X. A life like me four decades ago with a happiness amount of 100 (reported at
that time as 8, but reported now as 6) and a life satisfaction of 8; or
• Y. A life like me in 2025 with a happiness amount of 150 (reported as 6.5) and a
life satisfaction of 6.5?
It is absolutely clear to me that I will have not the slightest hesitation in choosing
Y, due to its 50%higher amount of happiness (150 over the figure of 100 inX), despite
its lower figure of life satisfaction (6.5 in Y vs. 8 in X). It is true that, being less
satisfied with life in Y than in X should itself reduces the happiness in Y somewhat.
However, this effect should have already been taken into account in the happiness
figure of 150 that should be inclusive of all affective feelings, including the happy
or unhappy feeling in evaluating the life satisfaction. Happiness is the net sum total
judgments of past happinessmay be quite reliable. See, however,Hagerty (2003) on somedifficulties
of intertemporal judgments of happiness and life satisfaction.
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of all such affective feelings that are valuable to the individual. Thus, the happiness
index is more appropriate than the life satisfaction index. (More on this in Chap. 5.)5
In the above example concerningmyself, the happiness and life satisfaction indices
reported contemporarily are the same (8 and 8 four decades ago; 9 and 9 now;
etc.). However, cases where the two diverge contemporarily may also be possible.
Consider this likely possible though hypothetical example. Consider a fairly happy
(amount of happiness = 100) and ambitious young man who reported a happiness
level of 7 and life satisfaction of 6 (as his ambition for much higher achievements
had far from being realized). Twenty years later, he has experienced much real-
life problems and has also come to know many miseries of others, etc. His own
happiness amount drops from 100 to 50. He then reports his happiness as 6 but
his life satisfaction as 7. His life satisfaction index goes up despite a drop in the
actual happiness amount and the reported level because of a much lower level of
ambition. The crucial question is: If you have the chance to live only one of these
two periods of his life, which one would you want? The earlier one with higher
happiness and lower life satisfaction, or the later one with lower happiness but higher
life satisfaction? I believe that most people, myself included, will choose the former.
The answer to this question largely depends on whether one takes happiness or life
satisfaction to be intrinsically valuable, ultimately speaking. The next chapter argues
for happiness as the only intrinsic value. Also, by taking psychological happiness
in the sense of feeling good instead of life satisfaction or ‘attitudinal’ happiness as
of the ultimate value, many controversies in moral philosophy may be resolved; an
example is discussed in Appendix A.
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Chapter 5
Happiness as the Only Intrinsic Value
Abstract As happiness is directly experienced by the individual as valuable, its
normative value needs no additional justification. Things like institutions and moral
principles may be used to promote happiness directly and indirectly. In time, they
may be mistakenly valued for their own sake, while ultimately their values should
be based on their contribution to happiness. We are born, brought up, and socially
influenced to have certain preferences which are largely consistent with our own
happiness. Where they diverge, then apart from the effects on the happiness in the
future and of others (hence really no divergence in the longer/wider perspective
of happiness), ultimately it is happiness that is really consistent with rationality.
Arguments for happiness as the only intrinsic value are made and defended against
objections or opposite arguments (including ‘Rather be unhappy Socrates than a
happy pig’, Kant’s categorical imperatives, Rawls’ maximin, etc.). The apparent
acceptability of these opposing positions is due either to our imperfect rationality
and/or inadequate account on the effects in the future and on others.
Our argument in the previous chapter for preferring happiness when it diverges from
life satisfaction is based on the belief that happiness is ultimately speaking, the only
thing of intrinsic value. After arguing for this in Sect. 5.1, we also consider some
common objections in Sect. 5.2. The non-welfarist position of Kant’s categorical
imperatives and ‘anti-utilitarian’ position of Rawls are criticized in Sects. 5.3 and
5.4 respectively. Further objections are discussed in Appendix B.
5.1 Happiness as the Only Intrinsic Value
A number of reasons may make life satisfaction to diverge from happiness. In the
previous chapter, we discuss a case where a person A may have low or even negative
(net) happiness but yet have high life satisfaction as she believes that she has made
significant contributions towards increasing the happiness of others. Whether this
belief is correct or not, it can be argued that only her happiness, not her life satis-
faction, should be counted in the ultimate social objective. For simplicity, consider
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only the extreme cases where her belief is either entirely correct or entirely wrong.
The intermediate cases are also taken care of by the combination of the arguments
for each of the two pure cases.
If A’s belief is incorrect, she did not actually contribute to raising the happiness
of other individuals. Her belief that she did so may increase her own happiness.
If so, that increased happiness is already counted in the social objective that takes
account of her happiness. If A’s belief is correct, she did contribute to raising the
happiness of other individuals. The higher happiness levels of other individuals from
her contribution are already counted in a social objective function1 that takes account
of the welfare or happiness levels of all individuals. (‘Welfare’ and ‘happiness’ are
used interchangeably as a happiness definition of welfare is adopted.)2 Knowing or
believing that her contribution has made other individuals happier probably makes A
happier. However, A’s happiness level may remain low, though her life satisfaction
level may be fairly high. It should be the low happiness level rather than the high life
satisfaction level that should count towards social welfare. Why?
Suppose a person B does voluntary social work that contributes to the happiness
of say some elderly people. Obviously, the higher happiness levels of these elderly
people count towards social welfare. Moreover, if B himself gets happiness from
the social work and/or from knowing/believing that he contributed to the happiness
of these elderly people, his higher happiness level should also be counted in social
welfare. Thus, it is not the fact that the happiness of other individuals that A helps
to raise has already been included within social welfare that precludes the counting
of the higher life satisfaction of A. It is just that happiness should be counted but
life satisfaction (at least the part that is not based on happiness but on say pure
contribution to others or what may be called non-affective altruism) not; why?
Happiness, either in the form of pleasure of the flesh like eating delicious food
or having sex or in the form of spiritual fulfilment, is what the individual directly
enjoys and hence is inherently valuable to herself. Each and every individual wants
to have a high level of happiness for its own sake. Happiness is valuable in itself.
This is self-evident to anyone. (If fact, this trait of being able to enjoy and suffer is
so important for our survival that individuals completely without this capability are
extremely rare, if they have ever existed.) Thus, we do not need any philosophical
arguments to justify this (that happiness is valuable in itself). However, we do have
to justify the point that, ultimately speaking, only happiness is valuable and that
all other valuable things derive their values ultimately from their contributions to
happiness. This is done below.
1 Any Paretian social welfare (or objective) function is increasing in individual welfare levels. A
utilitarian social welfare function sums all individual welfare levels with equal weights.
2 Welfare has been used in a variety of senses. Here, only the happiness concept of welfare is
used. Even for those who regard welfare as happiness, usually welfare is used to denote longer term
happiness. However, either holding the time period concerned the same or taking account of relevant
effects in the future, we may use welfare and happiness interchangeably, as already remarked in the
text earlier.
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First, it may be pointed out that arguments on what is good, valuable or ought
to be done, etc. belong to the normative sphere.3 In contrast to the positive sphere
where statements/judgmentsmay be either true or false in some objective sense, value
judgments can only be persuasive or not. Thus, it is not logically possible for one to
prove that only happiness is ultimately or intrinsically valuable or to prove the truth
of any other value judgment. One could only try to make the arguments persuasive.
However, noting that different people have different views on such normative issues,
one does not expect complete agreement.
Let us try to see the persuasiveness or even the compellingness of the main point
in a number of steps.4
Step 1: In an isolated world of no affective sentients, nothing is of any normative
significance
Here, an isolated world means a world/universe that is completed isolated from
any other existence in the sense not only of having no informational or any other
flows between it and others but also of having no any causal connections (including
through gravity or any other force) with any other existence. We may conduct our
analysis along the line of Einstein’s thought experiments; the question of realism is
not a relevant issue. One way to imagine this isolated world is to assume that the
real world does not exist. That isolated world is the only existence and hence has
no informational or any other causal connections with others. If the whole world
has no affective sentients from beginning (if there was a beginning) to end (if there
will be an end), it seems clear that nothing is of any normative significance. Here,
affective sentients are beings that are capable of enjoying happiness and/or suffering
pain/unhappiness. Whether that world is getting warmer or colder, more chaotic or
more orderly, etc., nothing will be made better off or worse off. It is of no normative
significance.
Step 2: Other things being equal, it is undesirable to inflict pain/unhappiness;
it is desirable/valuable to have happiness
If pain/unhappiness is inflicted upon some affective sentient beings without anything
desirable, either directly or indirectly, it is clearly undesirable. Similarly, if happiness
can be enjoyedwithout causing anything negative directly or indirectly, it is desirable,
as the affective sentient beings (like us humans) can testify to that, at least in principle.
This does not rule out the possible desirability of pain/unhappiness that leads to more
happiness in the future and/or for others and the possible undesirability of happiness
that leads to more unhappiness in the future and/or for others.
3 I use the term ‘normative’ in its wider sense, being in contrast to ‘positive’ and inclusive of
elements of ‘evaluative’ and ‘prescriptive’.
4 See also Ng (2000b, Sect. 3.3) for the argument that rational individualism implies welfarism.
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Step 3: If something is of normative significance, it must ultimately speaking
be due to some effects on the enjoyment of happiness or the suffering of
pain/unhappiness.
Comparing Steps 1 and 2 above, it can be seen that, if nothing is of any normative
significance in a world of no affective sentients, then in a world with normative
significance, the normative significance must be due, directly or indirectly, to the
affective feelings (happiness and/or unhappiness) of the affective sentients, since
this is the only difference between the two cases.
Consider the situation illustrated in Insert 1 where a host of factors may directly
or indirectly affect the affective feelings (happiness and pain) of sentients. These
factors and doing things that may affect these factors may thus be important or being
of normative significance from Step 2 above. However, if the top box (affective
feelings) does not exist right from the beginning and to eternity, then we are in the
world of Step 1 and nothing is of any normative significance. Thus, in the world
where affective feelings exist and something may be of normative significance, the
normative significance must be based on or due to, at least ultimately speaking, on
the effects on the normatively important affective feelings (top box in Insert 1).
Profits
Cash flows sales Other 





Consider an analogy illustrated in Insert 2 where the final profits of a firm is shown
in the top box. The analogy is not perfect because things other than the final profits
may be significant, even just to the firm (or its owners). Thus, to make the analogy
hold, we have to either assume that things other than profits are not significant, or hold
all other things that may be significant unchanged in the comparison, as indicated
in the top right box. For example, if the firm is concerned with the welfare of its
employees over and above the effects on its final profits, the welfare of its employees
must be among those factors that are held unchanged in our comparison. Apart from
these factors that are held unchanged, many variables may affect the final profits of
the firm directly or indirectly. Assume that, apart from those factors held constant,
the firm is only concerned with its final profits and not, say with its cash flows and
sales except for their effects on profits. (These effects are usually on the future period.
However, to abstract away from the complication of dynamic illustration, we take all
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the effects as occurring simultaneously or in the a-temporal framework of Insert 2.)
Then, any combined changes (e.g. some decrease in cash holding plus some increase
in stock holding) that leave the final profits unchanged must be deemed as equally
desirable and hence of no evaluative consequences to the firm. Changes that are of
consequence must be those that do affect the final profits.
Affec ve feelings
Biological Economic Other 
Myriads of variables 
An exogenous change that increases the sales of the firm is usually of positive
consequence to the final profits. Thus, some middle managers, especially those in
charge of sales,may think it is highly desirable to advertise to increase sales.However,
this endogenous increase has significant costs in the form of advertising outlays. The
top management should know that even a highly effective advertising may not be
desirable if it is too costly. What is desirable or not has to be judged by the net effects
on the final profits. Similarly, for the case of Insert 1, what is normatively desirable
or not has to be judged by the final effects on affective feelings, ultimately speaking.
Step 4: Something that is not in itself happiness or unhappiness but that may
affect happiness or unhappiness either directly or indirectly may also be of
normative significance.
If I surreptitiously put a tasteless poison in your coffee, it may have no effect on your
enjoyment of that cup of coffee. However, if it makes you seriously sick the next day,
it is obviously a bad thing for me to do that, at least if you deserve no punishment
and no other benefits comes from this. More indirectly, telling a certain lie may in
itself cause no or little unhappiness or may even save some embarrassment, but it
may have the indirect undesirable effects of reducing marginally the degree of trust
between people and even the degree of observance of other basic moral principles
in general, and hence may eventually has more negative effects on happiness and is
undesirable as a result.
Step 5: Normative (including moral) principles may be fostered to promote
happiness and/or reduce sufferings or to promote things that may be indirectly
conducive to happiness.
Due to the reliance of the human species on sociability (including cooperation in
hunting) for survival, we have in-born (naturally selected or God-made) abilities
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like the capability to learn languages, the instinct for moral sentiments and outrages,
and even the gene for altruism.5 However, as the human species also has a long
period of childhood for learning, we also rely much on nurture/education, including
learning to observe certain principles such as honesty and refraining from littering.
This learning takes place at home, in schools, and through social contacts. Most of
us benefits greatly from the observance of these principles by most people, largely
speaking. Thus, the peer and social pressures against non-observance are big.
Step 6: The adherence of certain outdated normative principlesmay cause great
sufferings.
As circumstances change, certain previously sensible normative principles may no
longer be conducive to happiness and may even cause great sufferings. Just a single
example suffices to convince. At least in ancient China (for at least a millennium
from the Southern Song Dynasty to the recent Qing Dynasty), it was regarded as
immoral for a woman to marry twice, even after the early death of her husband
(while a man must remarry to have offspring and could even have more than one
wives simultaneously). The long tradition to continue adhering to thismoral principle
cause great sufferings and was the theme of much realistic novels. Very slowly but
eventually, this principle was given up over the early decades of the 1900′s.
Step 7: Just like people may adhere to inappropriate normative principles,
people, including moral philosophers, may inappropriately believe that certain
things are valuable independent of and over and above their contributions to
happiness.
Influenced both by our inborn inclinations (including moral intuitions for equality
and justice) and our upbringings, many people (including learned moral philoso-
phers) may mistakenly believe in the normative significance of things other than
happiness and independent of their contributions to happiness. This is a mistake (in
the normative sense, being inappropriate, unpersuasive, or even wrong, rather than
being false) since it violates Step 3. This may need some elaboration.
Step 3 says that if something is of normative significance, it must ultimately
speaking be due to some effects on the enjoyment of happiness or the suffering
of pain/unhappiness. These include the effects on future happiness/unhappiness
and the effects on the happiness/unhappiness of others, including other individuals
and possibly other affective sentients. When we examine closely normative princi-
ples/arguments supposedly based on considerations independent of happiness, we
can always find that either they are really related, directly or indirectly, to effects on
future happiness or effects on the happiness of others, or that the principles are not
acceptable.6
5 Evolutionary biology suggests that we are probably programmed to be sociable, increasing our
fitness for survival and reproduction. In fact, even the gene that gives those who possess it a high
in helping others has been found; see Bachner-Melman et al. 2005. This, however, does not negate
the importance of upbringing and social influences.
6 Thus, Mill’s distinction of happiness of higher and lower quality is either reducible to quantities
of happiness when the indirect effects on others and in the future are taken into account, or not
really acceptable.
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Our discussion above is analogous to the three levels of ‘chan’ (禅), a Buddhist
teaching on understanding the real world. At the first level, when you see a mountain
(or river), it looks like a mountain (river). At the second level, when you see a
mountain (river), it does not look like a mountain (river). At the third and highest
level, when you see a mountain (river), it still looks like a mountain (river). Here,
recognizing the intrinsic importance of happiness is the first level. Recognizing that
things other than happiness, like knowledge, freedom, justice, morality, etc. are also
important is the second level. Recognizing that why these things are important should
ultimately be due to their contributions to happiness is the third and highest level.
It may be thought that what is of ultimate intrinsic values may be multi-factors or
multi-dimensional and not just confined to happiness. However, if one (or the society,
or any decision maker) has multiple final objectives, one will be in difficulties when
these objectives are in conflict with each other. For example, most people including
I agree that both freedom of speech and non-racism are good principles that we wish
to observe, other things being equal. However, once a radio person made some racist
remark and was fired. Here, the two principles are in conflict. Should one always
observe one that is ranked higher in importance? How to judge? It is not obvious
that non-racism is more important than freedom of speech, or vice versa. My view
that these principles are important only because of their contributions to happiness
allows us a simple way (in principle, though we may still have difficulties in getting
the relevant information) to make decision in the presence of such a conflict of two
or more desirable principles. We should roughly estimate the effects on happiness,
taking all relevant effects into account. In the example above, perhaps if the remark
involves only very slight hint of racism without too much bad effects, perhaps the
anchor person should only be warned instead of fired. Whenever we have a conflict
of two or more desirable principles/rules, we need some higher criterion to guide our
choice. Overall net welfare is the highest criterion that trumps all other principles,
as Little puts it (see the interview of Ian Little by Pattanaik and Salles 2005, p. 364,
368).
However,many people have objection tomywelfare-supremacy view. To consider
all such arguments would require a monograph in itself. Here, let us just consider
some examples that can be discussed and answered together in the next Section.7
5.2 Answering Some Objections
One is the multi-century old argument that it is better to be the unhappy Socrates than
a happy pig. A more modern version of this or a similar argument is the so-called
pleasure or experience-machine argument (Nozick 1974); most people prefer their
less happy current situations than to be hooked up to pleasure machines that will
7 For these and similar arguments, see, e.g. Elster (1983), Sen (1987), Sumner (1996), Jost andShiner
(2002), Brülde (2007), Chekola (2007). For contrasting views, see Silverstein (2000), Feldman
(2004), Tännsjö (2007), Crisp (2006), Haines (2010).
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give them much more machine-induced pleasurable feelings. Another argument is
on the common dis-preference for happiness based on falsehood. An example is a
happy woman whose husband is disloyal to her. These and similar arguments are
apparently very persuasive, making modern welfarists and utilitarians largely prefer-
ence (or attitudinal) utilitarians rather than the classical hedonistic ones. (Welfarism
maximizes social welfare as a function only of individual welfare; utilitarianism
goes for a social welfare function that is just the unweighted, or equally weighted,
sum of individual happiness. Classical utilitarianismmaximizes the unweighted sum
of individual happiness; preference utilitarianism maximizes the unweighted sum of
individual preferences or utilities.) The principle of happiness as the only appropriate
ultimate objective is defended below against these arguments.8
Consider Mr. C. He believes that, in the presence of uncertainty, the appropriate
thing to do is tomaximize the expectedwelfare. (Welfare is used interchangeablywith
net happiness. For simplicity, consider only choices that do not affect the welfare of
others.) Suppose you put C in the privacy of a hotel room with an attractive, young,
and willing lady. C can choose to go to bed with her or not to. C knows that the
former choice involves a small but not negligible risk of contracting AIDS. He also
calculates that the expected welfare of this choice is negative. Nevertheless, he agrees
that, provided the lady is beautiful enough and the risk not too high (though high
enough to reduce his expected welfare), he will choose to go (or fail to abstain going)
to bed with her. This choice of C, though irrational (at least from the welfare point
of view), is far from atypical. Rather, I am confident that it applies to at least 80% of
adult males, the present writer included. Men are genetically programmed to want to
make love to attractive (usually implying healthy) women in their reproductive ages
who have not yet conceived (simultaneously explaining why slimness in waist and
young girls are attractive), since this helps them to pass on their genes.
After the evolution of consciousness to helpmaking choices (like fight or flight) on
the spot by sizing up the situation, evolution (or God) makes sure that consciousness-
guided choices are consistent with fitness (for survival and reproduction) by also
endowing conscious species with affective feelings. So, activities consistent with
fitness (like eating nutritious food when hungry and having sex with reproductive
members of the opposite sex) are rewardedwith pleasures and fitness-reducing activi-
ties (like injuries to the body) are penalizedwith pain. Thus, fitness-consistent choices
are usually also welfare-maximizing choices. However, since the ultimate decisive
factor is fitness, the coincidence is not 100% (Ng 1995). In particular, programming
the organism to be excessively (from the viewpoint of welfare maximization) in
fear of death or to be excessively inclined to mate may be fitness-maximizing. This
explains why aman likeMr. C above will likely choose to have sex with the attractive
girl even if he knows that this reduces his expected welfare. This example suggests
that the choice or preference of a person may not be a perfect guide to what should
ultimately be valuable to her.
8 For hedonistic utilitarianism, one needs the additional unweighted sum of utility/happiness part
not discussed here. It is argued for in Ng (2000b, Chap. 5).
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Should our ultimate objective be happiness or should it be our preference? Pref-
erence may diverge from happiness or welfare for three reasons: a concern for the
welfare of others (possibly including animals), ignorance, and irrationality (or imper-
fect rationality), as discussed in Chap. 10.1007/978-981-33-4972-8_2 above. These
three factors are exhaustive as ‘irrational preference’ is defined to be the preference
against one’s own welfare due neither to ignorance nor a concern for the welfare of
others. Obviously, if the divergence is due to ignorance, happiness should prevail over
preference. If due to a concern for the welfare of others, a distinction should be made
between the individual and the society. It is admirable for an individual to sacrifice her
own happiness for the welfare of others. However, for the society, the social objec-
tive should take account of the welfare of all individuals. (For simplicity, we ignore
animal welfare here; on which see the final Chap. 10.1007/978-981-33-4972-8_15.)
If the divergence is due to irrational preference, it is also clear that happiness should
prevail, since preferences based on irrationality are similar to those based on igno-
rance. For the case of this divergence due to the genetically programmed tendency
to mate, it may be pointed out that our (i.e. persons like you and me) welfare is the
affective feelings that we enjoy over our life time, not that of our genes that ‘aim’
at fitness. We should aim at happiness, not fitness. (The maximization of long-term
welfare requires sufficiently high fitness though.) We are the feeling persons, not the
unfeeling genes. Thus, Mr. C, in his calm and reflective moment, may agree that it
is in his interest to resist going to bed with the attractive lady to avoid contracting
AIDS. However, due to biology, few men can resist successfully in that hotel room.
However, for the ultimate social objective, we should go with his reflective moment
rather the moment he was tempted by the attractive lady in the hotel room; we should
go with our feeling persons, not with the unfeeling genes.
Just as we are born with the excessive inclination to mate, we are also genetically
programmed with certain traits that tend to increase our fitness even if our happiness
may be compromised somewhat, perhaps at the margin. One such trait is our incli-
nation to do things rather than just enjoying existing accomplishments or just enjoy
the stimulation of a pleasure machine. The drive to achieve helps us to increase our
fitness. This drive is also much reinforced by education and social influences. We
find such drives so natural and so important that we do not know that, when such
drives conflict with our happiness, they (usually only at the margin, as too low a drive
level is bad both for fitness and for welfare) are really bad for our true interest, just
like the excessive drive to mate in the case of Mr. C in his hotel room. Thus, while it
may be true that most persons will reject the pleasure machine option offering many
times the amount of happy feelings, the choice of this option (assuming no external
costs on others) is the more rational one, just like the choice of not sleeping with the
lady.
Will I choose the pleasure machine option? Still not, because I believe that I can
contribute to the welfare of others through my work. If I cannot and if hooking up
to the machine will not put anyone in misery, I will in fact gladly choose to hook
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up!9 Similarly, I prefer to be a happy pig rather than be a learned philosopher if my
philosophy cannot help others, directly or indirectly, to increase happiness by a lot
more. My choice may be the exception. However, as explained above, most people
(the present author included) are not perfectly rational due to our genetic programs
and our upbringings.
We are similarly programmed and socially influenced to be curious and want
to find the truth and so on. Thus, our preference for ‘authentic happiness’ or dis-
preference for a happy but deluded life may again be explained by either the effects
on the happiness in the future or of others, or by our imperfectly rational preferences.
For the ultimate social objective, we should go with the rational objective of happi-
ness rather than the imperfectly rational preferences. In fact, it may be argued that it
is a mistake for failing to see that happiness is the only rational ultimate objective and
all supposed qualifications to this can be explained by the effects on the happiness
in the future or of others (hence really no qualification) or that their apparent accept-
ability is due to our imperfectly rational preferences programmed by our genes and
shaped by our upbringings and social interactions. If moral philosophers can see this
fundamental point in ethics, they would probably have no difficulties in accepting
happiness as the only right ultimate moral principle, making most of the muddled
discussion in moral philosophy unnecessary.
This does not deny the value of secondary virtues like truth, autonomy, accom-
plishment, justice, etc. However, it is important to keep in mind that all these virtues
are ultimately based on the effects on happiness. Failure to do so may end up causing
great suffering such as the case of blindly adhering to the moral principle of not
permitting women to marry twice in ancient China discussed above. Injustice is the
denial of due happiness or the undue imposition of unhappiness.10 Why certain denial
is or is not due denial or undue imposition is ultimately also based on the effects on
happiness. However, once secondary virtues/principles are accepted, their violation
may be detrimental to happiness not only due to the direct effects but also due to
indirect effects, including reducing the general adherence to good moral principles
and making those believing in the principles concerned less happy. Viewing happi-
ness as ultimately the only thing of value does not preclude taking all these direct
and indirect effects into account.
Griffin (2007, p. 147) asks, ‘What could be the bridging notion that would allow
us to compare a short life of supreme moral achievement with a long ordinary life?’
A short life of supreme moral achievement (safeguarding the country in Griffin’s
example) may be more valuable, but only because it helps others to achieve more
happiness, both directly in safeguarding the country and in setting a good example for
virtuous and courageous acts. Accepting happiness as the only ultimately valuable
9 The amount of happiness from the pleasure machine has to be very, very large for it to be worth-
while for all individuals to hook up if that means no further advance in knowledge, science, and
technology which may help to increase the happiness of our grandchildren very spectacularly; see
Chap. 10.1007/978-981-33-4972-8_12.
10 Ian Little goes as far as saying not only that happiness is the final criterion but also that happiness
or ‘welfare can trump justice’ (see the interview of Ian Little by Pattanaik and Salles 2005, p. 364,
368).
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thing allows us (subject to practical difficulties of estimating the quantitative effects)
to compare different secondary values and to make the logical choice when different
secondary principles are in conflict.11
Most, if not all, objections to happiness as the only ultimate value ignore the
effects on others and in the future. For example, consider Hausman’s (2010, p. 336)
objection: ‘A crucial problem with the proposal to diminish the time people spend
doing things they find unpleasant is that a myopic policy of maximizing current net
pleasure is no more likely to maximize net pleasure over a lifetime than is a policy
of maximizing weekly profits likely to maximize profits over a decade.’ Obviously,
if adequate effects on the future and on others are taken into account, maximizing
(net) happiness is not open to such objections.
The above argues in favour of happinessmainly against preference (as the ultimate
objective). However, the difference between happiness and life satisfaction and that
between happiness and preference are very similar. Thus, our argument in favour of
happiness against preference can also be used to argue in favour of happiness against
life satisfaction where the two differ.
5.3 Rejecting Kant’s Categorical Imperatives
Our welfarist position that ultimately only welfare or happiness is of intrinsic value
is different or even inconsistent with some other moral philosophical positions, espe-
cially the Kantian. While this is not a place to provide a full refutation of these alter-
native positions, I will just briefly explain that welfarism/utilitarianism is not incon-
sistent with the valid parts in Kant (e.g. universalizability; treating humanity not as
mere means); and those parts in Kant not consistent with welfarism/utilitarianism are
not acceptable (e.g. disclosing the hiding place of potential victims to a murderer).
For simplicity, we ignore the difference between utility and welfare discussed in
Chap. 2 above.
If you want to quench your thirst, you have to drink something. Drinking some-
thing is then a conditional imperative, being conditional on wanting to quench your
thirst. A categorical imperative is not conditional on anything; it is something you
must do (morally speaking) unconditionally. Accepting some imperatives or moral
11 Our pure happiness theory also avoids many asymmetrical positions difficult to sustain. For
example, among others, Brülde (2007) argue against the pure happiness theory based, in my view,
either on effects on others or the future or on unacceptable grounds. However, he concludes, ‘The
pure (unmodified) happiness theory is not a plausible theory of the good life, but it may well be a
plausible theory of the bad life” (p. 47). Such asymmetries are difficult to justify. If a happy life
may not be good due either to the detrimental effects on others and the future (which I accept as a
valid reason but not inconsistent with the pure happiness theory) or to the violation of some princi-
ples/virtues not based on happiness (which I reject), then it seems that we should also symmetrically
have the result that a miserable life may not be bad due to the favourable effects on the happiness of
others and/or the future or due to the observance of some principles/virtues not based on happiness.
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principles categorically irrespective of their welfare consequences may certainly be
inconsistent with welfarism, as discussed below with reference to Kant.
I have no qualm with Kant’s first formulation of universalizability: ‘Act only
according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should
become a universal law.’ (Kant 1785/1993, p. 30; 4:421). Obviously, it is also consis-
tent with welfarism and utilitarianism. Each individual utility or welfare value has
the same significance with any anonymous SWF (social welfare function). Since
welfarism/utilitarianism does not rule out but rather requires anonymity, there is no
inconsistency with universalizability.
Now consider Kant’s second formulation of humanity: ‘Act in such a way that
you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never
merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end’ (Kant 1785/1993,
p. 36; 4: 429). The consistency of this with welfarism is ambiguous, depending on
interpretation.
Kant’s imperative of ‘nomeremeans for humanity’maybe interpreted in amorally
compelling way and as being consistent with welfarism. The central part of treating
any person ‘never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end’
is certainly consistent with welfarism. Welfarism requires that the utility of each and
every individual should enter into the SWF (i.e. is taken into account of) positively.
This is inconsistent with treating a person as a mere means, not also as an end. If
person is a mere means, his utility does not enter the SWF directly but may only
affect social welfare by contributing (as a means) to the utility levels of some other
individuals that enter the SWF. Welfarism requires the consideration of the utility of
each and every person. We may use a pencil as a mere means. We may also use a
person as a means to achieve something, but in doing so, we must also consider her
feeling. If we use her as a mere means, not as also an end, then we do not need to
consider her feeling, just like we do not have to consider the feeling of a pencil.
In fact, for this compelling part of ‘never merely as a means to an end, but always
at the same time as an end’, I would go beyond humanity and include all sentients
capable of welfare (enjoyment and suffering). Animal welfare should be a part of
human morality, as discussed in the final Chap. 15.
Both Kant and many interpreters of Kant went beyond the above compelling part
of ‘not merely a means’. Without entering into a full discussion, I will just mention
two points quickly.
First, from his categorical imperative, Kant derived some moral principles too
absolutely, to the disregard of possible huge welfare losses. One clearly unaccept-
able example is Kant’s insistence that ‘To be truthful (honest) in all declarations is
therefore a sacred unconditional command of reason, and not to be limited by any
expediency’ (Kant 1799; last page), even to an intended murderer about the hiding
place of the potential victim. Kant made this clearly absolute imperative in his reply
to Benjamin Constant’s criticism. Most people, myself clearly included, find this
unacceptable.
One reason that led Kant astray is his mistaken all-or-nothing reasoning. This
happened in many of his arguments. Just one simple example here. In his argument
against stealing, Kant considered the moral proposition that it is permissible to steal.
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He argued that this proposition would result in a contradiction upon universalization.
The concept of stealing itself presupposes the existence of private property rights.
However, the universalization of stealing would lead to no property rights, leading to
a logical contradiction. This reasoning is based on contrasting only the two opposite
extremes of free stealing for all and absolutely no stealing in any circumstances.
In the real world, we are always in-between these two non-existent extremes. Most
morally upright personswould avoid stealing as far as possible, butmay be compelled
to steal if that is the only way, say, to avoid starvation of his children to death. Such
a morality that allows stealing in some extreme circumstances does not end us up
with complete absence of property rights. (For a similar mistake of all-or-nothing
comparison by aNobel laureate ending upwith the gravemistake against the sensible
taxation of pollution, see Ng 2007.)
Secondly, considering some real-world examples where the observance of some
categorical imperatives has ended up in dismal situationsmay illustrate the unaccept-
ability of sticking to some imperatives without regard to their welfare consequences.
As already discussed above, in ancient China, for nearly a thousand years since the
Southern Song dynasty in the twelfth century, people virtually universally believed
in the categorical imperative that ‘one woman should not serve two men/husbands’.
This does not just mean that a woman should not marry two husbands at the same
time. Rather, it means that, once a woman is married to a man, she should not marry
again even after the death of her husband, and even if the death occurs at the wedding
night, after the ceremony but before real consummation of the marriage. This imper-
ative or principle was dictated by the sacred unconditional command of chastity,
irrespective of its welfare consequences. For many centuries, this imperative led to
enormous misery. It was only after many decades of severe criticisms, including by
many novelists, that the imperative was gradually given up over the early decades
of the twentieth century. The change was partly assisted by the Western thinking of
gender equality and women emancipation.
It may be thought that such backward moral principles as ‘one woman should
not serve two men/husbands’ were only observed by ignorant people in a backward
country in the past; modern people do not commit such a sillymistake. Actually, right
today, almost throughout the whole world and for all countries except one, we have
a similar sacrosanct moral principle of categorical imperative that has contributed to
unnecessary, intense and prolonged suffering of many people. Those trying to help
reduce this suffering have been persecuted and jailed. What is this principle? The
sanctity of (human) life.
At least in some important aspects, the belief in the sanctity of life serves some
very useful purposes. When a person dies, she can no longer enjoy life. Thus, ending
a life prematurely is a grave matter. In addition, living persons are also threatened
by this possible premature death. The costs of causing deaths are enormous. Empha-
sizing the sanctity of life helps to prevent or at least reduce wanton disregard to
lives and serves some useful purpose. The mistake consists in absolutising it and
divorcing it fromwelfare. This absolute sanctity leads to the imprisonment of doctors
helping desperate patients to end their miserable lives earlier. This has led to much
unnecessary suffering.
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In conclusion,Kant and other deontic arguments have not refutedwelfarismwhich
is consistent with their acceptable parts; those parts inconsistent with welfarism are
not really acceptable.
5.4 A Critique of Rawls
If all welfare-independent rights are unacceptable as fundamental moral principles,
as argued above, Rawls’ (1971) second principle of justice (maximin) is absurd,
despite its widespread influence.
Rawls’ first principle requires that each person is to have an equal right to
the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar
system of liberty for all. I am prepared to accept this first principle on the following
understanding:
(1) that it is adopted because it promotes the general welfare;
(2) in circumstances where it is disastrous to the general welfare, it may have to
be suspended;
(3) in deciding what is the “most extensive total system” and what is compatible
… for all”, the ultimate criterion is the general welfare.
A sexmaniacmay be in favour of freedom to rape and claim that this is compatible
with everyone’s freedom to rape.12 It may also happen that the sex maniac is the
person of the lowest welfare level such that freedom to rape for all will maximize the
welfare of the worst off, hence consistent with the spirit of Rawls’ second principle to
be discussed below.However, if freedom to rape results in the reduction of thewelfare
of those raped and scared of being raped by more than (in aggregate) the welfare
gains of the rapists (even though the former still have higher welfare levels than the
latter group even with freedom to rape), then freedom to rape should be regarded
as not compatible with the freedom of not being raped. The “most extensive total
system of basic liberties” should then not include the freedom to rape. However, thus
interpreted, the first principle is really a device to promote the general welfare. It is
not ultimate.
Despite its obvious absurdity, Rawls’ second principle is very popular. For
example, Temkin believes that, in “one form or another, many philosophers have
come to advocate a maximin principle of justice, and one can see why. There is
strong appeal to the view that just as it would be right for a mother to devote most of
her effort and resources to her neediest child, so it would be right for society to devote
most of its effort and resources to its neediest members” (Temkin 1986 p. 109). In
my view, the ethical appealingness of this argument as well as that of the maximin
principle of justice itself is not difficult to refute.
12 It is true that Rawls would argue that freedom to rape is not a basic liberty while the right to
non-violation of body is. However, how do we determine what are basic liberties? Either it is based
on the welfarist principle or it is open to the objection of the last subsection on the unacceptability
of rights-based ethics.
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I agree that, in most cases, a mother should devote more, and in many cases, most
of her effort and resources to her neediest child, but only because this maximizes
the welfare of the whole family (ignoring effects on others for simplicity). The most
disadvantaged child is usually the neediest one because he/she will suffer most in the
absence of extra help. Also, the extra help for the neediest also promotes the good
spirit of helping the needy. Thus, the extra care for the most disadvantaged need not
be inconsistent with overall welfare maximization. However, the maximin principle
requires the mother to go much further.
For simplicity, suppose that the mother is faced with only two alternatives. One is
to go away with the most disadvantaged child to live in a mountain resort for certain
marginal benefit to the health of the sick child. The other is to stay at home looking
after all the five children but still with possibly more care for the most disadvantaged
one. Suppose the two welfare profiles for the children are
WPA = (10, 10, 10, 10, 9)
WPH = (9000, 9000, 9000, 9000, 8)
and that themother is indifferent herself and no one else is affected by the choice. The
maximin principle requires choosing WPA. This, in comparison to the alternative of
staying at home, increases the welfare of the worst-off child from 8 to 9 at the costs of
a huge reduction in welfare (from 9000 to 10) for every other child. No sane mother
in the world would make such an absurd choice.
Note that the welfare profiles WPA and WPH above are ultimate outcomes, as
must be the case for all discussion of the ultimate ethical principles. Thus, the more
equal welfare profile of WPA would not promote further gain in welfare through,
say, a more harmonious family relationship. Such effects, if any, should already have
been incorporated into WPA and WPH.
Consider the much-cherished principle, “From each according to his ability; to
each according to his needs” (which I personally approve, assuming no disincentive
effect). Why doesn’t it read, “An equal amount of work from each; an equal amount
of income to each”? If a weak man is tired by four hours of work, it is better for
a stronger man to work longer to relieve him. Similarly, if the worst-off child will
not gain much more happiness by extra effort and resources, it is better that these
resources be spent on other children.
In the original position, behind the veil of ignorance as to which child I would be
born into, I would have not the slightest hesitation in wishingmymother tomaximize
the welfare of all the children, i.e. the unweighted sum of all children’s welfare (the
welfare of the mother and that of any other person are being held constant in this
comparison). This maximizes mine as well as other children’s expected welfare.
It is sometimes argued that a risk-averse person may not want to maximize
expected welfare. It is quite rational to be risk-averse with respect to income or any
other objective rewards since onemay have, with good reasons, diminishingmarginal
utility/welfare of income. But since utility/welfare is the ultimate objective one is
presumably maximizing, it is not rational not to maximize expected utility/welfare,
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if the relevant utility/welfare profiles already included all relevant effects, including
such things as anxiety, excitement, etc. which explain most paradoxes of choices
involving risk such as the Allais (Allais and Hagen 1979); see Harsanyi (1976, Part
A) and Ng (1984). Secondly, if one chooses to be risk-averse with respect to welfare,
it is still impossible to reasonably justify an absolute degree of risk-averseness as
implied by the maximin principle.
After the lifting of the veil of ignorance, I would still think that it is right for my
mother or anyone’s mother to maximize the welfare of all children together whether
I were the worst-off child or not. Again, my bias in favour of my own welfare may
mean that I would hope that my mother would spend more effort and resources on
me somewhat beyond the level justified by unweighted sum maximization. (But I
think it is unjust for my mother to follow the partial wish of any child.) However,
even then, I would definitely not wantmymother to maximin in my favour, implying
a zero trade-off on the welfares of my brothers and sisters as long as their welfares
remain higher than mine. Thus, given the welfare profiles WPA and WPH above,
even if I were the worst-off child, I would want my mother to chooseWPH. It may be
thought that since my welfare is higher in WPA, I could not have wanted my mother
to choose WPH. This ignores the differences between welfare and preference due to
a concern for the welfares of others as discussed in Chap. 2 above.
From the above, it may be concluded that the maximin principle of justice is
not only utterly unacceptable but an ethical principle similar to the one in favour
of its adoption seems to require the worst-off group itself not to accept it. Why
then is the principle so popular? One possible explanation is that it appeals to the
guilt feeling of the better-off. They have admirable sympathy for the worst-off but
yet are not prepared and/or find it ineffective to alleviate this by substantial personal
contribution to the worst-off (by charity or the like). Paying lip service by advocating
themaximin principle of justice is amuchmore cost-effective way of alleviating their
sense of guilt. Of course, this explanation need not apply to all advocates of maximin.
In addition to those considered in this chapter, other arguments against happiness
as the only intrinsic value are discussed in Appendix B.
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Abstract Simple ways to improve the accuracy and interpersonal and intertemporal
comparability of happiness measurement include using happiness instead of life
satisfaction (or other concepts), pinning down the dividing line of the zero amount
of net happiness, using an interpersonally valid unit based on the just perceivable
increment of happiness, and the complementary use of this method for small samples
and the traditional methods for large samples.
Economists generally speak in terms of preference or utility. [In modern economics,
utility is most commonly used as a representation of preference, in the following
sense: Ui(x) > Ui(y) means ‘Individual i prefers (alternative/situation/bundle of
goods) x to y.] Only since the recent three decades or so that more economists have
explicitly studied happiness. However, even if we confine to the older days, utility
and happiness did not differ by much. In our definition, they differ only by imper-
fect information, possible concern for the welfare of others, and irrationality. For
most issues concerning individual preference/happiness, especially on traditional
economic issues of consumer choice, we typically abstract from imperfect infor-
mation, irrationality, and pure or non-affective altruism (ruling out a true concern
for the welfare of others over and above effects like warm glow). Then, the issues
of measurability and interpersonal comparability of either happiness or utility are
then essentially similar. In this chapter, we treat them similarly. Section 6.1 argues
that happiness (and utility that represents preference) is cardinally measurable and
interpersonally comparable, at least in principle. Section 6.2 discusses some ways to
improve the accuracy and comparability of happiness in practice. Appendix D also
addresses a practical problem in happiness measurement.
6.1 Happiness is Cardinally Measurable
and Interpersonally Comparable
I believe that many students of economics, like myself, have at some stage been
baffled by the controversies regarding whether happiness or utility is measurable or
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not measurable, cardinally measurable or just ordinally measurable. Ordinal measur-
ability involves ability to rank.With just ordinalmeasurability, one can say that utility
at x is higher than that at y, but cannot say how many times higher, nor compare
differences in utility.
The confusion with respect to utility measurability is partly due to the use of the
same term ‘utility’ both as a measure of subjective satisfaction and as an indicator of
objective choice or preference.Another source of confusion is the insufficient distinc-
tion between measurability in principle and measurability in practice. For utility as
a measure of the subjective satisfaction or happiness of an individual, it seems clear
that it is cardinally measurable in principle, though the practical difficulties of such
measurements may be very real. These difficulties include inaccuracies and possible
insincerity in preference revelation. Moreover, even the individual himself may have
difficulties in giving a precise measure. For example, I prefer an apple to an orange
and prefer an orange to a pear. If you ask me, ‘Do you prefer an apple to an orange
more strongly than an orange to a pear? (Question A), then I will say, ‘It depends
on what kind of fruits I had in the immediate past, what sort of meal I am having’.
If all these are known, then I will be able to give a definite answer. Thus, subject
to practical difficulties my subjective utility is cardinally measurable. If it was just
ordinally measurable, I would not just have some difficulties in answering Ques-
tion A, I would dismiss it as meaningless. It seems clear that any individual will be
able to compare the difference in subjective utility between having an apple and an
orange and that between an orange and a house, and able to compare the difference
in subjective disutility between a bite of an ant and a sting of a bee and that between
a sting of a bee and having his right arm cut off.
It also seems meaningful to say that I was at least twice as happy in 2020 as
in 1970. If I have a perfect memory, I may even be able to pin down the ratio of
happiness, at say, around 2.8. It also seems sensible for someone to say, ‘Had I
known the sufferings I had to undergo, I would have committed suicide long ago’,
or ‘If I had to lead such a miserable life, I would wish not to have been born at
all!’ Hence, it makes sense to speak of negative or positive happiness/utility. Thus,
somewhere in themiddle, there is something corresponding to zero utility. ‘There can
be little doubt that an individual, apart from his attitude of preference or indifference
to a pair of alternatives, may also desire an alternative not in the sense of preferring
it to some other alternative, or may have an aversion towards it not in the sense of
contra–preferring it to some other alternative. There seem to be pleasant situations
that are intrinsically desirable and painful situations that are intrinsically repugnant.
It does not seem unreasonable to postulate that welfare is+ve in the former case and
–ve in the latter’ (Armstrong 1951, p. 269). This is also effectively the conclusion
of Kahneman et al. 1997. Hence it seems clear that utility or welfare as a subjective
feeling is in principle measurable in a full cardinal sense.
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Economists’ Bias Against Utility/Happiness Cardinal Measurability and Inter-
personal Comparability
Instead of the subjective sense discussed above, we may use ‘utility’ purely as an
objective indicator of an individual preference ordering and we may not be inter-
ested in anything in addition to this ordinal aspect of ‘utility’. For example, for
certain economic problems like the derivation of demand curves/functions, we only
have to assume that a consumer/individual can compare the desirability of different
bundles of goods ordinally, i.e. the ability to rank different bundles is sufficient. The
same demand function can be derived from the same set of indifference curves with
different sets of cardinal utility numbers, provided that the same ranking is preserved.
Thus, in this sense, cardinal utility can be assumed away on the ground of Occam’s
razor for such problems. At least partly due to this, many economists are hostile
against cardinal measurability. However, to insist on ordinal utility only (denying
the use or cardinal utility) even for other problems, such as happiness studies, social
choice1, optimal population, choices affecting the probabilities of survival (see e.g.
Ng 2011, 2016 on the latter issue) where cardinal utilities are needed, is to commit
the fallacy of misplaced abstraction. This mistake is similar to insisting that a person
must shave off his mustache since that is unnecessary for eating; not allowing for the
possibility that he may want to keep his mustache to increase his sex appeal!
The following is representative of the modern textbook hostility against the
cardinal measurability and interpersonal comparability of utility. ‘There is no way
that you or I can measure the amount of utility that a consumer might be able to
obtain from a particular good… there can be no accurate scientific assessment of the
utility that someone might receive by consuming a frozen dinner or a movie relative
to the utility that another person might receive from that same good… Today no one
really believes that we can actually measure utils’ (Miller 2011, pp. 436–7). There
is at least one counter-example to this confident assertion—the present writer.
A probably most widely used textbook in basic economics (‘sold millions of
copies in more than 40 languages’ by 1997) that has lived through 19 editions over
1948-2010 and written by a Nobel laureate puts it bluntly: ‘Economists today gener-
ally reject the notion of a cardinal, measurable utility’ (Samuelson and Nordhaus
2010, p. 89). Note that a cardinal, measurable utility is not just abstracted away as
unnecessary, but rejected outright.
Another widely used intermediate microeconomic textbook example on the
hostility against cardinal utility: ‘But how do we tell if a person likes one bundle
twice as much as another? How could you even tell if you like one bundle twice as
much as another? One could propose various definitions for this kind of assignment:
I like one bundle twice as much as another if I am willing to run twice as far to get
it, or to wait twice as long, or to gamble for it at twice the odds… Although each of
them is a possible interpretation of what it means to want one thing twice as much as
1 The making of social choices involving Pareto non-comparable alternatives, interpersonal
comparisons of individual cardinal utilities are needed (Mueller 2003, Chap. 23 and Ng 2000b,
Chap. 2).
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another, none of them appears to be an especially compelling interpretation’ (Varian
2010, pp. 57–8).
Indeed, there is an especially compelling interpretation. Since our ultimate objec-
tive is happiness (on which see Chap. 5 above), using the amount of happiness of
the individual involved provides a perfect answer to Varian’s question, if we ignore
the effects on others, which is another issue (slightly touched on above). In addition,
the actual amount of happiness enjoyed, but not the amount of utility as representing
preference orderings only, could be used to determinewell-being even in the presence
of preference changes. Thus, using happiness/welfare instead of preference/utility,
we may analyze the normative aspects of preference changes.
It is true that the strong and explicit beliefs in the non-cardinal measurability and
non-interpersonal comparability of happiness and/or preference (see Chap. 2 on the
differences between the two concepts) are held mainly by economists (due to the
non-necessity for demand analysis as discussed above). However, even among soci-
ologists and psychologists who study happiness, such beliefs are also very common.
For example, sociologist and veteran happiness researcher Veenhoven ‘argued that
happiness is measured at the ordinal level’ (Kalmijn and Veenhoven 2005; Veen-
hoven 2010, p. 612n). The common belief in the non-cardinality of happiness/utility
spans the whole multi-disciplinary happiness studies. Thus, after a cross-disciplinary
survey of the issue of cardinality, Kristoffersen (2017, p. 612n) concluded that ‘Many
scholars (economists and others) are of the opinion that wellbeing data are strictly
ordinal in nature, and tend to criticise the common tendency to treat them as cardinal
measures’. (See also Kristoffersen 2017.) Levinson (2012, p.873) also mentions
that ‘economists normally assume utility is ordinal rather than cardinal, and that
interpersonal comparisons based on stated happiness are impossible’.
The Compellingness of Cardinal Measurability and Interpersonal Compara-
bility
In fact, the compellingness of the cardinal measurability and interpersonal compara-
bility of happiness/utility is obvious. Consider the following three simple alternatives
faced by a person:
A: Her current situation.
B: Her current situation plus being bitten by an ant (non-poisonous one) once.
C: Her current situation plus being thrown bodily into a pool of boiling water
Obviously, she prefers A to B and B to C. If preference/utility is purely ordinal,
this is all she can say. However, even you, not being her, know that the intensity of
her preference of B over C is at least many thousand times larger than that of A over
B. Moreover, you may also be confident that the intensity of her preference of B over
C is at least many thousand times larger than that of your preference of A over B
(interpreting A and B as applied to you).
True, this is interpersonal comparison of utility regarded by Robbins (1932, 1938)
as unscientific. In fact, this comparison is solidly based on evolutionary biology, as
touched on earlier and also discussed in Appendix C. An ant bite reduces her (and
most individuals’) fitness by a very small amount and hence induces only a small
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amount of pain. Being thrown bodily into boiling water threatens ones’ survival and
must cause great pain and intense attempt to avoid it. Though there may be some
degree of interpersonal differences, these are almost certainly less significant than
the huge survival difference between an ant bite and being thrown into boiling water.
Thus, our degree of confidence in the truth of the comparison above is no less than
99.99%, a degree of certainty envied by all empirical scientists, economists included.
Most people now know that our brain consists of two hemispheres, with the left
brain controlling the right side of the body andvice versa.Wedonot feel this duality as
our two brain hemispheres are connected by corpus callosum, making our subjective
consciousness unified. However, some patients with serious epilepsy have their two
brain hemispheres separated by cutting the connection (to reduce brain interaction).
They then behave as if having two centres of consciousness or mind, with their left
brain (normally controlling speech) not knowing what their right brain has seen with
the left eye, if a blinder is also placed between their two eyes (Gazzaniga, 1970).2
Thus, two separate brain hemispheres each with independent consciousness may be
unified with connection through the corpus callosum. Similarly, if our technology is
advanced enough to imitate the connection through the corpus callosum, we could
so connect her brain with yours. Then, she could feel your taste of ice cream and you
could feel her taste of blueberries. Interpersonal comparison would become almost
perfect!
While happiness is cardinally measurable and interpersonally comparable in prin-
ciple, it is true that the commonly used methods of happiness measurement are not
very cardinal and interpersonally very difficult to compare, as mentioned above.
The lack in comparability in existing happiness measures makes happiness studies
vulnerable to the criticism of doubters of happiness results such as Johns et al. (2007)
and Ott (2010). If happiness measures could be based on more comparable methods
of measurement, as discussed below, the critics may have less gun powder to use.
6.2 How Could the Measurement of Happiness be
Improved?
One reason most economists are skeptical of happiness measurement is that profes-
sionally they trust what people do rather than what their say (‘cheap talk’). If an
individual is willing to pay from her own pocket to actually buy a certain item,
economists are willing to accept that she values that item at least at the price paid. If
she just says that she values certain thing at a certain value, economists are generally
skeptical. Since most if not all existing measurements of happiness are based on how
happy people say they are in questionnaire surveys, economists are thus skeptical of
their reliability. This skepticism has some validity.
2 However, see Pinto et al. (2017) on the point that, ‘although the two hemispheres are completely
insulated from each other, the brain as a whole is still able to produce only one conscious agent’.
64 6 Happiness Measurability and Interpersonal Comparability
However, there are persuasive arguments that existing measures, though imper-
fect, are rather reliable. For example, different measures of happiness correlate well
with one another (Fordyce 1988), with recalls of positive versus negative life events
(Seidlitz et al. 1997), with reports of friends and family members (Costa andMcCrae
1988; Diener 1984; Sandvik et al. 1993, 2009), with physical measures like heart rate
and blood pressure measures (Shedler et al. 1993), with EEG measures of prefrontal
brain activity (Sutton andDavidson 1997), andwithmore objectivemeasures ofwell-
being like incidence of depression, poor appetite and sleep (Luttmer 2005). Pavot
et al. (1991) finds that respondents reporting that they are very happy tend to smile
more. MacCulloch and Di Tella (2000) note that psychologists who study and give
advice on happiness for a living use happiness data. ‘Presumably, if markets work
and there was a better way to study well-being, people who insist on using bad data
would be driven out of the market’ (pp. 7–8). Moreover, correlations of happiness
show remarkably consistency across countries, including developing and transitional
(GrahamandPettinato 2001, 2002;Namazie andSanfey 2001).Dominitz andManski
(1999) examine the scientific basis underlying economists’ hostility against subjec-
tive data and found it to be ‘meager’ and ‘unfounded’. Rather, ‘survey respondents
do provide coherent, useful information when queried systematically’; see Manski
2000, p. 132.) Despite remaining problems of happiness measurement (see, e.g.
Schwarz and Stracek 1999; Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001), reported happiness
indices may be used as good approximations (Frey and Stutzer 2002b; Oishi 2019)
and ‘happiness surveys are capturing something meaningful about true utility’ (Di
Tella and MacCulloch 2006, p. 28).
For those economists who are still skeptical or even look down upon and deride
at the happiness measures (which actually happened), I call upon them to look at
their own backyard. Consider themost important economic variable GDP or GNP. Its
measurement is subject to all sorts of inaccuracies, as iswell-known to all economists.
We used the imperfect measure for many decades. Then came the PPP (purchasing
power parity) adjustment which overnight increased the Chinese GDP by 4 times
and the Indian GDP by 6 times from this single adjustment alone! Most happiness
measures may not be very accurate but I doubt that a 4-times adjustment will ever
be necessary for the average figure of any nation.
There are a number of methods to improve the measurement of happiness to
increase its accuracy and comparability, including interpersonal and intertemporal
comparability. Some of these methods are easier to implement than others. Let us
start from the easier ones first.
First, as discussed in the previous chapters, as a rule, using the concept of happiness
instead of other concepts like life satisfaction is likely to yield a better result. This is
easily implemented.
Secondly, asking subjects to tick from: very happy, pretty happy, not too happy,
and unhappy gives very vague results. This is so because phrase like ‘not too happy’
is vague as to the amount of happiness it represents. It may either represent a positive
amount of (net) happiness or a negative amount. Before we use some interpersonal
comparable units of happiness measurement (which is more complex, as discussed
below), it is difficult to get happiness results that are valid across persons. Different
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persons may use the same phrase such as ‘very happy’ to describe different amounts
of happiness, and use different phrases to describe the same amount of happiness,
making interpersonal comparison difficult. However, there is a well-defined level of
happiness that has interpersonal significance. This is the level of zero (net) happiness,
or where the amount of positive happiness is just offset by the negative amount of
happiness or the amount of unhappiness (pain and sufferings). In terms of Figure 1
above (Chap. 1), it is the case where the area above the line of neutrality equals that
below this line. If the net amount of happiness is zero, the value of life to that person
herself (i.e. ignoring any effects on others) is neutral. This has an interpersonal
significance. A person may have a large amount of positive happiness and also a
large amount of unhappiness. Another person may have a small amount of positive
happiness and also a small amount of unhappiness. It may be difficult to compare
the amount of happiness (or unhappiness) of the first person with that of the second.
However, if the amount of positive happiness of each of these two persons just
offsets the amount of unhappiness, the net amounts of happiness of both persons are
the same, being both equal to zero. Thus, happiness studies should aim to discover,
among others, information regarding the proportions of people with happiness levels
above, at and below this level of neutrality. This is an interpersonally, intertemporally,
internationally, and interculturally comparable and useful piece of information.
When a subject is asked to rate her own happiness within the scale of say 0-10, it
is true that most people may use the mid point of 5 to stand for the point of neutrality.
However, this is by no means certain or universal. This is particularly so as many
Western countries use 50 (out of 100) as the passing mark in exam grading, while
the corresponding passing mark is 60 in China. Thus, a brief instruction asking the
subject to use 5 to stand for neutrality will increase the informational content of the
survey results especially with respect to the comparability of the proportion of people
above the neutrality point.
The above improvement can be easily implemented. However, while achieving a
significant improvement easily, it does not solve most of the problems of compara-
bility. Society A may have 90% of people above the line of neutrality while society
B only has 85%. However, society B may still be a happier one if many of those
above neutrality have much higher happiness than society A and most of those
below neutrality in society B are only marginally below while most of those below
neutrality in society A are significantly below.
To overcome such difficulty of incomparability, I develop (Ng 1996) a method
that yields happiness measures that are comparable interpersonally, inter-temporally,
and interculturally. It is based on Edgeworth’s concept of a just perceptible increment
of happiness, but developed to be operational and actually used to conduct an actual
survey/measurement.3 For example, if you prefer two spoons of sugar in a given cup
of coffee to 1.5 spoons, you may not know the difference between 2 and 1.99 spoons.
3 The concept of using the faintest unit of pleasure as the unit of measurement may be traced back
to Bentham; see Tännsjö (1998).
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There exists a difference that makes one just perceivably taste better than the other.4
Edgeworth took it as axiomatic, or, in his words ‘a first principle incapable of proof’,
that the ‘minimum sensible or the just perceivable increments of pleasures for all
persons, are equatable (Edgeworth 1881, pp. 7ff., pp. 60 ff.). I (Ng 1975) derived this
result as well as the utilitarian social welfare function (SWF), that social welfare is
the unweighted sum of individual utilities/welfares, from more basic axioms.
The main axiom is the Weak Majority Preference Criterion (WMP): For any
two alternatives x and y, if no individual prefers y to x, and (1) if I, the number of
individuals, is even, at least I/2 individuals prefer x to y; (2) if I is odd, at least (I–1)/2
individuals prefer x to y and at least another individual’s utility level is not lower in
x than in y, then social welfare is higher in x than in y.
The reason why WMP leads us to the utilitarian SWF is not difficult to see.
The criterion WMP requires that individual utility/welfare differences sufficient
to give rise to preferences of half of the population must be regarded as socially
more significant than utility differences not sufficient to give rise to preferences (or
dis-preferences) of another half. Since any group of individuals comprising 50 per
cent of the population is an acceptable half, this effectively makes a just–perceiv-
able increment of utility/welfare of any individual an interpersonally comparable
unit.5 (Ignoring the difference between individual preferences and welfare, utility
and welfare may be used interchangeably. Where they differ, welfare or happiness
should be used, as argued in above; WMP should then be revised to refer to happi-
ness.) The compellingness of this argument is further expounded in Ng & Singer
(1981).
Thus, measures of happiness based on the concept just perceivable increment
of happiness is not only cardinal but also interpersonally comparable. If we use the
same number say one to measure the happiness difference of a just perceivable incre-
ment6 for all individuals, the happiness indices so constructed are interpersonally
comparable since each just perceivable increment of happiness is equitable across
individuals. Though suchmeasures aremore difficult to obtain7, some suchmeasures
may be obtained for some small but representative samples and the results compared
with the existing measures taken on larger samples. If some reliable correspondences
between the two sets of measures could be established, we may not have to use the
more complicated method for the majority of subjects surveyed. The combined use
of these two methods may be a good way to tackle the problems of reliability and
comparability.
4 Where the time dimension is considered, we may have to use a just perceivable increment over a
just perceivable unit of time. Also, given perfect divisibility and continuity in preference, we may
have to use a just (maximally) non-perceivable indifference instead of a just perceivable preference.
5 Given continuity, if we do not equate a just–perceptible increment of utility/welfare of any indi-
vidual with that of any other individual, then we count the perceptible increment of one person
as less important than the imperceptible increment of another and this violates WMP and is also
clearly unacceptable.
6 Or rather, a just unperceivable indifference.
7 See Argenziano and Gilboa (2019) on some issue of data availability.
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The study of happiness is still a very new science. Thus, it has much scope to
be improved to increase the accuracy and comparability of happiness measures not
only by taking account of the above but also many other issues. Given time and more
studies, significant improvements may be expected.
Concluding Summary
Simple ways to improve the accuracy and interpersonal and intertemporal compara-
bility of happiness measurement include using happiness instead of life satisfaction
(or other concepts), pinning down the dividing line of the zero amount of net happi-
ness, using an interpersonally valid unit based on the just perceivable increment of
happiness, and the complementary use of this method for small samples and the
traditional methods for large samples.
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Chapter 7
Does Money Buy Happiness?
Abstract After a relatively low level of survival and comfort, additional consump-
tion does not increase happiness significantly, especially at the social level. At the
individual level, people want more due to the relative competition effect which
cancels out at the social level. In addition, the adaptation effects and environmental
disruption effects also work to limit the contributions of higher consumption and
enlarge the gap between expectation and actuality.
Studies by psychologists and sociologists show that, both within a country and across
nations, the happiness level of people increases with the income level, but only
slightly. For example, using regional and cultural classifications, the Northern Euro-
pean countries with high incomes score top on happiness, followed by the group of
English-speakingUS,UK,Australia, and Ireland. Central and South-American coun-
tries including Brazil come next, followed by theMiddle East, the Central European,
Southern and Eastern European (Greece, Russia, Turkey, and Yugoslavia), the Indian
Sub-continent, andAfrica which does not, however, come last. Southern andWestern
European (France, Italy, and Spain) score significantly lower than Africa. And the
last group is East Asia, including the country that leads in income, Japan. Singapore
had an income level (per capita) 82.4 times that of India. Even in terms of purchasing
power parity instead of using exchange rate, Singapore was still 16.4 time higher than
India in income. However, the happiness scores of both countries were exactly the
same, both significantly higher than that of Japan. (See Cummins 1998. Cf. Diener
and Suh 1999; Inglehart et al. 1998, Table V18. On the East-Asian happiness gap,
see Chap. 13). While there are notable cases like Japan and France that are far off the
regression line, a statistically significant positive relationship between happiness and
income exists cross-nationally. However, over around US$5,000 per capita annually,
the correlation disappears (Veenhoven and Timmermans 1998, Fig. 2). More recent
studies show largely similar results (Easterlin 2010, 2013, 2017; World Happiness
Report 2016, 2021; Asadullah et al. 2018; Cheng et al. 2018; Clark et al. 2018; Diener
et al. 2018; Frey and Stutzer 2018; Luo et al. 2018; Olivera 2019).1
1 However, while “Havin’ Money’s Not Everything, Not Havin’ It Is”; see Brzozowski and Spotton
Visano (2020) on the importance of financial satisfaction.
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When the above result was presented in a seminar, a colleague said, ‘Cross-
national relationship between income and happiness is affected by cultural differ-
ences. The relationship should be stronger within the same country.’ In fact, the
relationship between happiness and income level inter-temporally within the same
country (at least for the advanced countries which have such data) is even less encour-
aging in terms of giving a positive relationship. For example, from the 1940s to 1994,
the real income per capita of theUSnearly trebled.However, the percentage of people
who regard themselves as very happy fluctuated around 30%, without showing an
upward trend; another measure of average happiness fluctuated around 72%. Since
1958, the real income level in Japan increased by more than 5 times. However, its
average happiness measure fluctuated around 59%, also without an upward trend.
(See Diener and Suh 1997; Frank 1997; Myers 1996, p. 445; Oswald 1997; Veen-
hoven 1993). Blanchflower and Oswald 2000 show that the levels of happiness in
the United States have declined slightly over the period from the early 1970’s to the
late 1990’s while (Hagerty and Veenhoven 1999) show a slight increase. ‘Roughly
unchanged’ seems still to be the best bet.). Perhaps, dynamically, we need rising
incomes just to sustain happiness at an unchanged level, the so-called ‘hedonic tread-
mill’. However, there are also studies showing happiness to be inversely related to
the pace of economic growth (Diener et al. 1993).
There could also be different degrees of cultural bias in reports of happiness levels
internationally (Diener et al. 2009). For example, people in the US are more inclined
to profess happiness, as being happy is socially regarded as something positive.
French respondents may have the opposite bias, as Charles de Gaulle was quoted as
saying ‘Happy people are idiots’, though this assertion has actually been refuted by
evidence (Diener 1984). In Japan, the social customofmodestymaymake people less
ready to describe themselves as very happy. However, for intertemporal comparisons,
it is likely that, if there have been any significant changes in such biases, they are
likely towards more willingness to profess happiness. Thus, such cultural bias cannot
be used to explain the failure of the happiness measures to increase over time with
income.Moreover, researchers have used variousmethods (e.g. the social desirability
scale of Crowne and Marlowe (1964) to isolate the effects of such biases without
changing the conclusions significantly. For example,KonowandEarley (2002) report
that the use of the C-M scale to control for the bias does not significantly affect their
findings that people who help others are happier.
On the other hand, happiness studies show that a number of factors including
marriage, personality, health, religious belief, employment, social capital correlate
positively and strongly with happiness (e.g. Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1998;
Bjornskov 2003; Diener et al. 2010; Amato and James 2018; Leng et al. 2020).
For example, for personality, ‘the most robust predictors of higher life satisfaction
were higher extraversion, conscientiousness, emotional stability (lower neuroticism)’
(Kobylińska et al. 2020, Abstract).
It is interesting that age correlates with happiness in an unexpected way. Most
people may expect that happiness first increases with age as one gains more inde-
pendence, incomes, and knowledge to enjoy life and then decreases with age as
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one gets old and less healthy. Happiness researchers first found no significant rela-
tionship between age and happiness. However, when they allow for the square of
age in the regression, they find that average happiness first decreases with age until
around thirty something years old and then increases monotonically with age until
the highest range available in studies, seventy something. That the minimum point
occurs at around thirty something could be explained by the pressure of paying off
the first mortgage on the housing loan, inexperience in adjusting to one’s partner
and in bringing up the first child. Knowledge of this unexpected U-shaped happiness
curve is very, very important, especially to the majority of readers of this book who
may be around or will soon reach the minimum happiness point in their life cycles.
Some of the less happy may think, ‘I am already so unhappy at this young age; won’t
I have an even more miserable life when I am old? Perhaps I should end this miser-
able life!’ The knowledge of the U-shaped happiness curve may thus prevent many
suicides and provide a more optimistic outlook by knowing a brighter future ahead.
This knowledge alone is certainly worthmany, many times the total opportunity costs
of buying and reading this book! Your happiness is also increased by knowing that
your consumer surplus of buying this book is so huge; haha! (On the age-happiness
relationship, see Chap. 9.)
The picture is not much different even if we use more objective indicators of the
quality of life. Analyzing a panel data set of 95 quality-of-life indicators (covering
education, health, transport, inequality, pollution, democracy, political stability)
covering 1960–1990, Easterly (1999) reaches some remarkable results. While virtu-
ally all of these indicators show quality of life across nations to be positively asso-
ciated with per capita income, when country effects are removed using either fixed
effects or an estimator in first differences, the effects of economic growth on the
quality of life are uneven and often nonexistent. It is found that ‘quality of life is
about equally likely to improve or worsen with rising income. … In the sample of 69
indicators available for the irst Differences indicator, 62 percent of the indicators
had time shifts improve the indicator more than growth did’ (Easterly 1999, p. 17–8).
Even for the only 20 out of the 81 indicators with a significantly positive relationship
with income under fixed effects, time improved 10 out of these 20 indicators more
than income did.
The surprising results are not due to the worsening income distribution (there is
some evidence that the share of the poor gets better with growth). Rather, the quality
of life of any country depends less on its own economic growth or income level
but more on the scientific, technological, and other breakthroughs at the world level.
These depend more on public spending than private consumption (Radcliff 2013; Ott
2015; Ho et al. 2020; Cf. Dowding and Taylor 2020). Many studies (e.g. Estes 1988;
Slottje 1991; see Offer 2000 for a review) show that measures of social progress
strongly correlate with income level at low incomes (to around US$3,000 at 1981
prices) but the correlation disappears after that. Others (e.g. Veenhoven 1991; Diener
and Suh 1999) show a similar relationship between happiness and income.
Higher income and consumption may increase the preference for even higher
levels but they may in fact decrease the happiness level if the consumption level
remains unchanged. In other words, higher consumption makes us adapted to the
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Fig. 7.1 The adaptation of happiness to customary consumption levels
higher level and raises our expectation and hence makes us needing even higher
consumption to remain at the same welfare level. As illustrated in Fig. 7.1, when
one’s customary consumption level is indicated by the point A, the (total) welfare
curve is X. When one’s customary level increases to B, the curve moves to Y. Thus,
the welfare level does not increase to BB” but only marginally to BB’. However, the
marginal welfare of consumption (originally measured by the slope of the curve X at
point A’) may increase (to the slope of the curve Y at B’). This makes the individual
feel that having more money to spend becomes more important. However, the long-
run welfare curve is the curve that passes through A’B’C’ which has a much lower
slope, indicating that the marginal welfare of consumption is low. According to the
estimate of Kapteyn et al. (1976), up to 80% of an expected initial welfare increase of
additional income disappears with an actual increase in income. Fuentes and Rojas
(2001) found that income does not have a strong influence on either well-being or
on the probability of happiness. ‘However, people tend to overstress the impact that
additional income would have on their subjective well-being’(p. 289).
If we take into account the costs of adjustment, the whole long-run welfare curve
is also a function of one’s accustomed level of consumption a higher level of which
lowers the whole long-run welfare curve. To maximize happiness in the long run,
one should start with not too high a consumption level so as to be able to gradually
increase the level over time. In this perspective, children of the rich may really suffer
a disadvantage. (This is supported by evidence on adolescents reported in Schneider,
B., & Csikszentmihalyi 2000.) They start off being accustomed to very high levels of
consumption which they may find difficult to surpass, hence suffering in happiness
terms. Thus, wise rich people do not splash their children with money. But there are
difficulties for the rich in limiting the consumption levels of their children, due to
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comparison with those of the parents and with peers. This may also partly explain
why there is not much difference in happiness terms between the rich and the poor.
Failing to realize expectation is important in student examination performance.
The despair after non-realization makes many students giving up, fail to pass,
and drop out of school. An intervention to help students adjust to more realistic
expectation reduce the failure/drop-out rates by 25–40% (Goux et al. 2017).
Reich (2000) argues for putting more time for one’s family than in long working
hours and is thus in agreement with the theme here. However, his proposal of
providing US$60,000 for everyone turning 18may not be a good idea as it is contrary
to the principle of starting from a low consumption level as well as the merit of
self-reliance.
There is a consideration that qualifies the above principle of starting from a low
consumption level. For certain items of consumption, especially those important for
health, too low a level does not only fail to improve one’s future ability to happiness,
it actually lowers that ability. This is especially so in one’s childhood and adolescent
periodswhere sufficient (material and spiritual) nutrients are important for the healthy
growth of the body, the development of healthy personality, and the build up of
knowledge (Glewwe et al. 2001). If one is handicapped by serious deficiencies earlier
in life, one may never catch up later. However, this consideration is more important
than the adaptation effect only at very low consumption levels. It may be thought that
an informed and rational individual would know and take account of the long-run
effects and hence the problem does not arise. However, the evidence suggests that
most individuals are not perfectly rational and/or informed in this sense and that they
are thus guided more by their short-run curves (Frijters 2000; Gilbert 2006; Shafir
2008; Linden 2011).
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Nation Index: A Proposed National
Success Indicator
Abstract The average happy life years HLY (of a country) is the product of the
average happiness (or life satisfaction) index and the life expectancy index. Adjusting
HLY to get rid of the misleading parts with negative happiness to obtain the adjusted
or net HLY; deducting again the per-capita environmental costs imposed on others,
we obtain the ‘environmentally responsible happy nation index’ as an internationally
acceptable national success indicator that accounts positively for long and happy lives
but negatively at the external costs of environmental disruption imposed on others
and in the future. Hopefully, this ‘environmentally responsible happy nation index’
will lead to some re-orientation of both the market and national governments towards
something more fundamentally valuable.
8.1 Introduction
For many decades, some measures of national income (GDP, GNP and its per capita
values) have been used as a comprehensive achievement or success indicator of a
nation, at least in the economic sphere. The inadequacy of such income measures
prompts the development of improvements or alternative measures, including
the proposals in the 1970’s for taking account of leisure time and pollution, a
‘genuine progress indicator’ (Halstead 1998;Hamilton 1998), a ‘measure of domestic
progress’ (Jackson 2004), and the launching by the United Nations of the Human
Development Report in 1990 (which provides the Human Development Index, the
Gender-related Development Index, the Gender Empowerment Measure, and the
Human Poverty Index). The Human Development Index combines indices of life
expectancy, education, and PPP-adjusted GDP per capita. While such indices are
certainly relevant, they are still inadequate. Thus, it is ‘perfectly possible … to be
well-educated, free of illness and rich, but miserable and lonely’ (Marks et al. 2006,
p. 6).
As happiness is the only intrinsic value, ultimately speaking (Chap. 5), and as
economic growth no longer increase happiness significantly after a rather low level
of survival and comfort (Chap. 7), it is natural that we should look for a largely
happiness-based index. Thus, the focus on happiness and its relationships with
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economic and other variables by economists since the commencement of this century
(e.g. Frey and Stutzer 2002a; Layard 2005; van Praag & Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2004; Di
Tella and MacCulloch 2006) is to be welcome. Sociologists and other researchers
have also devised various measures of quality of life (QOL) indicators (see Hagerty
et al. 2001 for a review and a set of criteria for evaluating the indexes, and Ridzi
et al. 2020 for some recent discussion). However, as emphasized by Hajiran (2006,
pp. 33–4), ‘Improving QOL is just “a means” and not “an end” in itself. The ultimate
goal of improving QOL is to maintain and enhance the scope, depth and intensity
of human well-being or “happiness”’. Thus, good QOL indicators should reflect this
ultimate goal. More subjective indices have also been proposed, from Andrews and
Withey (1976) and Campbell et al. (1976) to Diener (2000), Cummins et al. (2003),
and Kahneman et al. (2004), Tanaka and Tokimatsu (2020).
For an individual, happiness or welfare1 is probably the most important ultimate
objective. However, at the national and global level and for the welfare of the future,
we have to consider two related factors, the possible costs imposed on others and the
sustainability of the situation. The most important variable here is the environmental
disruption imposed on our life support systems.
We do not really want just a single index. For different purposes, different indices
may be relevant (Cf. Ruggeri et al. 2020). For example, even just for purely economic
production, even after we know the GDP figure, we may still want to know the figure
for say total output of cars. On the other hand, some indices could certainly be
improved. For example, the gross material production index used by the former
centrally planned economies that involves double counting over different stages of
production (e.g. wheat, flour, and bread all counted at their full values, not just values
added) but that excludes services can be seen to be inferior to the modern concept of
national income or product. The former index had thus been discarded.
It is the purpose of this chapter to propose some improvements over certain
measures and to advance a measure of national success indicator that takes into
account the ultimate objective of life and the external costs imposed on others and
on the future. In particular, this chapter argues that.
• Existing method of calculating the measure of happy life years should be revised
to give a more accurate figure (Sect. 8.3).
• A revised index called the environmentally responsible happy nation index
(ERHNI) is proposed as an internationally more acceptable national success indi-
cator (Sect. 8.4) and calculated for the various countries with the relevant data
(Sect. 8.5).
• ERHNI = revised HLY - per capita external costs.
1 These two terms are used interchangeably here. In everyday usage, happiness probably refers
to current situation while welfare refers to the long term. For any given time period, the two are
the same. If I am very happy over a certain period, my welfare over that period must be high. On
the other hand, ‘utility’ which represents ‘preference’ may differ from happiness due to ignorance
(including imperfect foresight), a concern for the welfare of others, and imperfect rationality; see
Chap. 2.
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8.2 Revising the Measurement of Happy Life Years
Since happiness (or other similar measures like life satisfaction) is measured for a
given period (like a week or a year) but an individual may live a short or a long
live, the happiness index itself does not give the total amount of happiness enjoyed
over the whole lifespan. The concept of happy life years (Veenhoven ) is conceived
to overcome this problem. Conceptually, HLY is just the product of the average
happiness index over the lifespan and the length of the lifespan (of life expectancy).
For any given average happiness level (if positive), everyone would like to live a
longer than a shorter life. Thus, HLY is an important extension of the measurement
of happiness. However, an important revision in the actual measurement of HLY is
needed.
As measured by Veenhoven (2005), happy-life-years = happiness (index in the
range of 0–1) times life-expectancy at birth (in years). The happiness index is
converted from the normal index in the range 0–100 or 0–10 into 0–1, e.g. an index
of 50 (out of 100) is converted into 0.5. This measure has the following problem. It
is well known that, for a scale of 0–10, the figure of 5 typically corresponds to the
level of neutrality in net happiness. Since the level of overall net happiness can be
either positive or negative (an individual can be happy or unhappy), and since the
figure of 50% is typically used as the bare passing grade in schools, most people also
habitually use the figure of 5 out of 10 or 50 out of 100 to represent the level of zero
net happiness as is also the case for the curve in Fig. 1.1. (Some surveys explicitly
locate the neutrality point at 5.) The average happiness indices of most nations in the
world fall within the range of 4 to 8 (out of 10).
Consider the following two situations:
• A. An average happiness index of 4 (out of 10) with a lifespan of 100, giving
a HLY index of 40 (with the happiness index normalized to the range 0–1 as in
Veenhoven’s measure);
• B. An average happiness index of 6.5 (out of 10) with a lifespan of 60, giving a
HLY index of 39.
Which situation or life experience would you rather have? Since an index of 5
means neutrality (neither happy nor unhappy), the index of 4 really mean unhappi-
ness, with negative net happiness, or unhappiness more than happiness. For such a
life, it is better to have a shorter than a longer life, as a longer life really mean longer
suffering. Thus, most people will definitely choose B over A. However, existing
measure of HLY rank A higher than B. This is very misleading.
This difficulty can be easily overcome. We should count only the value over
neutrality as being valuable. In the above example, the adjusted HLY for the two
situations are calculated as:
A. (4 – 5) times 0.1 (conversion to the scale of 0–1) times 100=−10 (minus ten).
B. (6.5 – 5) times 0.1 times 60 = 9.
The superiority of B over A can then be reflected by the positive index of 9 for B
over the negative figure of minus 10 for A.
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Without the above adjustment, the problem still remains even if no happiness
index below the neutrality level of 5 is involved. Consider:
• C. An average happiness index of 5.1 with a lifespan of 100, giving an unadjusted
HLY index of 51.
• D. An average happiness index of 8 with a lifespan of 60, giving an unadjusted
HLY index of 48.
Again, most people would rather have a very happy life of 60 years rather than a
barely worth living life of 100 years. The adjusted HLY gives:
• C: (5.1 – 5) times 0.1 times 100 = 1.
• D: (8 – 5) times 0.1 times 60 = 18.
This shows a clear superiority of D over C as consistent with the preferences of
most people, as well as with rationality.
If the above adjustment is done, is the adjusted HLY an appropriate national
success indicator?
8.3 Towards an International Acceptable National Success
Indicator
For an individual, ignoring the effects on others, the adjusted HLY seems an appro-
priate indicator. However, for a whole nation, if say America is able to achieve a very
high adjusted HLY, but only by imposing very high environmental costs, making
people in other countries and in the future suffer enormously, this is not a good
outcome. (On the importance of the natural environment for happiness, see Chaps. 5
and 6, World Happiness Report 2020.) Thus, to provide an appropriate national
success indicator, it seems natural to allow for the adjusted HLY positively, and the
(per-capita) net external costs imposed on others negatively. In principle, the net
external costs may account for the balance of various external costs and benefits.
Due to the overwhelming importance of environmental protection, we may concen-
trate on the costs of environmental disruption. We then have the environmentally
responsible happy nation index (ERHNI) as our proposed national success indicator,
ERHNI = Adjusted HLY—per capita external costs
where ERHNI = Environmentally Responsible Happy Nation Index.2
2 A possible issue is whether the equality in happiness should be taken into account. In my view,
inequality in income is undesirable both because of the diminishing marginal utility of income and
because of the indirect undesirable effects of inequality in reducing happiness through for example
reducing social cohesion. Since happiness is already the ultimate objective, we can neither have
diminishing marginal happiness of happiness nor further indirect effects, except in an intertemporal
framework where the happiness in the future has not yet been accounted for. (Correctly accounting
for this intertemporal effect, an objective function that is not linear in individual happiness can be
shown to violate some compelling axiom, i.e. treating a perceptible increment of happiness as less
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The index for per capita external costs measures the aggregate costs imposed on
the global community by the nation concerned in per capita terms. Note that the ‘per
capita’ here is in the sense of per person within the home nation. Thus, if a nation of 1
billion persons imposes a total environmental costs on the rest of theworld (including
the future) equivalent to 6 billion Adjusted HLY, its per capita external cost is not
0.1 (6 billion/60 billion) but rather 6 (6 billion/1 billion). Thus, ERHNI measures
the amount of happy life years a nation achieves for an average person less the per
capita costs imposed externally on the global community. A nation that achieves a
high HLY and a low PCEC (and hence a high ERHNI) not only entails high happy
life years for its own residents but also imposes low (per capita) costs externally (on
others). Since the main form of external costs is probably environmental disruption,
the index is called ‘environmentally responsible happy nation index’ (ERHNI). If
ERHNI is accepted as a measure of national success, governments and people in
different nations around the world will not only each strive to achieve a high level
of HLY but will also strive to lower the costs imposed on others. This will enhance
the ability of each nation to achieve a high HLY index and the ability of the world to
sustain a high HLY more permanently.
If we sum the two terms (on the right hand side of the above equation) to get
ERHNI, the two terms have to be in comparable units. Since the relevant external
costs are on the whole world including the effects in the future, we cannot expect to
have a very accurate estimate. However, starting with some imperfect estimates (or
even just guestimates) may have the advantage of leading to more accurate estimates.
It is better to be roughly right on important things than to be perfectly accurate on
things that are irrelevant. Since environmental disruption is clearly a very important
issue that may even threaten our survival, it is imperative that we have some national
success indicator that gives sufficient recognition of the negative environmental costs.
The concept of green GDP takes some account of this. However, recent happiness
studies (see summaries in e.g. Frey and Stutzer 2002a; Layard 2005; Kahneman and
Krueger 2006; Ahuvia 2008; Asadullah et al. 2018; Cheng et al. 2018; Luo et al.
2018; Sherman et al. 2020) show that, at the social level (where individual relative
competition cancels out) incomes above a relatively low level does not increase
happiness (at least not to any significant extent). Thus, income is inferior to happiness
as the ultimate national success indicator. Secondly, depending on the particular
method of adjustment (from the traditional GDP), the measure of green GDP may
mainly emphasize the environmental effects on the country concerned, while the
concept of ERHNI emphasize the costs imposed on others and the future. Also,
though we propose to start with environmental costs, the concept of external costs
in ERHNI need not be confined to environmental costs. Once we shift from income
to happiness, the environmental costs internal to the country concerned is already
largely reflected in the measure of HLY of that country, though some effects on the
important than a less than a perceptible one; see Ng 1975, 1984.) Moreover, the argument for the
utilitarian social welfare function (Ng 2000, Chap. 5; also Chap. 5) supports not taking into account
inequality in the ultimate objective. Also, Ott (2005) shows that higher average happiness tends to
go with higher equality in happiness.
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future may still not be fully captured. Thus, for the measure of ERHNI, we focus on
the environmental costs external to that nation and imposed on the world.
What should be includedunder external costs could be further discussed.However,
wemay start with the global environmental costs imposed by a nation. Before a more
comprehensive measure of PCEC or its main component per capita global environ-
mental costs has been calculated, Ng (2008) uses the figures for CO2 emissions
calculated by the United Nations’ Department of Economic and Social Affairs as the
proxy. This is based on the reasoning that the most important global environmental
cost is probably that of global warming which is threatening the sustainability of
the whole life support system of the whole world. CO2 is the principal greenhouse
gas. Thus, using CO2 emissions may be a better proxy for external costs than the
full ecological footprint which includes both external and non-external items. In any
case, our calculation is mainly illustrative. When a more appropriate figure for the
external cost index is available, it could be used instead.
8.4 Estimating the Environmentally Responsible Happy
Nation Index
The Environmentally Responsible Happy Nation Index (ERHNI) may be estimated
for the various nations in the world if sufficient data are available. If we wait until
we have perfect data, we will wait forever. Partly for the purpose of illustration and
partly to kick start the endeavour, I calculated the ERHNI indices for 142 countries
with available data (in 2006) based on very rough estimates of the relevant variables
in Ng (2008), which should be consulted on the detailed method of estimation. Here
only some of the results are reported.
The results show that nations with low ERHNI indices are mainly African and
former communist countries (with their poverty and difficulties of transition, respec-
tively),3 due more to their low life satisfaction figures than their high external costs.
In Asia, only Pakistan has a negative figure and no nation in Western Europe and
(North and Latin) Americas has a negative index. This is partly because our estimate
of PCEC is conservative or has a significantly downward bias. However, although
our conservative estimate of external costs does not turn the ERHNI of these nations
into a negative figure, it nevertheless gives a different picture than just the figures
for HLY. For example, in North America, Canada and the USA have very similar
values in terms of life satisfaction, but Canada has an ERHNI value (11.3) signifi-
cantly higher that of the USA (8.064) due to a lower per capita total CO2 emission
(and hence our estimate of PCEC) of Canada than USA. Nations in Western Europe
which mostly have emission figures even lower than Canada, register high ERHNI
figures, taking six out of the top ten nations reported in Table 8.1, with Switzerland
and Denmark heading the list. Leading nations in the Asia–Pacific area are New
3 On the negative effects of transition on happiness, especially for Poland and Russia, see Brzezinski
(2019).
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Zealand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, and Mongolia, as listed in the lower part
of Table 8.1. A table reporting the results for all the 142 countries is in Ng (2008).
(This has been extended and updated by Chen et al. (2016) the result of which is
reported in Table 8.2.)
Following Ng (2008), Chen et al. (2016) make some important refinements to the
proposed ERHNI and use wider (than just CO2) scope for external costs and also
using more updated (2015) data and have a new estimate for an expanded set of 151
countries. Only the top 15 scorers are reported in Table 8.2.
8.5 Concluding Remarks
It is true that the existing happiness or life satisfaction measures are not perfectly
accurate and the external costs measures are also very rudimentary and incomplete.
However, we did not wait for the measure of GNP to be improved by the green
adjustments, the PPP adjustments, etc. before using it. We also did not wait for the
measures of happiness and life satisfaction to be perfected before using them. Recent
happiness studies show that income is a poor correlate with happiness (Chap. 7),
especially at the social level. Our ultimate objective is really happiness rather than
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incomes. Thus, having a measure of national success in terms of some appropriate
measure of happiness is very important. Moreover, just shifting to happiness alone
is not sufficient. If each of the 200 or so nations in the world strives to increase
the happiness level of its own people without sufficient check on the external costs
imposed on the rest of the world, we may still have the tragedy of the commons.
A desirable national success indicator should take into account not only the
(average) happy live years achieved for its own people, but must also take into
(negative) account the external costs (only global environmental disruption is taken
into account in this chapter, but the concept could be extended) imposed on
others (including the future). The Environmentally Responsible Happy Nation Index
(ERHNI) is proposed to serve this purpose. The calculation of this for the various
nations reported in the last section is based on very rough and incomplete estimates.
Nevertheless, it is hoped that, with further improvements, it will lead to some re-
orientation of both the market and national governments towards something more
fundamentally valuable and less damaging to our life support system.
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Abstract Contrary to the common belief that the age-happiness relationship is
mountain shape (the middle aged being happier than children and the aged), it is
really largely U shape, with the middle aged (at around mid 30’s or 40’s) least
happy. The increase from around 60 to 70’s is particularly clear. However, happiness
becomes lower over the last few years of illness before passing away. The decline in
happiness from around 12 years old and the trough in happiness level around middle
ages may partly be explained by the delay in sleep–wake cycles of teenagers, causing
conflict with their mostly middle-aged parents. Recognizing the evolutionary ulti-
mate explanation for this delay advanced here, the society should delay start hours
for high schools to fit in with the delayed biological clock of teenagers.
9.1 The U-shape Relation of Age and Happiness
What is the relationship of age and happiness? Many if not most people (myself
included before I looked at the evidence) believe that happiness should first mostly
with age up to around the middle age, and then decline with age; the relationship
is that of an inverted U shape, or mountain shape. This is thought to be so because
children do not have independence, have the pressure of passing exam, and are not
capable of enjoying life much; in contrast, the elderly have health problems and
likely have lower incomes as well.
Actually, many studies in different countries discover that the situation is actually
the opposite. Young children are fairly happy, and happiness starts to decline from
around 11–12 years old (González-Carrasco et al. 2017). Happiness reaches a low at
around mid-thirties to fifty something; then it increases (Gerdham and Johannesson
2001;Mroczek and Spiro 2005; Deaton 2008; Blanchflower and Oswald 2008; 2017;
Cheng et al. 2017; Graham and Pozuelo 2017; Beja 2018; Laaksonen 2018; Butkovic
et al. 2020), but decreases over the last few years (Fukuda 2013; Burns et al. 2014),
typically with serious illness that ends their lives. A study on China shows the lowest
point at around 34 years old (Graham et al. 2017).
Knowing this somewhat counter-intuitive evidence is very important. When you
are very unhappy at say around early thirties, you may think that, I am young and
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healthy, but I am already so unhappy; won’t it be horrible when I become old and
unhealthy? Perhaps I should end this miserable life! Now, having known that the
age-happiness relationship is largely U shape instead of mountain shape, when you
are at your low, you will know that this is only the low point in life, and the future
will be much better. Just this knowledge will reduce your unhappiness then and help
you endure over that, instead of ending your life unwisely. This knowledge may thus
save your life and increase your happiness. This is certainly worth many thousands
of times the costs of reading this book.
Is the U shape relationship of age and happiness non-controversial? There were
some controversies. Earlier, happiness researchers believed that there is no regular
relationship between age and happiness; the happiness levels of individuals in
different age groups are largely the same; on average, a person over different ages
also has largely similar happiness levels. Differences and fluctuations are not mainly
age-related, with no definite tendencies or patterns. They believed in this probably
because there are many factors affecting happiness, with large interpersonal differ-
ences. In the absence of a large amount of data, it is very difficult to see any tendency
or pattern. In later studies, with much more data, more reliable conclusions could be
reached. For example, Blanchflower and Oswald (2017), using seven data sets from
51 countries covering 1.3 million randomly selected individuals from 20 to 90 years
old, reaching the reliable conclusion that the age-happiness relationship is largely U
shape.
I have read many papers on this issue and may safely conclude that, if we exclude
the last few years of illness before death, in most cases, we do have the largely
U shape age-happiness relationship. There are also some double U or W shape
relationships. For example, a recent U.K. primary data set shows a low at around age
20, recovering to about 34 years old, and then declining to another low around 46;
after 50, happiness recovers strongly until 70’s. The U.S. data are similar, especially
the jump in happiness from 60 to the 70’s is very clear. Confucius said, ‘I started
to devote myself to study at the age of 15; became independent at 30; had no more
illusions at 40; knew the mandate of Heaven at 50; could accept different opinions
calmly at 60; could do whatever I want without overstepping any bounds at 70’ (my
translation). It was likely that his happiness also increased in the later few decades
of his life.
An evidence strongly supporting that (net) happiness is U shape in age is that
negative feelings and behavior like pressures, psychological problems, depressions,
suicide rates, etc. are strongly mountain shape in age. These data are more objec-
tive and reliable. As these factors are strongly negatively related to happiness, this
mountain shape supports the U shape age-happiness relationship. The Graham et al.
(2017) study on China that reaches the lowest happiness level at around 34 years old,
also shows a peak in these negative factors at around 33 years old.
Yet another interesting supporting evidence is from apes (including chimpanzees
and orangutangs). Those feeding these apes can tell whether they are happy or
unhappy from their appearance and behavior. Their happiness indices so judged
are also U shape, with a low in middle age (Weiss et al. 2012).
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Why does our happiness initially fall with age to a trough at middle age and
recover after that?
The decline in happiness from about age 12 is probably associated with puberty.
Children at such ages start to have their own views which may be different from the
parents. For example, some want to dye their hair into different colors and may have
strong disputes with parents. They start to be interested in the opposite sex, but have
little experience in relationship. Who they are interested in may not reciprocate. The
pressure of study is also increasing.
The unhappiness at around 30’s or 40’s may be associated with financial pressures
such as paying back housing loans, higher family responsibilities and expenses. It
may also be the time pressure, with the need to take care of both the parents and
children, at a time when working is important. Alternatively, it may also be due to
being newly wed, still lacking experience in handling the relationship well; or first
having a child, with no experience in caring for it. On the other hand, the higher
happiness of the old may be due to the higher wisdom, and like Confucius, being
able to do as onewisheswithout overstepping bounds.1 However, formy case, though
I have long known the mandate of Heaven (well, well over 50), I still have illusions.
If I do as I want, I will certainly be put into prison. Nevertheless, my own happiness
levels also conform to the general pattern, being U shape with age. My least happy
periodwas also inmy early thirties. Since then,my happiness increased every decade,
with the peak at the current decade in my 70’s.
I have an observation thatmay partly explain the decrease in and the low happiness
level of teenagers and those in their middle ages simultaneously, as well as a simple
way to increase their happiness. This is related to the delay in the sleep/wake cycle
of teenagers, as discussed below.
9.2 The Delay in Sleep/wake Cycles of Teenagers: Ultimate
Reason and Implications
We are all familiar with the sleep/wake cycle. This basic circadian rhythms of day-
night wake-sleep cycles are observed from fruit fly to human (Dunlap 1999). Though
the reasons for sleeping may not yet been settled, given the need for sleeping, the
reason for the circadian rhythms is fairly obvious, being dictated by the 24 h day-night
cycle. Here we are concerned with why this rhythm is delayed for teenagers upon
the onset of puberty. This delay is well-known by all parents with teenage children.
It is very difficult to get adolescents to observe ‘early to bed and early to rise’. It has
also been clearly confirmed by scientific research, ‘Our results indicate that pubertal
maturation at this transitional phase (age 11–12 years) has a significant influence
upon phase preference [i.e. delay in the circadian sleep cycle] and that psychosocial
factors are less influential than anticipated’ (Carskadon et al. 1993, p. 261; see also
1 On the contribution of wisdom to the old, see Cheung and Chow (2020).
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Gradisar et al. 2013). Thus, your teenage children’ late sleeping habit is not mainly
influenced by bad friends, but has a biological basis.
Why do teenagers sleep late? In biological research, there is a distinction between
proximate versus ultimate reasons (Mayr 1961). Thephysiologicalmechanisms influ-
encing the circadian rhythms and the differences of these factors for teenagers have
been explored. A proximate reason for sleeping delay of teenagers is the delay in
the secretion of melatonin in the body since puberty (Hagenauer et al. 2009; Troxel
and Wolfson 2017). (Melatonin is related to sleeping. Thus, when one has jet lags,
taking melatonin about 45 min before sleeping may help.) But why does this delay
take place and at puberty? This more ultimate reason for this teenage delay in the
rhythm has not, to my knowledge, been discussed. Here, I wish to advance a likely
ultimate explanation.
The fact that the onset of the phase delay occurs at puberty suggests that it is
related tomating. A person becomes potentially sexually active after puberty.Mating
is directly related to the passing on of one’s genes and hence takes priority over many
other things (with the possible exception of survival). Thus, after puberty, allowing
the individual to have high chance of mating becomes a high priority. Why is this
related to the circadian phase delay?
The answer is hinted at in an ancient Chinese poem from the Song Dynasty: ‘The
moon rising up the top of the willow tree; people dating after nightfall’ (Ouyang Xiu
欧阳修). Mating is more appropriate or common after nightfall. This is so both for
privacy and safety, as one is more vulnerable to attack while mating. Thus, to have
more opportunities for mating (and the pre-mating courting), adolescents have to
delay sleeping time until well after nightfall. Given that it is probably easier and less
harmful to delay than to shorten the sleeping time, the teenage circadian delay then
emerged from mutation and got selected. This is our mating-facilitating explanation
for the delay.
This delay helps partly explain the low happiness levels for both the teenagers and
the middle aged. The belief in the desirability of ‘early to bed and early to rise makes
a person healthy, wealthy, and wise’ is very deep-seated. Many schedules, including
school and office hours observe this rule. When teenagers start to sleep and wake
up late, they unavoidably get into conflict with their (mostly middle-aged) parents.
This is likely one of the reasons accounting for the low happiness levels of these two
groups.
Apart from having conflict with their parents, the delay in the sleep–wake cycles
of teenagers also make them not having enough sleep, especially as the schooling
hours have not been changed to fit their new biological clock (Carskadon et al. 2004).
For the U.S., only about 7% of high-school students have enough sleep of 9 h a day
needed for their ages (Basch et al. 2014). Evidence suggests no improvement in this
and even some deterioration (Troxel and Wolfson 2017, p. 419).
One obvious social measure to tackle problems created by the delay in the
teenagers’ circadian cycle is to delay schooling hours for high schools. Why has this
not been done. One reason is the inadequate recognition of this delay being biolog-
ical rather than the influence of bad friends. Not realizing that this delay is natural
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tendency difficult to fight against makes people wanting the teenagers themselves to
adjust to the social schedules.
Another reason against delaying hours for high schools is that this will increase
transportation costs. Even if this is true, the benefits would likely be many times
the costs. In fact, even if we confine only to the more easily measurable economic
factors, the benefits are 9 times the costs (Jacob and Rockoff 2011). Even purely for
productivity considerations, delaying high-school hours is highly desirable (Hafner
et al. 2017).
Another reason against the delay in schooling hours for teenagers (high schools)
is the argument that this delay will only delay further their hours of going to bed,
not increasing the amount of their sleep. This is contradicted by a study showing
that a delay of school hours by 50 min increases students’ sleeping time by more
than half an hour and reduces fatigue in day time (Owens et al. 2017). Some study
concludes that delaying school start hours does not delay bedtime, but increases the
amount of sleep, reduces daytime sleepiness, promote a better mood, and reduces
coffee drinking (Boergers et al. 2014).
Frommany studies and experiments, it may be concluded that delaying schooling
hours for teenagers not only increases their health, function, and safety, but also
benefits the economy (Troxel and Wolfson 2017, p. 420). On the other hand, ‘there
was no evidence suggesting potential harmful outcomes associated with later start
times for adolescents’ (Troxel and Wolfson 2017, p. 421). Rather, inadequate sleep
is obviously harmful, including affecting safety, as it will increase traffic accidents
(Danner and Phillips 2008).
In April 2016, some southern districts of Maine in U.S. voted to delay secondary
and high schools starting hours to no earlier than 8.30 (Collins et al. 2017). (Before
this change, many schools started at around 7.30.) This decision affected 6,500
students. The delay in school starting hours produced positive effects, with no
increase in transportation costs as afraid. People are now accustomed to the new
hours. One personnel said, ‘If you told our kids we’d be going back to the old system
we’d have a revolt’ (Collins et al. 2017, p. 482).
It seems clear that delaying starting hours for high schools is a simple way to
increase sleeping time, health, and happiness for teenagers and their parents.
9.3 Chapter Appendix. Methodology
There are two different methods in analyzing the age-happiness relationship. The
first is to directly look at the primary data, comparing the average happiness levels of
individuals with different ages. This was used by early researchers, mainly psychol-
ogists. Within this method, there are also two different ways of analysis. The first is
to compare the happiness levels of people of different age groups in any one time,
i.e. taking a cross-section of people in the society at the same time/period. Another
is to follow a group of people through their life or as they age. This is the time-series
data (with the panel data on a specific group one being more reliable), in contrast to
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the cross-section data. This second way takes a long time to complete the study and
hence is more costly and less frequently used.
In contrast to just looking at the primary data, another method is to do multiple
regression on the primary data, either the cross-section or the panel one. Apart from
separating people into different ages, we add other possible variables like sex, jobs,
incomes, health conditions, etc. to get the relationships of age itself with happiness.
The need for doing this multiple regression is based on the following rationale. For
simplicity, suppose (not really true) that female (or the blue-collar workers) age-
happiness relationship is mountain shape, while the male (while-collar workers) one
is U shape. Then, if we do not distinguish the two groups and put them together,
we may get the result that the age-happiness curve is horizontal, i.e. no relationship.
But this hide the opposite and hence offsetting relationships of the two groups. Also,
the middle age may be happier due to their higher incomes; if the income factor is
deducted, there may be no different. Similarly, the aged may be less happy because
of lower health; excluding the health factor, happiness may be unchanged.
However, it may also be argued that, the middle aged have higher incomes
precisely because of their higher age (compared to the younger groups) that increases
their experience and hence their incomes. So, this should not be deducted. Similarly,
the aged may be less healthy precisely because of being older. So, this factor should
also not be deducted. Thus, both the method using just primary data and the method
using multiple regression have some advantages and some inadequacies. We may
use both methods and compare the results. In recent years, researchers used both
methods and still obtained the result that the age-happiness relationship is largely U
shape. For example, Blanchflower and Oswald (2017) show that, out of seven data
sets, if we just look at the primary data, we have the U shape relationship for 5 sets
out of 7. Using multiple regression, we have the U shape result for all the 7 sets.
Moreover, the U shape relationship is very large.
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Abstract Many factors may affect happiness, including how our needs (including
the five levels identified by Maslow) are satisfied. Four important F’s for happiness
at the individual level are: faith, form/fitness, family, and friends. At the social level,
important factors include environmental quality, equality, social capital (including
trust).
10.1 Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs
We may look at our needs before examining factors affecting our happiness. A
well-known list of needs is Maslow’s (1943, 1954/1970a/1987) hierarchy of five
levels/stages.1 The first (most basic) level is the basic physiological needs of clothing,
food, shelter, and sex.Next comes that of safety (including personal, employment and
health); followed by love, friendship and belonging; and the fourth level of esteem,
including achievement, being respected, and good reputation.2 The highest fifth level
is that of self-actualization. (Maslow estimated that only 2% of people reached this
stage.)
I am in strong agreement with all the first four levels, but strongly disagree with
self-actualization. First, I think that, except for the two points mentioned below,
if a person has achieved the basic needs, safety, love, and esteem, she has largely
actualized herself; there is no need for an extra level of self-actualization. This extra
could create another Hitler that achieve self-actualization to the serious detriments of
others. Secondly, the needs of the first four levels should be related to happiness of the
individual concerned. Thirdly, I do want a higher fifth level, not of self-actualization,
but ‘beyond oneself’. Having achieved those in the first four levels, or even before
1 These five levels/stages have been expanded to include cognitive and aesthetic needs (Maslow
1970) and transcendence needs (Maslow 1970). For empirical studies of different needs, see Tay and
Diener (2011) and Rodríguez-Meirinhos et al. (2020); for a recent critical discussion, see McLeod
(2020).
2 On the role of self-esteem, especially in mediating the contribution of modesty to happiness, see
Zheng and Wu (2020).
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that, one should go beyond oneself to include the welfare of others, even including
that of animals (on which see the final Chap. 16.
Partly based on our needs,wemay also classify factors affecting our happiness into
the subjective (i.e. one’s own) andobjective. Subjective factors include: nature (genes,
pregnancy; though pregnancy may also be regarded as a form of nurture) and nurture
(nourishment, education and influence of family, school, society), including phys-
ical, personality, intelligence, emotional quotient, etc. The objective factors include:
family, school, work unit, friends, society, etc. The subjective and objective factors
actually interact with each other as well as with personal choice and random factors.
In this process, factors such as health, mental conditions, personal relationships,
income/consumption/wealth, work, life, leisure activities, etc. are all important. One
also experiences happiness and unhappiness, which in turns have feedbacks to those
(especially subjective) factors. Then, over time, we have dynamic evolution of the
various factors and happiness levels.
10.2 The Four F’s of Happiness
Many years ago, I once (in public lectures) selected out of many factors for happi-
ness, four particularly important ones for discussion. These are: Faith, Form/Fitness,
Family, Friends—the four F’s of happiness. Why four and not three or five. This is
so because there is a well-known four F’s in animal behavior. Except for sleeping
(when hardly any behavior is involved), most if not all animals engage in the four
F’s most of the time: Feeding, Fighting, Fleeing, Mating. (Please do not ask me or
anyone else: Why they are called the four F’s, as the fourth one is an M, not an F?).
Faith includes in particular religious faith.Believers are happier than non-believers
(Gundlachand Opfinger 2013). It may be that hope and spirituality may be more
important here, rather than participation of religious rituals as such (Marques et al.
2013). I was brought up in a completely non-religious family. My father was
a strong believer in materialism/communism in philosophy/politics; my mother,
though believing in the existence of ghosts, did not practice any religious activi-
ties. However, influenced by my father, teachers, and the general atmosphere at the
time (1950’s in Malaya, the main constituent of Malaysia), I was a strong believer
in communism as well. Since the second year in high school, I also actively partic-
ipated in the communist-led student activities. Our faith and activities then actually
also contributed much to our happiness then, though also likely to the miseries of
some, including those expelled from schools, imprisoned, and even killed.
The importance of religious faith to happiness is likely underestimated. Religious
belief is related negatively to incomes. Despite lower incomes, the believers are
happier (Inglehart 2010). Thus, the positive effect of faith to happiness must be
strong enough to offset the negative effect of incomes.
The factor of ‘form/fitness’ refers to health, including both physical and mental
health. Though this factor has an important element of nature (what one is born
with), nurture is also important. I can say this partly from my personal experience. I
am the last (seventh) child in my family. Perhaps the factory of my mother’s womb
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had been overworked by then (more than nine pregnancies including the still-born),
I was born with somewhat below average health (and height). I remember having
more illness including flu and toothache than most fellow school mates. I maintained
frequent, though irregular exercises until I finished my first degree. After that, during
my three years doing my PhD and the first few years as a lecturer, I had no serious
exercise except mowing the lawn during spring/summer time after we bought our
house. I reckon that over these 7 years or so of lack of exercise, my health conditions
further deteriorated from its slightly below average level. Having realizing that, I
started gradually to increase my exercise levels since around mymid 30’s. Now, I am
spending about 90 min virtually every day exercising; about an hour in the morning
of breathing, stretching, standups, pushups, and gongfu, plus half an hour of taiji
before going to bed. After decades of catching up, my health level is now far above
people of the same age, and also above myself at my thirties.
Health is not just affected by nature and exercise, but also by one’s attitude to life,
lifestyle including healthy food and enough sleep. This is true for both physical and
mental health.
I have a particular need to stay healthy and live long, at least until my 100 birthday
in 2042. The story started frommy teaching a Ford class (Sino-American Economics
Training Centre) of graduates in Renmin University in Beijing over 1992–1993.
Towards the end of that semester in March 1993, I made an appointment with the 40
students in the class to have a reunion after 16.5 years. Twenty of the forty students
attended the reunion on 30 September 1999. At the end of the reunion, we made
another appointment for another reunion after 16.5 × 2 = 33 years from then, or on
30 September 2042, when I will already be 100 years old. Since not many in that
Ford class may be able to attend the next reunion, we also decided to extend the
invitation to all my students. If you regard yourself as my student, you may come.
Moreover, since I could do only about 20 pushups when I was in my 20 s, and 60
pushups in my 60 s, I will try to do 100 pushups in one go then. Thus, I have to live
long and stay healthy. I am doing around 78 pushups every morning now, and adding
one more every year. By 2042, I should be able to do 100! Haha!
For the last two F’s of happiness: family and friends. I will say a few words on
the last factor (friends) before discussing ‘family’ a little more later.
The importance of friendship for happiness is obvious for everyone. There are
quite a few old Chinese sayings relating to this, e.g. ‘At home, you rely on your
parents; away from home, you rely on your friends’; ‘With friends coming from afar,
I am so happy!’ In many Western countries, it is very important for many men to
have a pint of bear with friends chatting at a bar. Studies also confirm the importance
of friendship for happiness. However, it is more important to have one or a few
good friends with whom one can share intimate joys and sorrows than having many
friends. Here, it seems that quality is much more important than quantity.
The company of some friends enhances the mood at good activities and even
turn negative moods into positive for undesirable activities. ‘For example, to hike or
walk alone raises mood by 2%, while a shared walk raises mood by much more, by
7.5% with a friend or 8.9% with a partner. Activities that normally worsen moods
can induce happiness when done in the company of a friend or partner. Commuting
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or traveling, activities that on average worsen mood levels (−1.9%) are happiness-
inducing when shared with friends or partners, with mood up 5.3% for a trip shared
with a friend, or 3.9%with a partner. Even waiting or queueing, a significant negative
when done alone (-3.5%) becomes a net positive when the experience is done with
the company of a friend (+3.5%)’ (World Happiness Report 2020, Chap. 1).3
Now on family. Before one forms one’s own family, the relationship with parents
and siblings are very important for happiness.4 Similarly, these relationships are also
very important for the happiness of parents.Most people have personal understanding
of these from personal experience, if not also from watching TV and reading novels.
When one grows up, one may get married to form one’s own family. Despite the
popular saying ‘marriage is the grave of love’, marriage is actually, on average, good
for happiness.
In 2018, a study in U.S. lasting for three decades, discovered that 40% of the
married regarded themselves as very happy; for those not married, this figure is
only 24%. This is not a special case. Actually, many happiness studies consistently
find that the married are happier than those not married. For happiness, marriage
and employment are twice as important as incomes (Caroll 2007). Some researcher
even estimated that, on average, a single person has to increase her/his income level
to 13.8 times the existing level, to attain the same happiness level as the married
(Dockery 2005).5 Note that this is not 13.8% higher, but 13.8 times the original
income. Except for very unusual fortunes, this huge increase in income is almost
impossible; it is easier to get married. However, one must not marry any other person
of the opposite sex. You have to find the right person. Those trying to get a divorce
are much less happy than the singles. One aspect of a suitable spouse is similarity
in personality (agreeableness and openness in particular) and values (moral identity
and spirituality) which contribute not only to the life satisfaction of the couple but
also the children (Wu et al. 2020).
You may suspect that the causal relationship may be reversed. It may not be that
marriage increases your happiness; rather, it may be that the happier persons choose
to marry, or easier to get a mate. While this reverse causal effect is likely applicable
to some extent, further research shows that the beneficial effects of marriage on
happiness aremore important (HoriandKamo2017;Tao2019).6 GroverandHelliwell
(2019, Abstract) ‘control individual pre-marital well-being levels and find that the
married are still more satisfied, suggesting a causal effect at all stages of themarriage,
from pre-nuptual bliss to marriages of long-duration’.
3 On the importance of engagement with family and friends for children happiness, see Savahl et al.
(2020).
4 On the importance of family, friends, and the school for children happiness, see Mínguez (2020);
on the importance of parent–child relationship for the happiness of children, see Cherry et al. (2020).
5 ‘…mean hourly earnings in 2002were $A14.51. To have as great an impact on expected happiness
as being married does for a a youngmale relative to being single would require earnings of in excess
of $A200 per hour’ (Dockery 2005, p. 300).
6 Tao, focussing on Taiwan, in fact find no selection effect; married people were not happier 2 or
more years before marriage. Also, ‘Marriage, on average, enhances happiness more and longer for
women’ (Abstract).
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Why does marriage increase happiness? The most direct reason is the satisfaction
of needs. Except for very few cases of artificial fertilization, sex between a man and
a woman is needed to have babies and for the species to continue. Thus, to ensure the
accomplishment of this mission, we have evolved the capacity for high enjoyment
of sex.
You may argue that one does not have to get married to have sex. However,
long-term well-adjusted partnership may achieve high levels in various relation-
ships, not attainable by a one-night stand or commercial sex. In economic anal-
ysis, there is something called ‘learning by doing’. This is also applicable to sexual
relationship. Studies show that the best relationship is achieved after 15 years
or longer: https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2016/jul/23/why-sex-is-better-
in-a-long-term-relationship.
About forty years ago, when the 50+ years old wife of a high official in China
passed away, he was very sad. A colleague told him, ‘With you wife gone, you may
marry a younger one, isn’t this nice?’ When reading this report then, I was agreeable
with that colleague. Now I understand more why that official was very sad. Though
younger women are more attractive in look, a well-adjusted long-term partner is
more beneficial to happiness, as studies show. Of course, apart from sex, there are
also other relationships between a husband and wife. Man is a social animal and are
born not to like loneliness.
From an economic or financial aspect, marriage is also advantageous. The ideas
of division of labor and economies of scale also apply here. Men and women are
good in different things and can cooperate to achieve much better results in many
areas. Cooking for two persons certainly costs much less than twice the time of doing
that for one person.
A few years back, an interesting paper entitled ‘Are all good men married? The
conclusion is: ‘Not that all good men are married; but rather, after being married and
having a good wife to assist him, that he becomes a high-earning good man’ (王智
波、李长洪 2016,第838页; my translation) . Thus, with the right partner, marriage
is likely an arrangement that is most mutually beneficial.
Since marriage is good for us financially, biologically, and spiritually, why is the
institution of marriage seems to be on the decline, with some people (e.g. 俞炜华
2011) even regarding it as being restrictive of human nature and will vanish in due
course? (See 黄有光 2013 for a defense of the institution of marriage against this
argument.)
First, though marriage is good for our happiness, many do not sufficiently recog-
nize this fact. For example, in Netherlands and the U.S., most people believe that
marriage will not increase our life satisfaction, but actually, studies show that their
life satisfaction is positively affected by marriage (Kapteyn et al. 2010, p. 99).
Secondly, we are usually misled by news reports and gossips. We often hear that
someone’s marriage has broken up, or the relationship is in trouble, making people
believe that ‘marriage is the grave of love’. Actually, most happy marriages attract
little reports and gossips, but marriages in trouble do. When you enjoy yourself
much in your home, you do not talk to friends and relatives about it; when you have
relationship problems, you may seek help from them. This asymmetry may mislead
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bystanders. This is related to the saying, ‘Good news does not go out of your doorstep;
bad news is spread thousands of miles away’.
One example of the exaggeration of bad news is this. Over many decades, it has
been said that more than 50% of marriages in the U.S. will end up in divorce, and that
this figure is still increasing. Actually, this was only an estimated figure for the future
that never realizes. In the 1970’s, after the relaxation of the divorce laws in the U.S.,
the rates of divorce increased rapidly. Someone then extrapolated the future divorce
rates to break the 50% line, based on that short-term increase. But this prediction
never comes true. Actually, the divorce rates in the U.S. have declined substantially
over the last four decades, with the number of divorces for every thousand married
women declining from 22.6 in 1980 to 16.9 in 2015, and remaining around this lower
figure since. However, the 50% figure has spread widely and still believed by many.
Yet another reason for the underestimation of the benefits of marriage is that
these benefits are largely longer-term, not fully realized in the short run. According
to a U.S. study (Amatoand James 2018), happiness increases after marriage, but then
decreases somewhat over the next fewyears, reaching a lowat around 5–10 years after
marriage. Thus, the so-called ‘seven-years itch’ has some validity. Nevertheless, after
more than ten or twenty years after marriage, happiness increases back significantly.
A report by the government of Shanghai shows a similar result. More than 80% of
women in Shanghai are happy, but those women married for less than three years
have the lowest happiness levels. Those with the highest happiness levels have been
married for 20 years or longer, as reported in United Morning Daily, Singapore’s
leading Chinese newspaper (《联合早报》2015.10.28). Marriage has to be cultivated
for a long time to produce great happiness.
Thus, the saying ‘Marriage is the grave of love’ is largely based on unreliable
guess, inaccurate or misleading reports/gossips, and the inadequate recognition of
the long-term effects. Thus, persons of marriageable age should not be misled by
this saying. They should get a good partner to marry.
In 2014, at a function for new students, I was asked to give a talk. Among other
points, I mentioned this. During this few years of study, do not just get a degree;
get a partner as well. University study is the golden age for finding a partner: more
opportunities, more information, more sincerity. However, I also told them, ‘If you
have not got a partner yet, you cannot beat me, because my wife and I started dating
each other in our high school days and got married soon after our degrees!’.
For those already married, they should not give it up easily. It may take time
to make a marriage work well. However, for those unsalvageable relationship, the
divorce option should not be excluded altogether. Instead of suffer a long time to
maintain an unhappy marriage, ending the relationship and get a new start may be
better.
These days, many people cohabitate without getting married. Is cohabitation as
good as marriage for happiness? A study in the U.K. shows that both cohabitation
and happiness are good for happiness. However, for those first time getting married,
marriage increases life satisfaction more than cohabitation does (Blekesaune 2018).
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For people in the East, due to the higher traditional views about marriage, this advan-
tage of marriage over cohabitation is likely to be even bigger. Also, a higher degree
of commitment in partnership increases life satisfaction (Bucher et al. 2019).
There is an interesting difference between men and women regarding marriage.
A study on more than two thousand persons (Liu et al. 2013) shows that, for men’s
life satisfaction, whether one is married or not is important; for women, the quality
of the marriage is more important. The old Chinese saying, ‘It is important for a
man not to enter a wrong business; it is important for a woman not to marry a wrong
husband’, has some validity. Of course, the quality of marriage is important for both
men and women; however, it is more important for women. Thus, the extra care (in
comparison to men) taken by a woman in choosing a partner does not only have an
evolutionary reason (Sect. 10.3), but also a rational one (consistent with happiness
calculation).
There is another interesting finding in China. For those university-educated
females, those with the highest happiness level are ‘with family but no job’; next
comes those ‘with family and job’; further down are those with ‘job but no family’.
The least happy are those with neither job nor family (吴要武、刘倩 2014,第27页).
Family and job are both important, but at least for females, family is more important
than job.
An important question especially for parents is: For the future happiness when
grown up, what factors are important when young? Layard et al. (2014) show that the
most important factor is emotional health, followed by characters or conduct, with
the least important one being intellectual development, out of these three important
factors. Thus, for the true happiness of children rather than your own face, do not give
too much pressure on children to performwell in examination; much more important
to help them develop well on emotional health, and behave properly, particularly by
setting examples yourselves.
10.3 Important Factors at the Social Level
The above factors affecting happiness, the 4 F’s in particular, focus at the individual
level. For the social level, there are many other factors important for the happi-
ness of individuals in the society. This include environmental quality, equality (in
the distribution of incomes and wealth), freedom, democracy, government quality
(Helliwelland Huang 2008), social capital, etc. On the importance of social capital,
see Neira et al. 2019; on the importance of trust, an important element of social
capital, see Hudson 2006; Helliwelland Wang 2011; Helliwell et al. 2014; on the
importance of social trust especially for urban males, see Lu et al. 2020, b; on the
importance of mental capital, which is more on the individual level, see Ho 2013.
Also, Chap. 7 of the World Happiness Report 2020 finds that higher personal and
institutional trust are key factors in explaining why life evaluations are high in the
Nordic countries.
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On democracy, Frey and Stutzer (2002) comparing situations in different cantons
in Switzerland, find that direct election is positively associated with happiness, both
in getting people’s preferred results, and also in higher satisfaction in the democratic
process.On the other hand,Chinese researchers (陈前恒 et al. 2014) find that each 1%
increase in democratic development in the village, increases well-being equivalent to
18.47% increase in per-capita net income. This is a huge effect. (On the importance
of political participation on farmers’ happiness, see also Tang et al. 2020.)
Freedom is positively associated with happiness (Veenhoven 2000), but mainly
for rich countries; not for poor countries, except for economic freedom. Free trade
related positively to happiness in poor, but not in rich countries. This is consistentwith
the higher positive relationship of income levels before US$7,500 per-capita per year
than after this level. Free trade increases effective consumption andhence is important
for people at lower incomes. Similarly, economic and legal institutions are more
important to low-income countries, while political institutions are more important to
rich countries (Bjornskov et al. 2010; Helliwell et al. 2014). On the importance of
economic freedom, see also Graafland (2020) especially on the interdependence of
culture and institutions.
Equality (in both income and wealth distribution) increases happiness in many
ways. First, human beings are not as strong as tigers physically, and hence we rely
largely on our intelligence (in its generalized sense of including IQ, EQ and wisdom)
and cooperation to survive and prosper. Our sense for equality and justice helps us
to cooperate better and hence we are probably universally born with a preference for
equality. This is further strengthened by nurture as our education and culture are also
equality-friendly. Hence, a higher degree of equality, if not achieved at prohibitive
costs, allows the society to be better off because individuals directly feel better off
with higher equality.
Secondly, consumption of the poor meets more urgent needs than that of the rich,
at the margin. That is to say, the last one thousand dollars of spending probably
contribute little if anything to the utility or welfare of a rich person, but may mean a
lot to one with low consumption. Thus, a higher degree of equality promotes more
aggregate welfare, through the differentials in the marginal utility of consumption.
This argument is based on the interpersonal comparability of cardinal utility/welfare
that many economists frown upon traditionally, but is defended in Chap. 6 above. The
age of insisting upon only ordinal measurability and interpersonal non-comparability
is, or at least should be, over.
Thirdly, equality reduces crimes and promotes social harmony. This has been
known for a long time. However, recent research emphasizing the efficiency-
promoting effects of equality has shifted economists’ view. Formerly, economists
(e.g. Mirrlees 1971; Okun 1975/2015) focused on the tradeoff between equality and
efficiency. That is, if we promote equality, we need to sacrifice a bit of efficiency, e.g.
taxing the rich to help the poor incurs not only administrative costs, but also creates
the disincentive effects that discourage the earning of more money. Now, economists
focus on the beneficial effects of equality on efficiency and growth.
One important aspect here is related to the shift from physical to human capital
as being important for economic growth. When physical capital was important,
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inequality increased growth by increasing savings by the rich and hence increased
capital accumulation and economic growth; as human capital becomes more impor-
tant, equality increases the contribution of widespread education and hence growth
(Milanovic 2011). In addition, ‘Economic historians have shown (Solar 1995;
Greifand Iyigun 2013) that the net effect of the Poor Law was probably to foster
technological progress, because it weakened the resolve of the inevitable losers to
resist it and thus reduced social unrest’ (Mokyr 2014, p.192). Also, ‘…economic
historians such as Lindert (2004, 2009) … have shown the complex, but on the
whole favorable, effect of the Welfare State on economic performance to the point
where the full economic benefits and costs may have been roughly equal, making
the Welfare State a “free lunch”’ (Mokyr 2014, p.191). This suggests that more
equality-improving welfare spending may be welfare improving, since equality also
contributes to welfare more directly as discussed above.7 This is consistent with a
recent result that ‘Tax policy that alleviates poverty improves economic growth in
most instances’ (Biswas et al. 2017, p. 724).
Equality also reduces crimes and increases social harmony and trust, and trust
increases happiness (Uslaner 2001). There is much evidence that inequality is nega-
tive to happiness; see Hagerty (2000), Fahey and Smyth (2004), Oshioand Urakawa
(2013), Huang et al. (2016), Ding et al. (2020) and the second half of Chap. 2,
World Happiness Report 2020. Oishi et al. (2012) show that countries with higher
progressivity in the income tax system have higher happiness levels. Using data
in China, Ding et al. (2020, Abstract) show that ‘both absolute and relative income
affect subject well-being, and that an inverted-U shaped relationship between income
inequality and individual well-being appears at least for urban residents, whereas this
relationship tend to be negative in the case of people living in rural areas’. There are
also indirect evidence of the desirability of equality. In the U.S., regional death rates
are highly related to inequality (Kaplan et al. 1996; Lynch et al. 1998). In Italy,
inequality is more important than income and education for the effects on death rates
(De Vogli et al. 2005).8
The importance of equality is not only for its material/financial aspects, but for the
sense of justice/fairness. (On the negative effects of inequality in both income and
life satisfaction on trust and hence happiness, see Graaflandand Lous 2019.) A small
story may be told here. Decades ago in China under Mao, dating at high school was
much discouraged if not outright prohibited. A young couple disobeyed the advice
not to date. Partly as ameans to separate the two, the boywas sent down to the village.
Though not sent down to themuch difficult living andworking conditions of a village,
the girl went to stay with her lover in the village. Then came the Autumn Festival
and each family was distributed with one mooncake. The youngster came home
with the mooncake before his lover came home. During those days of starvation, he
7 For studies showing some efficiency-enhancing features of equality, see also references cited at
the end of Chap. 6 of Ng 2000.
8 However, see Hirschmanand Rothschild (1973) and Davis (2019) on the tunnel effect or ‘the
propensity for individuals to be pleased by the success of others if they believe this signals an
improvement in their own prospects’. Also, on the importance of perceived (instead of actual)
inequality, see Schalembier (2019).
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could not resist the temptation of eating half of the cake before her return. However,
once tasting the delicious mooncake in a semi-hunger situation, he could not restrain
himself and ended up swallowing the whole cake. When the girl came back, she
happily asked, ‘I heard that we have a mooncake’. He sadly told her that he had
eaten it all. She kept silent for a few minutes, and then burst out, ‘I follow you to
the horrible conditions of the village to be with you. And … And you did not even
keep my share of the cake for me?!’ She packed up and left him to go back home
to the city. What the strong state power failed to separate was easily done by half a
mooncake.
An issue related to inequality is relative income/consumption/standing. In
economics, this has been analysed from Rae (1834) and Veblen (1899) to Frank
(1999). This relative competition is not just important for the rich; even in poor
villages in China and India, it is more important than absolute income (Luttmer 2005;
Knight et al. 2009a, b; Knightand Gunatilaka 2010; Linssen et al. 2011; Guillen-
Royo 2011; Fontaineand Yamada 2012. Cf. Garrard 2012; Huang et al. 2016; Li
2017; Asadullah et al. 2018; Luo et al. 2018; Collischon 2019; Sherman et al. 2019;
Bakkeli 2020; Zhangand Wang, 2020). Some researchers (e.g. Layard et al. 2010)
even regard ‘All effects are relative’. This resonates with the Confucian saying that
‘No worry about poverty, but about inequality’. Even in health care, where one
expects that the absolute levels are more important, relative standing is more impor-
tant than absolute level. The relatively poor, even with higher absolute income and
health care, have lower absolute health outcomes (Wilkinson 1997).
The importance of relative standing is largely evolutionary-biological. To pass on
your genes you need to attract good mates. Here, it is more important to be better
than your competitors than just to have high values. This is particularly so for males.
Before the short history of common monogamy, the head-man of a tribe could mate
with all women. But awoman is limited by the requirement of 9months of pregnancy,
years of nursing and caring to ensure that the child will be able to survive. Thus, men
are more competitive, trying to go to the top, much more than women. However, that
they have the higher urge does not necessarily means that they are also better leaders
than women. With their higher EQ and language abilities, perhaps women are better
leaders.
I mentioned this during a class of a dozen PhD students at Monash University
more than ten years ago. A female student from China objected that a woman should
only be No. 2, not No.1. I was very surprised and asked why. She said that women are
more emotional, especially during their monthly periods. Perhaps she had a point.
But an Australian girl student objected very vehemently. The Chinese girl said, ‘See!
Aren’t you very emotional now?’ When I told this story to another class at Nanyang
Technological University some years later, a male student said that, by the time she is
ready to lead either a nation, an enterprise, or a university, a woman is typically well
pass the time of having monthly periods. This is largely true. However, the Chinese
girl student may still be right that, even outside the monthly periods, women are
more emotional. Also, the recent birth of a baby by the young female prime minister
of New Zealand is also a counter example. Likely a counter example in both the
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following opposite senses: that they are no longer having periods; that they are too
emotional to lead well. As often, many factors are involved.
There is another troubling gender difference. In early decades of happiness study,
at least in the U.S., women happiness was originally found to be higher than men.
However, in recent decades, despite (or because of ?) much higher gender equal-
ization, this advantage of women has decreased and disappeared (Kahneman et al.
1999; Stevensonand Wolfers 2009).9 Kahneman believes that this may be due to
more honesty in report or higher demands due to higher opportunities. Thus, this is
related to the possible divergences between true happiness and reported happiness.
Ho (2013) disagrees and believes that it may be due to the higher housework respon-
sibilities of women, despite both having full-time jobs. Also, Audette et al. (2019)
find the promotion of gender equality increases happiness for both sexes. Again,
multiple factors are likely involved and further studies are needed.
Employment and price stability are also important for happiness. In economics,
there is a well-known formula that the misery index = unemployment rate + infla-
tion rate. However, according to happiness studies, this formula should be seriously
revised. Instead of being equally important in contributing to happiness or misery,
each percentage point of unemployment reduces happiness 5 times that of each
percentage point of inflation (Blanchflower et al. 2014). It is interesting to note that
an increase in unemployment benefits increases the happiness of both the unemployed
and the employed (Di Tella et al. 2003). With reasonable unemployment benefits,
perhaps the employed also feel more secure. Also, while people may adjust or adapt,
over time, to many problems, but it is very difficult to adjust to being unemployed,
even given time (Clark and Georgellis 2013).
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Chapter 11
How Do You Increase Your Happiness?
Abstract Expanding factors already discussed in previous chapters, this chapter
identified 12 factors/ways important for increasing happiness: Attitude, balance,
confidence, dignity, engagement, family/friends, gratitude, health, ideals, joyful,
kindness, love.
Pooling the views of many experts on the useful ways to increase happiness, Buettner
et al. (2020, Abstract) conclude that ‘Policy strategies deemed the most effective and
feasible are: (1) investing in happiness research, (2) support of vulnerable people
and (3) improving the social climate, in particular by promoting voluntary work and
supporting non-profits. Individual strategies deemedmost effective are: (a) investing
in social networks, (b) doingmeaningful things and (c) caring for one’s health.’ Public
policies for happiness promotion are discussed in Chap. 14 below. Here, we discuss
what individuals may do.
While we have mentioned the four F’s of happiness (faith, fitness, family, friends)
above, these may be increased to 12 factors from A to L, as important factors for and
ways one may increase happiness, as discussed below.
First, A is for attitude. An appropriate, positive attitude to life is very important for
happiness for oneself as well as for the society. Though happiness is the only thing
of intrinsic value (Chap. 5), pursuing only one’s own happiness is not the appropriate
attitude. This is true not only socially speaking, but also for the individual as well.
We have already discussed before that we are born and brought up having happiness
in helping others and contributing to the society. It also increases our self-esteem.
Confucius said, ‘A gentleman is honest and magnanimous; a villain often feels sad’.
Being good to the society typically also brings happiness to oneself. This is consistent
with modern happiness studies showing that those less purely self-interested, and are
willing to help others and providing uncompensated services, are happier (Frey and
Stutzer 2002; Bruni and Stanca 2008; Lu et al. 2020; Son and Padilla-Walker 2020).
B is for balance (moderation, the golden mean). This principle is applicable to
many areas. Even on the attitude towards time, a balanced view is positive for happi-
ness (Zhang et al. 2013). Even towards the enemies, we should not be excessive;
even towards our children, we should not dote on them too much. We should have
sufficient exercise, but not too much. Professional sports persons usually do not
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live long. We should work well, but not too long hours. Excessive working hours
are very detrimental to happiness; excessive leisure time is also not good (Haller
et al. 2013; de Zeeuw 2018; Lee et al. 2020; Noda 2020). Harmonious (instead
of obsessive) ‘passion for work may play a salient role in individuals’ well-being’
(Yukhymenko-Lescroart and Sharma 2019).
Decades ago, I had a colleague who was a workaholic. We share a same secretary
who told me that he was working 12 h a day and 7 days a week. This is more than
twice my weekly hours of work. True, if we take the total time I am in my office plus
the time I work at home over the weekend, it adds up to be more than 50 h. However,
some of the office hours are spent on personal affairs like emailing my daughters,
my investment agents, etc., not to mention watching beautiful girls on the computer!
Haha! Taking off those hours will leave no more than about 40 h. Working in excess
of 80 h a week, that colleague of mine not only caused serious family problems at
home (I was even called upon to help resolve some), but he eventually died young
at 55. The excessive hours did not pay off, even in terms of the narrow result of
productivity, not to mention the toll on happiness and his life. (On the desirability of
living a balanced life, especially between doing and being, and between relationship
and solitude, see Littman-Ovadia 2019. For the importance ofmodesty, as the balance
between arrogance and self-abasement, see Zheng and Wu 2020: ‘The more modest
you are, the happier you are’.)
C is for confidence. One should have confidence in oneself, and be confident about
the future. This is neither being arrogant, nor being blindly optimistic. Rather, it is
being cautiously optimistic, recognizing both the subjective (conditions of oneself)
and objective factors. Do not have an inferiority complex about oneself. Every person
has some advantages and some shortcomings. For example, you may think that I am
able to publish many books and papers in top journals, but I also have many aspects
much lower than the average. For one thing, I am only 1.6 m in height. After fully
grown up, one cannot increase one’s height any more. Thus, just take this as given
and not to worry about it. I do not aspire to be a basketball star; this is not a problem.
As a child, we lived close to the seaside. We went to play in the water since about
the age of 3–4. Many of my fellow children of about the same age soon learned
how to swim quite well. They could then swim out to the deeper parts of the sea
and stay there for an hour or so before coming back. I could not even float. Then
another group of younger children joined us. Long after the second or third groups
were able to swim to the deeper parts before I managed to float. I never dare to swim
to areas deeper than my chest. But again there is no problem as I do not aspire to
be an Olympic swimming champion. I started drinking tea and coffee since a young
child. However, I could not tell the difference between tea of good and low quality;
I could only tell the difference between tea and coffee! Haha! Only until my early
40’s, more than three decades since first drinking, that I started to appreciate the
difference between high and low qualities, in tea only. Not yet in coffee! At least not
much. Also not yet in wines. I find about half of the cheaper types of wines taste
good and half not good; and the same proportion for wines 10 times more expensive.
D is for dignity. A person should live with dignity and not doing things bad.
Doing bad things may lead to some financial gains in the short run, but losing the
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more important dignity. Even if others do now know, you know yourself and hence
has a lower self-esteem, not to mention the worry of being found out and penalized
accordingly. However, the principle of balance, insistance on dignity should not be
too extreme. Quite often, stepping back a few steps allows much more scope for
both sides. Accepting what is unavoidable saves many troubles. There is no need to
quibble on every detail.
E is for engagement. We are a social animal and are born to derive high happiness
engaging in interpersonal relationships. Sharing our happiness with familymembers,
friends, relatives, colleagues, etc., we increase, instead of reducing our happiness,
while they also typically are also happy sharing it; on the other hand, talking over
your sorrowswith some good friends usually reduces your unhappiness dramatically,
while your friends also feel happy being able to help you reducing your sorrows.
Due to our social nature, engaging in socially useful activities usually increases our
happiness. According to data fromWorld Values Survey, happiness is highly related
to time engaged in interpersonal relationships and voluntary social services (Bruni
and Stanca 2008), while the termination of such relationships (divorce or parents’
divorce) has very large negative effects on happiness (Helliwell 2003; Dolan et al.
2008).
Engagement is not confined to that on social activities. Just being engaged in
doing activities one is interested in may also increases happiness (Lyubomirsky
2008; Lyubomirsky and Layous 2013; Lauzon and Green-Demers 2020).1 However,
many may have spent too much time just watching TV. As this is an easy way to
spend time and usually immediate rewards at negligible costs, many may then fail to
engage in other activities that are really more rewarding in the long run (Frey et al.
2007). However, Bayraktaroglu et al. (2019) show that watching TV does not reduce
happiness the next day, but reduced positive affect increases TV watching the next
day.
F is for family and friends. As we have discussed these in the previous chapter,
we will skip to G.
G is for gratitude. People in China have a very long tradition of emphasizing the
importance of showing gratitude to those who have helped us and repay them when
possible. ‘A drop of favor should be repaid with a whole spring of water’. The impor-
tance of gratitude for happiness is also supported by modern happiness studies (e.g.
McCullough et al., 2002; Ruini & Vescovelli 2013; Ahrens & Forbes, 2014; Green
et al., 2019; Bohlmeijer et al., 2020); ‘feelings of gratitude were positively related
to well-being at the within-person level’ (Nezlek et al., 2019, Abstract); ‘gratitude
may not only have a negative influence on depression, but may also counteract the
symptoms of depression by enhancing a state of peace of mind’ (Liang et al. 2020,
Abstract).
We should be grateful not only for those who helped us, but also, if not more
so, to those who brought us into being, our parents who typically also have fed and
1 Lauzon and Green-Demers (2020, Abstract) call it ‘Savouring… the capacity to focus on pleasant
experiences in order to intensify and prolong the experience of positive affectivity. On the savouring
strategies of different age groups, see Marques-Pinto et al. (2020).
118 11 How Do You Increase Your Happiness?
educate us, and sacrificed much for us in many other ways. Those who believe in
God should also be grateful to God. Those not believing in God should read Ng
(2019). In this short book, using five compelling axioms, I prove that God evolved
in the wider universe and created our sub-universe about 13.8 billion years ago in
the Big Bang (or one identical to it). This explains what Science and Religion have
no answer. Science argues for the Big Bang but cannot explain how it came from;
religion believes that God created all, but cannot explain how God came about. This
little book explains the origins of both our universe and God, its creator. It even
answers the question: How came the wider universe? It answers all these questions
in ways consistent with what we know now and also logically consistent.
H is for health. We have already discussed this a bit (fitness, one of the 4 F’s of
happiness). Here, I want to add some more, starting with correcting this mistake: I
know the importance of exercising to keep healthy, but I have no time. Instead, for
those not lacking time, exercising is not very important; for those not having enough
time, exercising is very important.
Compared with no exercising, if you spend half or one hour everyday exercising,
you may sleep less by the same amount of time and still wake up fresher the next day,
being able to do better qualitywork and enjoy life better the next day. Thus, exercising
actually does not take up time, but earns you time. This is especially so in the long
run, as keeping healthy allows you to live a longer life. Studies show that, before
an excessive level, each hour of exercise prolongs you live by 2–3 h. The positive
effects of exercising on health is clear (Huang andHumphreys 2012; Ruegsegger and
Booth 2018; Zhang and Chen 2019). The positive relationship between health and
happiness is likely mutual: being healthy increases happiness; being happy is also
good for your health (Kim et al. 2013; Trudel-Fitzgerald et al. 2014; Boehm et al.
2017; Lambiase et al. 2015; Martin-Maria et al. 2016; Makki and Mohanty 2019;
Steptoe 2019).
Apart from exercising, a healthy lifestyle is also very important for health and
happiness, including health food, enough sleep, and a positive attitude (see A for
Attitude above) are all relevant. Blanchflower et al. (2013) confirm the general belief
that eating more fruits and vegetables are good for health; the optimal amount is no
less than seven serves (an apple is one serve) a day (Cf. Mujcic and Oswald 2016).
Having enough sunlight is also good for health and happiness (Kaempfer and Mutz
2013).
On healthy food, many years ago, people were very scared of food with high
cholesterol. I had a colleague at Monash University who stopped all food with high
cholesterol after his hospitalization on some heart problem. A few years later, we
heard that he was sent back to hospital for having too few cholesterols. Then, a
distinction was made between good and bad cholesterol. However, since a few years
ago, even bad cholesterol is OK. Eggs including egg yoke with very high cholesterol
are now health food. So is fat meat. In fact, Taubes (2007) argued more than a dozen
years ago that cholesterols and fat are not the problem; rather excessive sugar and
inadequate fibers are the culprit. This is why sweet potatoes are now on top of the
list of heath food.
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Around a century ago, at least in Southern China, sweet potatoes are the staple
food of the poor; only the rich can afford the more expensive rice. As mymother told
us, when some poor people get financially better off, they changed to eating rice.
After a few days or weeks, they developed constipation or even haemorrhoids (piles).
They then had to change back eating sweet potatoes. Thus they said, ‘We are born to
eat sweet potatoes [cheap food]!’ Of course, it is not the case that some people are
born to eat cheap food. Rather, it is the lack of fibers. Even if you can afford it, there
is no need to eat and use expensive things; extra money may be donated for altruistic
purposes. (On how to do altruism effectively, see MacAskill 2015).
This reminds me about the true story about chicken and lobsters. In the Nineteen
Century, lobsters were so plentiful that they were fed only to the poor and prisoners.
Prisoners demanded and servants asked for clauses limiting the feeding of lobsters
to them at no more than three times a week. The lobster was considered among
the least desirable foods, ‘a garbage meat fit only for the indigent, indentured, and
incarcerated’. (See, e.g.Wallace 2005.) In contrast, chickenwas a delicacy affordable
only by the rich.Now,with lobsters becoming very scarce and chicken cheap, lobsters
become food for the rich people, and chicken as the food for the poor. To some extent,
this suggests that if extreme poverty is avoided (no one is starving or very under-
nourished), some inequality is probably not too serious a matter. Letting the rich
pay high prices for items like lobsters, first-class tickets, and luxury skyboxes (for
watching sports) helps to some extent to pay for the costs of supply and hence allows
others to pay less for other items.
I is for ideal. Every person should have one or more ideals. When a high-school
student, my ideal then was to help establish a communist society, believing that
it was a more just and happy society. Three events helped me to see the naivety
of this belief. First, despite my initial interests in physics, maths and philosophy, I
chose to study economics at university, believing that that knowledge would be more
relevant in building a new society. However, the study of economics helped me see
that capitalism has its rationale, though it may need some government functions to
increase equality and deal with environmental disruption. Secondly, the Sino-Soviet
dispute over the period about 1958–69 revealed to me further the conceptual and
practical problems of communism. Thirdly, the failure of the Great Leap Forward
Movement in China over 1958–60 that turned into a great leap downward, and the
Cultural Revolution over 1966–76 that bestowed a tremendous amount of hardship
on the people, made me realize the impracticability of communism. I thus gave up
fighting for communism completely and devote myself to teaching and research.
Not all persons need to have grand ideals which typically turn out impracticable
anyway as in my case. It is good to have realistic ideals that are likely realizable.
For example, one may wish to be healthy, happy, and successful in career. Some
may aspire to be a great entrepreneur or a great scientist. Ideals may be quite high,
but should avoid being too unrealistic. If it proves to be unrealizable, one should
adjust accordingly. If you cannot be a great entrepreneur, being a successful business
person is also good; if you fail to become another Einstein, being a good teacher
is also good. As long as you do not cause serious damages to others or the society,
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and can be happy doing what sustain your life, you should regard yourself as being
successful in having largely fulfilling the originally higher ideals.
Having ideals, one will derive much happiness in working towards the achieve-
ment of these ideals. Even in my case where I had to give up the original unrealistic
ideal, I was very happy while working for it.
In choosing what ideals one should have and work for, three important points
should be taken into consideration. First, you should look at your own conditions,
your advantages and disadvantages. If you are as short as me, do not aspire to be a
basketball champion. Everyone has some comparative advantages. Develop in these
directions. Secondly, you must look at the objective situation and find out where you
may succeed with your subjective conditions. Thirdly, you must choose something
that is beneficial both to yourself and to the society (especially including people
around you), usually both financially and happiness wise. Working only for others
with no self-benefit is difficult to persist for long, and also not effective. Doing what
benefits only yourself but not others will also not last long and achieve big. In the
long run, it will usually be counter-productive even to your own interests. Doing
something good for both oneself and others will likely promote mutual interaction,
complementation, and assistance, and will lead to many more fruitful results.
J is for joyful. Whether a person is usually joyful or not, may to some extent
decided by the inborn characters and the experience in one’s growing environ-
ment and interpersonal relationship. However, one’s characters are not completely
unchangeable (Boyce et al. 2013). To some extent, wemay also try tomake ourselves
more joyful. One simple way is to avoid going to places that may make you sad, or
persons who may make you unhappy. On the other hand, we may do something
we enjoy, read something interesting, or watch something amusing. Also, remind
oneself to be more joyful and not worry unnecessarily.
K is for kindness. Mencius said, everyone has compassion/kindness, justice,
respect/courtesy, wisdom (仁、义、礼、智); these capabilities are in born. At least,
there are large inborn components, though not precluding influences of nurture. These
capabilities are beneficial to interpersonal cooperation good for our survival.2 Partly
because of the inborn nature and partly because of long-run interaction effects, being
kind to others will usually make us happy ourselves. On the beneficial effects of
loving-kindness, even just thinking about it, see Gentile et al. (2020). We should be
kind not only to our fellow human beings, but also to other animals that may have
affective feelings of happiness and pain (the final Chap. 16).
2 On the biological basis of the emotional and moral sentiments, see Konner 2002, Hauser 2006. On
the fairness feeling and behaviour of monkeys see Brosnan & de Waal 2003. In humans, Richard
Epstein and other scientists in Israel discovered the significant relationships of altruistic behaviour
with the Dopamine D4 Receptor gene (Bachner-Melman et al. 2005). The fairness feeling and
behaviour also disappear with the electrical interference of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Knoch
et al. 2006). Religious or similar beliefs may enhance social relationships, and are beneficial for
survival. On the existence of the so-called God gene (DRD4) and the generation of the mystical
religious feeling of onenesswith the universe, see Persinger (1987), Hamer (2005), Comings (2008),
Tiger & McGuire (2010). See also, Johnstone et al. (2017), Ferguson et al. (2018).
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L is for love. We have already discussed this in reference to family and marriage
above.
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and Transforming Our Selves
Abstract The stimulation of the pleasure centres in our brain by electricity or other
means induces intense pleasures. Despite its discovery for nearly seven decades,
this method has not been widely used and discussed. Relatively small invest-
ment in perfecting this technique would give us a device for achieving easy and
‘supra-maximal’ pleasure that would obliviate pain, depression, and replace harmful
drugs. With adequate safeguards, we could also use genetic engineering to trans-
form ourselves and make us much more capable of happiness, surpassing the
‘supra-maximal’ pleasure of brain stimulation.
Apart from the normalways to increase our happiness discussed in the previous chap-
ters, there are other ways opened up by science and technology. Moreover, these new
ways may increase our happiness by many times more than the traditional methods.
First, for the traditional methods, including some technological advances in the past
like the invention of television, their contributions to happiness are subject to the
serious limitation of adaptation, losing their novelty and high marginal utilities very
quickly. While the adaptation effect will no doubt also dilute the welfare significance
of such innovations as web-surfing, there are at least two areas of expected future
advance that will not be significantly subject to the satiation (applying at the moment
of consumption) and adaptation (applying in the longer run) effects. Instead, they
are likely capable of increasing our happiness by x times rather than x%, where x is
a large number.
12.1 Stimulating the Pleasure Centers in Our Brains
First, there is the stimulation of the pleasure centres in our brain. It has been
known for more than six decades that deep brain stimulation (DBS) with elec-
tricity or other means1 can relieve acute pain, induce intense pleasure, and promote a
1 Apart from using electricity, there are other ways, including magnetic and ultrasound, of direct
stimulation of the brain’s pleasure centers; see e.g. Reti (2015), Frank (2018), Harmsen et al. (2018),
Moisset et al. (2020).
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sense of well-being without the undesirable health effects of drug addiction.2 There
have been research experiments and medical therapies in using DBS, especially in
treating Parkinson’s disease (e.g. Cai et al. 2020), depression (e.g. Coenen et al.
2018; Kisely et al. 2018; Liu et al. 2020), and post-traumatic stress disorder (e.g.
Koek et al. 2019). However, the enormous potential benefits of DBS have neither
been adequately explored nor widely discussed. Much increased research effort and
eventual widespread use of DBS are called for.
Positive reward associated with DBS leading to voluntary self-stimulation was
discovered by Olds and Milner (1954) when they observed that a rat returned to
the place where it received direct electrical stimulation of certain parts of its brain.
Further research established sites that induce pleasure (medial forebrain bundle,
septal, limbic and hypothalamic areas), pain, and ambiguous or mixed feelings.
Stimulation of the pleasurable sites clearly produces positive reward as suggested by
experiments in which rats were willing to cross a painful shock grid in order to obtain
the stimulation, and as confirmed by human subjects.Moreover, the pleasure induced
is so int ense that rats preferDBS to food and sex, and if not stopped by experimenters,
will continuously seek stimulation until exhaustion. In humans, ‘patients who were
having emotional or physical pain experienced such intense pleasurewith stimulation
that the painwas obliterated’ (Heath et al. 1968, p. 188). Scholars describe the feeling
from brain stimulation as ‘super–pleasure or ‘supramaximal’ (Dror 2016.)
Apart from relieving pain and inducing pleasure, DBS may also be used as
a ‘primer’ in improving well-being. For example, Heath (1964, p. 236) reported,
‘strong pleasure [from brain stimulation] was associated with sexual feelings, and
in most instances the patient experienced spontaneous orgasm … This patient, now
married to her third husband, had never experienced orgasm before she received
… stimulation to the brain, but since then has consistently achieved climax during
sexual relations.’ Once the right neurons have been excited, they become excitable
more easily. The right neural pathways have been established.
Among the important social problems of our time are drug addiction, crimes and
(mental) depression. These social problems, and possibly others, seem to be largely
solvable with the widespread use of DBS. In comparison to DBS, the use of addictive
drugs like heroin is a very inefficient and dangerous method of achieving a ‘high’.
If one has easy access to intensely pleasurable sensations by just turning on the
electricity, there seems little reason left to try dangerous alternatives like heroin. Just
as intractable pain may be relieved by DBS, mental depression should also be largely
removable by positive DBS. Since most depressions are caused by failure to achieve
happiness one way or other, the availability of happy sensations by DBS should
provide a definite relief. Among others, the amelioration of stress (Patterson et al.
1994), reduction of stress ulcers (Yadin and Thomas 1996), improved performance
in maze (Jiang et al. 1997), and the treatment of alcoholics (Krupitskii et al. 1993)
have been reported.
2 There are also other benefits such as improving sleep quality (Dafsari et al. 2020) and vision
restoration (Gall et al. 2013).
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Though DBS is not physically addictive, it might be psychologically addictive.
However, in contrast to heroin addiction, DBS addiction is not dangerous to health.
From the quite large amount of evidence we have, the proper use (Kavirajan et al.
2014; Patterson and Kesner 1981; Zhang et al. 2020) of DBS over a sustained period
for a long time (e.g. a few hours daily over a number of years) has proved to be
efficacious and safe.3 Thus DBS addiction is only a problem if it leads to the serious
disregard of other duties such as to threaten the welfare of (mainly) other people
(especially the future generations). While the pleasures induced by DBS can be
intense, I doubt that psychological addiction of such a magnitude would occur. Rats
choose to use DBS until exhaustion but humans only for “up to half an hour daily”
(Sem-Jacobsen, reported in Delgado 1976, p. 484). Relative to other pleasures and
objectives, the pleasure of DBS does not seem to be compelling for humans (Bishop
et al. 1964; Valenstein 1973, p. 28). If one believes in creation, perhaps God made
us this way so that we could eventually provide happiness not only for ourselves but
also for animals. In the unlikely event of serious addiction, the problem could be
solved by using legal and/or technical devices restricting the unlimited use of DBS.
For example, the electricity that could be used for brain stimulation is supplied over
certain limited hours only.
While DBS addiction is unlikely to be so serious as to threaten the survival of a
civilized society, it may be feared that it would significantly reduce mutual human
relationships. If one could obtain pleasure by simply turning on the electricity, there
might be little motivation left for the cultivation of personal relationships. This is
unlikely to happen. Even if one could obtain a variety of pleasurable sensations
by DBS, there would still be the innate need for companionship left. Secondly,
the pleasure from DBS to humans does not seem to be as fulfilling as, say, a full
sexual relationship with its simultaneous stimulation of a number of areas and close
personal contact, nor as rewarding as spiritual fulfilment of the highest order. Thirdly,
the provision of pleasure which might otherwise be unavailable in sufficient amount
may in fact create many happy and easy-to-go-with individuals. This may remove
many personal conflicts and promote better mutual relationships. Fourthly, even
if personal relationships were reduced, the benefits of DBS would still likely to
much more than compensate for the loss. For example, the introduction of television
probably has significantly reduced conversation. But that does not necessarily make
it a bad thing. Its benefits have to be taken into account as well.
In this connection, the long-lasting nature of pleasure from DBS definitely gives
it a big advantage. Things like television usually appear to have enormous potential
benefits around the time of their initial introduction. After prolonged usage, some
of their disadvantages are discovered though some other beneficial usages may also
be found. More importantly, the novelty value has disappeared. For example, while
watching television is very enjoyable for those just getting access to it, it may become
a second best option after its novelty value has disappeared. The benefits of television
3 For some side effects of DBS, see Schüpbach, et al. (2006), Christen et al. (2012) and Gallagher
(2021). However, ‘the results of DBS treatment are mostly positive’ (Gallagher 2021, p.32); Cf.
Voigt (2021) on the positive aspects of DBS.
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probably still outweigh its costs by a very wide margin, but not by as much as it
would be if the novelty value could be maintained. With DBS, the situation would
be different. Since DBS is the direct stimulation of the brain, the pleasure during
stimulation does not depend on any novelty value.Moreover, the intensity of pleasure
fromDBS does not diminishwith prolonged stimulation (either continuously or daily
over a number of years). Our hypothalamus where pleasure is produced continue to
respond normally to stimulation many thousand times unabated. Thus, there is no
diminishing marginal utility in DBS.
Common methods of enjoyment through the stimulation of our senses (through
the peripheral nervous systems) like eating delicious food and having sex is, after
some point, subject to fast diminishing marginal returns. This is so because we
are programmed through natural selection to protect us from over-eating, etc. On
the other hand, activities that yields no significant diminishing marginal returns
such as reading typically produces low levels of reward at each moment. This is so
since these activities had not been very essential over our long evolutionary history
in increasing our selection fitness. True, humans are capable of higher levels of
happiness including spiritual fulfillment. If it is not the only species on Earth that is
capable of spiritual feelings, it is certainly the only one where such feelings could be
so strong or intense. Nevertheless, even here adaptation and diminishing marginal
utility apply quickly. Thus, even the winning of a Nobel prize is said to yield a
high for only about two weeks. Thus, our ordinary biological capacity for happiness
is rather limited. However, in our eons of evolution, our brain was not stimulated
intracranially (bypassing the peripheral nervous systems) and hence there has been
no need to program diminishing marginal returns directly within the pleasure centres
in our brain. Thus, brain stimulation promises high happiness due to the absence of
diminishing marginal utility. Hence, intense pleasure over long duration is possible,
and with no apparent harm. For example, a monkey receiving stimulation presses the
button three times every second, 16 h a day, several days a week, over many years.
Researchers have to arrange it such as to prevent death from starvation or lack of
water, not from stimulation. I do not mind being that monkey! Thus the enormous
increase in happiness brought about by DBS could be expected to be maintained
largely unabated, and in fact could be greatly increased through better techniques of
stimulation (Cf. Sathi and Hosain 2020).
DBSmay be regarded as unnatural in the sense that it does not occur in the course
of our natural biological evolution. But most civilized products, institutions, medical
treatments, etc., are unnatural in this sense. This does not make them bad. To improve
our welfare, we have invented many “unnatural” things. DBS is a recent invention
that if properly made use of widely, possesses welfare significance surpassing all
previous inventions put together.
Many people from theWest may find, upon first contact, the culture, tradition, and
ways of enjoying life in the East and in some primitive tribes degrading. The same
is true for people from the East on some Western ways of life. But we have learned
from liberalism to be more tolerant towards different cultures and ways of life as
long as they are not harmful. Many liberals would go further in tolerating individual
freedom of action even for those actions which are harmful to the actors themselves.
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DBS is about the least harmful way of inducing intense pleasure and should never be
regarded as degrading by anyone who has the slightest adherence to liberalism. (See
also Pugh 2020 on the ethical issues of some possible personality changes, existence
of which is still being debated.)
Will God approve DBS? If one does not believe in God, the question does not arise
(but then he/she should read Ng 2019). If one believes in God, then the answer seems
to be affirmative. For example, the ten commandments do not include: Thou shall
not engage in DBS! Nor do they include: Thou shall not enjoy yourself. Moreover,
if God does not want us to use DBS, why did He create us in a way that DBS can
induce intense positive rewards?
If higher funding for research could result in such spectacularlywelfare-improving
discoveries and inventions as DBS, the present writer would be prepared to halve his
post-tax income to help pay for them.
For the 500 million or more of people just in China who have attained the level of
reasonable comfort, a further increase of even a hundred thousand (Chinese) dollars
each will not increase happiness appreciably at the social level in the long run.
However, if these half a billion people contribute just ten dollars each, we will have
5 billion dollars. Alternatively, this sum of money may be allocated by the Chinese
government. This amount is less than one in 4 thousands or 0.025% of the foreign
exchange reserve of China, and also less than one in twenty thousand or 0.005%
of the annual GDP in China. This relatively small sum of money would be enough
to fund research to develop a machine or instrument that we may use to stimulate
our brain for pleasure safely. The increase in happiness will be many times that of
increasing the GDP by ten times. Spreading the result to the rest of the world, China
would contribute more than its four ancient innovations combined!
After mass production, each machine will likely not cost more than that of a TV
set. If needed, I would be willing to pay millions of dollars to get one. My consumer
surplus would likely be many thousand times its price.
After learning of my views on this, a commentator in China emailed me, ‘When
it comes to experiments on humans, would you be willing to volunteer? Or rather,
you would wait until China used its prisoners for experiments to produce the fruit
that youWestern advisors would enjoy?’ I replied to her immediately that I would be
glad to volunteer to be the first human guinea pig. I do not see this as being altruistic.
Rather, I cannot wait to be that monkey.
12.2 Genetic Engineering and Our Own Transformation
Another expected advance that will lead to dramatic leaps in happiness may be
expected in genetic engineering. It is true that here we have to be even more careful
than in brain stimulation to avoid being counter-productive. Nevertheless, with care
and sufficient safeguards, genetic engineering promises great leaps because it may
transform our capacity for enjoyment itself. Short of the extremes like brain stimu-
lation and starvation, the happiness level of a person depends more on the subjective
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factors than the objective circumstances. The subjective factors are shaped by our
upbringings, education, social contacts, and a host of other factors. However, these
factors affect mainly the waves of happiness around a set point. The level of this set
point for each person is largely genetic (Lykken and Tellegen 1996; Lykken 1999).
This does not mean that we cannot affect our happiness levels at all. Even Lykken
(1999) who has established the high degree of association of happiness and a host of
other things with genetic factors through the study of identical twins (including those
reared apart), believes that we can learn to become happier by affecting the waves of
happiness. Nevertheless, the dominance of the genetic factors in determining the set
points remains. Even with DBS, the degree of the intense pleasure is also set. This
suggests that a way to increase happiness by a quantum leap more important than
brain stimulation is through genetic engineering. Of course, a very high degree of
care has to be taken for such an endeavour. Is it too risky nevertheless? While there
are some risks, they could be reduced by sufficient safeguards. Moreover, the risks
involved are far less than those created by our current path of high growth without
sufficient environmental protection. The returns of this high growth are just some
chance (if problems like climate change turn out to be of no significance) of higher
output that contributes virtually nothing to happiness. The risks are high chance of
environmental disasters including human extinction. In contrast, genetic engineering
promises a very high chance of huge quantum leaps in our happiness, at negligible
and avoidable risks. Why do many people still feel comfortable with the former and
not with the latter? I do not advocate using drastic forms of genetic engineering to
transform ourselves right now or even in the near future. However, research on this
and its eventual gradual usage with sufficient safeguards should not be precluded.4
To put it emphatically, it may be said that mankind is facing the greatest cross-
road in its entire history: We may choose to ignore the threat of global warming and
choose business as usual and go to Hell (extinction), or we may adequately solve
the problem of environmental disruption and ensure our road to Heaven (survival
and quantum leaps in the welfare of our offspring). The human species had faced
the threat of extinction before. Yet the current cross-road is more remarkable than
previous ones for two reasons. First, the current threat is man-made and could be
undone by us. Second, if we could avoid the current threat, we will have very good
chance of going to Heaven (quantum leaps in welfare). The difference has never been
greater!
References
AGGARWAL, S. & CHUGH, N. (2020). Ethical implications of closed loop brain device: 10-year
review. Minds & Machines, 30, 145–170.
4 Some brain implants and brain-computer interface have achieved clinical successes; see, e.g.
Aggarwal and Chugh (2020) on these devices and the related ethical issues.
References 131
BISHOP, M. P., ELDER, S. T. & HAETH, R. G. (1964). Attempted control of operant behavior
in man with intracranial self-stimulation. In HEATH, H. & ROW, (Hoeber)(1964), The Role of
Pleasure in Behavior Robert , 55–81, New York.
CAI, Y., REDDY, R. D., VARSHNEY, V. et al. (2020). Spinal cord stimulation in Parkinson’s
disease: A review of the preclinical and clinical data and future prospects. Bioelectron Med, 6, 5.
https://doi.org/10.1186/s42234-020-00041-9
CHRISTEN,M., BITTLINGER,M.,WALTER,H., BRUGGER, P.&MÜLLER, S. (2012). Dealing
with side effects of deep brain stimulation: Lessons learned from stimulating the STN. AJOB
Neuroscience, 3(1), 37–43.
COENEN, V. A., SAJONZ, B. E., REISERT, M., BOSTRÖM, J. P., BEWERNICK, B., URBACH,
H., JENKNER, C., REINACHER, P. C., SCHLAEPFER, T. E. & MÄDLER, B. (2018).
Tractography-assisted deep brain stimulation of the superolateral branch of the medial fore-
brain bundle (slMFB DBS) in major depression. NeuroImage : Clinical, 20, 580–593. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.nicl.2018.08.020
DAFSARI, H. S., RAY-CHAUDHURI, K., ASHKAN, K. et al. (2020). Beneficial effect of 24-
month bilateral subthalamic stimulation on quality of sleep in Parkinson’s disease. Journal of
Neurology, 267, 1830–1841. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00415-020-09743-1
DELGADO, J.M.R. (1976).Neworientation in brain stimulation inman.Brain-stimulation reward.
DROR, OTNIEL E. (2016). Cold War “super-pleasure”: Insatiability, self-stimulation, and the
postwar brain. Osiris, 31(1), 227–249.
FRANK, Lone (2018). The Pleasure Shock: The Rise of Deep Brain Stimulation and Its Forgotten
Inventor,NewYork: Dutton. Also:https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2018/03/pleasure-
shock-deep-brain-stimulation-happiness/556043/
GALLAGHER, Shaun (2021). Deep brain stimulation, self and relational autonomy. Neuroethics,
14(1), 31-43. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12152-018-9355-x
GALL, C., ANTAL, A. & SABEL, B.A. (2013). Non-invasive electrical brain stimulation induces
vision restoration in patients with visual pathway damage. Graefes Archive for Clinical and
Experimental Ophthalmology, 251, 1041–1043. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00417-012-2084-7
HARMSEN, I. E., ROWLAND, N. C., WENNBERG, R. A. & LOZANO, A. M. (2018). Char-
acterizing the effects of deep brain stimulation with magnetoencephalography: A review. Brain
Stimulation., 11(3), 481–491.
HEATH, R. G. (Ed.). (1964). The Role of Pleasure in Behavior. Harper and Row.
HEATH, Robert G., JOHN, Stanley B. & FONTANA, Charles J (1968). The pleasure response:
Studies by stereotaxic technics in patients. In Kline, N. and Laska, E. (Eds.), Computers and
Electronic Devices, Grune & Stratton, New York.
JIANG, F., RACINER.&TURNBULL. J. (1997). Electrical stimulation of the septal region of aged
rats improves performance in an open-field maze. Physiology & Behavior, 62(6), 1279–1282.
KAVIRAJAN,H.C., LUECK,K.&CHUANG,K. (2014).Alternating current cranial electrotherapy
stimulation (CES) for depression. The Cochrane database of systematic reviews, 7, CD010521.
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1002/14651858.CD010521.pub2
KISELY, S.R., LI, A., WARREN, N. & SISKIND, D.J. (2018). A systematic review and meta-
analysis of deep brain stimulation for depression. Depression and Anxiety, 35, 468–480. https://
doi.org/10.1002/da.22746
KOEK, R.J., ROACH, J., ATHANASIOU, N., WOUT-FRANK, M.V. & PHILIP, N.S. (2019).
Neuromodulatory treatments for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Progress in Neuro-
Psychopharmacology and Biological Psychiatry, 92, 148–160. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pnpbp.
2019.01.004
KRUPITSKII, E.M.,BURAKOV,A.M.,KARANDASHOVA,G. F., LEBEDEV,V.B., et al. (1993).
A method of treating affective disorders in alcoholics. Journal of Russian & East European
Psychiatry, 26(3), 26–37.
LIU, C., YANG, M., ZHANG, G., WANG, X., LI, B., LI, M., WOELFER, M., WALTER, M. &
WANG, L. (2020). Neural networks and the anti-inflammatory effect of transcutaneous auricular
132 12 Stimulating Our Brains and Transforming Our Selves
vagus nerve stimulation in depression. Journal of Neuroinflammation, 17. DOI:https://doi.org/
10.1186/s12974-020-01732-5
LYKKEN, David (1999). Happiness: What studies on twins show us about nature, nurture, and the
happiness set-point. Golden Books.
LYKKEN, David & TELLEGEN, Auke. (1996). Happiness is a stochastic phenomenon. Psycho-
logical Science, 7(3), 186–189.
MOISSET, X., LANTERI-MINET, M. & FONTAINE, D. (2020). Neurostimulation methods in
the treatment of chronic pain. Journal of Neural Transmission, 127, 673–686. https://doi.org/10.
1007/s00702-019-02092-y
NG, Yew-Kwang (2019). Evolved-God Creationism: A View of How God Evolved in the Wider
Universe, Cambridge Scholars.
OLDS, James &MILNER, Peter. (1954). Positive reinforcement produced by electrical stimulation
of septal area and other regions of the rat brain. Journal of Comparative Physiological Psychology,
47, 419–427.
PATTERSON, M. M. & KESNER, R. P. (1981). Electrical Stimulation Research Techniques.
Academic Press.
PATTERSON, M., KRUPITSKY, E., FLOOD, N., and BAKER, D. (1994). Amelioration of stress
in chemical dependency detoxification by transcranial electrostimulation. Stress Medicine, 10(2),
115–126.
PUGH, Jonathan. (2020). Clarifying the normative significance of ‘personality changes’ following
deep brain stimulation. Science and Engineering Ethics, 26, 1655–1680. https://doi.org/10.1007/
s11948-020-00207-3
RETI, I. ed. (2015). Brain Stimulation: Methodologies and Interventions, John Wiley & Sons.
SATHI, K.A. & HOSAIN, M.K. (2020). Modeling and simulation of deep brain stimulation elec-
trodes with various active contacts. Res. Biomed. Eng., 36, 147–161. https://doi.org/10.1007/s42
600-020-0000-0
SCHÜPBACH, M., M. GARGIULO, M.L. WELTER, C. MALLET, C. BÉHAR, AND J.L.
HOUETO (2006). Neurosurgery in Parkinson disease: A distressed mind in a repaired body?
Neurology, 66: 1811–1816. https://doi.org/10.1212/01.wnl.0000234880.51322.16.
VALENSTEIN,A. F. (1973).On attachment to painful feelings and the negative therapeutic reaction.
The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 28(1), 365–392.
VOIGT, Julia S. (2021). Bodily Felt Freedom: an Ethical Perspective on Positive Aspects of Deep
Brain Stimulation, Neuroethics, 14:45–57. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-018-9380-9
YADIN, Elna, THOMAS, Earl. (1996). Stimulation of the lateral septum attenuates immobilization-
induced stress ulcers. Physiology & Behavior, 59(4–5), 883–886.
ZHANG, X., QING, M., RAO, Y. & GUO, Y. (2020). Adjunctive vagus nerve stimulation for
treatment-resistant depression: A quantitative analysis. Psychiatric Quarterly, 1–11. DOI:https://
doi.org/10.1007/s11126-020-09726-5.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
Chapter 13
The East-Asian Happiness Gap: Causes
and Implications
Abstract Despite spectacular economic growth, most East Asian countries (espe-
cially those with the Confucian cultures) score relatively low in happiness surveys.
This chapter discusses the reasons for this East-Asian happiness gap, including
environmental disruption, excessive competitiveness, repressive education, exces-
sive conformity, negative attitudes towards enjoyment, and the emphasis on outward
appearance. Implications on the desired direction of future growth especially
regarding the relative importance of public spending on the environment and research
and the non-material aspects of life are also briefly touched on.
13.1 The East-Asian Happiness Gap
The East-Asian countries/regions referred to here include Mainland China, Hong
Kong, Taiwan, Korea, Japan, and Singapore. To some extent, it probably also applies
to Malaysia and Vietnam, but not much to the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia
which have rather different cultures.
While East Asia (with the major exception of Japan in the last three decades) has
done extremely well economically, it has not done well at all in terms of the ultimate
objective of life—happiness. In fact, an older international comparison (Cummins
1998) puts East Asians (China, Japan and Korea) as the very lowest group of coun-
tries, after the top group of Northern Europeans, followed by the English-speaking
countries, Latin Americans, Southeast Asians, the Middle East, middle Europeans,
South-Eastern Europeans, South Asia, Africa, and South-Western Europeans. Singa-
pore had a per-capita income 64 times that of India (and more than 16 times even
after PPP adjustment), but had the same happiness index. Korea and Japan ranked
the lowest. (The PPP adjustment refers to using the actual purchasing power parity,
instead of the foreign exchange rates, for making international comparison of GDP
This chapter is revised/updated from Ng (2002).
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or GNP per capita. The PPP-adjusted ones reflect more the actual purchasing power,
not inflated/deflated by possibly excessively high/low foreign exchange values of the
currency of the country concerned.)
For recent surveys, in all the 2018, 2019 and 2020World Happiness Reports, none
of the top twenty countries in happiness ranking are East-Asian. (Taiwan narrowly
made the top 19th for the 2021 Report.) At the time of writing, for the latest 2020
Report (based on data over 2017–2019), Singapore (which has a per-capita PPP-
adjusted GDP higher than that of the U.S.) came second (to Taiwan, which ranks
number 25 worldwide) in the Asian countries/regions in happiness score; it ranked
only at 31 (but climbing from 34 in the previous year) out of 153 countries in the
world with data. Malaysia (82) and Mainland China (94) both ranked well below the
mid-point of the 153 countries. Despite its economic stagnation, Japan (62) ranked
much higher than before the three ‘lost decades’ (For the 2021 report based on the
2020 scores, Japan jumped further to number 40 in the ranking.)
In fact, this ‘rise of Japan’ in happiness despite economic stagnation may be
described as a sister paradox, the paradox of happy stagnation, in comparison to
the well-known Easterlin’s (1974, 2017) paradox of unhappy growth (discussed in
several places earlier). Over the three decades of economic stagnation, the average
working hours in Japan also decreased significantly while its happiness level climbed
from second last (above only Korea; see Cummins 1998) to just below average
(Diener 2000), and then above average (Leigh and Wolfers 2006), and finally to the
respectable 62th and 40th out of 153 countries in the World Happiness Reports 2020
and 2021 respectively, as mentioned above. Perhaps people in Japan spent too much
time working during their heyday of high economic growth, and then realized their
mistake and work less?
This should make us pause to reflect on some fundamental issues like the ulti-
mate ends, the worth, and the costs of economic growth1; the reasons for the relative
failure of the East Asians in achieving happiness despite their economic success;
the implications on ways to increase happiness and for public policies. Due to the
unevenness of the level of economic progress, this chapter is more relevant for the
more developed parts of East Asia. (On the precise meaning of happiness, the argu-
ment that it is the appropriate ultimate objective, and related issues, see Chaps. 1 and
5.)
With the rapid growth in East Asia, researchers have discussed the (largely
positive) effects of Confucianism on economic growth. However, the East-Asian
happiness gap and its possible relation to the Confucian cultures have been largely
neglected. I am quite aware that this is a sensitive area. I also do not have enough
expertise in the area to give a complete discussion. However, since happiness is the
most important and the ultimate objective in life, it is important to discuss this in the
open so that perhaps suitable remedies may be forthcoming if more people become
interested.
1 For some forerunners discussing thewelfare costs of economic growth bywell-known economists,
see Mishan (1969/1993) and Scitovsky (1976/1992).
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The low ranking of East Asian countries in happiness is consistent with some
other measures. For example, according to the Durex report in 2014 ( http://library.
northernlight.com/FB20001017290000041.html), the satisfaction in sex life, Japan
topped the least satisfaction list by a wide margin. Other countries/regions with low
sex satisfaction include Hong Kong and Singapore. The average age of first sex (so-
called ‘loss of virginity’) is also highest in Asia (21.8 years old) in contrast to the
lowest continent’s (South America) Figure of 17.4.
An older Durex survey of 18 thousand adults in 27 countries and regions reported
in the mass media world-wide on 17–18 October 2000, Japan also had the lowest
average number of sex over a year, 37, far behind the second lowest (Malaysia) of
62 and the low figures for other East-Asian regions (Mainland China 69, Taiwan
78, Hong Kong 84). In comparison, the overall average of 96 is exceeded by, among
others, India (95), Brazil (113) and U.S. (132, the top figure). (Document available at
http://library.northernlight.com/FB20001017290000041.html.) More recent figures
(Beauchamp 2015) show a similar pattern: The lowest figure of 45 times for Japan is
far below the second lowest Figure of 73 for Singapore, and less than one third that
of the highest 138 times of Greece. The figures of 78 for Hong Kong, 88 for Taiwan,
96 for Mainland China are all within the lowest ten worldwide.
Japan is also the only country in the world where a higher percentage of people
report being dissatisfied with their sex lives than satisfied. The least satisfied (in sex)
countries/regions are, in descending order: Japan, France, Hong Kong, Singapore,
Thailand. ‘It’s not surprising that the Japanese are having infrequent, unsatisfying
sex. For years, Japan reported some of the longest average working hours in the
world. [But lower hours in recent years; see above.] In and of itself, this makes
sex less likely … Asian countries have a much higher mean age of virginity loss
than nations basically everywhere else.’ (Beauchamp 2015). According to Chatsbin
(http://chartsbin.com/view/xxj), the top countries/regions of highest age in having
first sex are all Asian (in descending order with ages in brackets): Malaysia (23),
India (22.9), Singapore (22.8), China (22.1), Thailand (20.5), Hong Kong (20.2),
Vietnam (19.7), in comparison to the lowest figure of 15.6 years old in Iceland.
Scholars in Asia also agree that Confucianism has the tendency to promote absti-
nence. The three traditionally influential religions/beliefs of Confucianism, Daoism,
and Buddhism in China and other East Asian countries ‘all promote the reduction
of material desire to pursue happiness/well-being’ (Gao et al. 2010, p.1043). What
we want to discuss next is the reasons for the East-Asian happiness gap, especially
for given levels (and growth rates) of per-capita income and education level (See
Veenhoven 2014; Ngoo et al. 2015; Kim 2018 for further evidence on this gap; Lim
et al. 2020 on some empirical analysis.)
13.2 Some Reflections
I do not profess to have the complete explanation and answers. However, since I
believe that, ultimately, happiness is the most, if not the only, important thing, I wish
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to venture some reflections. Incomplete and immature as they may be, these bricks
may still serve to attract jades.
13.2.1 Why Still the Rat-Race for Money?
If happiness is the ultimate objective andmore incomes no longer increase happiness,
why do people still engage in the rat race formakingmore andmoremoney?Thismay
be explained by: the environmental disruption effects, relative-income/consumption
effects (emphasized by researchers from Easterlin 1974 to Rojas 2019), the inade-
quate recognition of adaptation effects, and the irrational materialistic bias, as also
discussed in the previous chapters (Chap. 7 in particular). To some extent, it is individ-
ually rational to make more money, as higher incomes still contribute marginally to
happiness through the importance of relative standing.At the social level, the relative-
income effects between individuals cancel each other to leave no effect overall. In
addition, the environmental disruption effects of higher production and consumption
may really make people worse off. We may have welfare-reducing growth but for
the positive effects of the advancement in knowledge. (On welfare-reducing growth
despite individual and government optimization, see Ng 2003.) After the survival and
moderate comfort levels (wen bao溫飽 and xiao kang小康), since the positive effect
is really very small in terms of long-term real happiness, it is still irrational even at
the individual level to sacrifice things more important for happiness such as family,
friends, health, and even safety and freedom in order to make more money as many
people obviously do, including myself to some extent. But why do people have such
irrational preferences? To a large extent, this may be explained by our accumulation
instinct and instinct for competition for relative standing (nature) and the effects of
the omnipresent advertising and peer influence in our commercial society (nurture).
(See Ng 2003 for more details.)
13.2.2 The East Asian Happiness Gap: Its Causes
Even if high incomes no longer increase happiness, perhaps, dynamically, we need
rising incomes just to sustain happiness at an unchanged level, the so-called ‘hedonic
treadmill’. The East Asians have not only high income levels but also high rates of
growth in incomes. On these counts, they should be happier than others. Despite
these, they are less happy than others. This may be called the East Asian happiness
gap. Since our measures of happiness are not foolproof, we cannot be completely
confident of the existence of such a gap. However, there is sufficient evidence for
provisionally accepting the hypothesis of a gap before it is overthrown by more solid
evidence.
Some explanations of the East Asian happiness gap are related to the explanation
of the rat-race in the previous subsection. First, the higher congestion, pollution,
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and other forms of environmental disruption caused by high growth in production
and consumption, especially in the heavily congested cities and industrial areas may
partly explain why the rapid growth in East Asia is not an unmixed blessing, to say
the least. These problems also exist in theWest, but are more serious in East Asia due
to the higher population density and less adequate environmental protection. Some
more genuine indicator of progress that take account of congestion and environmental
disruption that are largely ignored by the conventionalGDPmay show that the growth
rates are not as spectacular. Certainly at the margin, it is undesirable to poison our
air and water to have additional inessential output. The human costs in ill health in
many cities are intolerable. In East Asia’s major cities, air and water pollution are
the sources of many premature deaths, bronchitis, and respiratory symptoms.2 The
severity of smog in Chinese cities, especially in Northern China including Beijing,
and especially over late Autumn to Winter, is well known. As reported, while China
has made progress cutting smog, the damage to the health of millions of people may
already have been done, especially as the population ages, according to a U.S.-based
research agency (Stanway 2018). According to the annual State of Global Air Report
by the Health Effects Institute, the annual figures of air-pollution related deaths per
100,000 in 2016 are 117 for China and 21 for the U.S., a difference of more than
five and a half times (MaCarthy 2018). Also, the under-reporting of such figures is
probably more serious in China.
Secondly, the East-Asians are reputed to be highly competitive. This partly
explains their economic success. However, the very high degree of competitive-
ness may be detrimental in achieving happiness both at the individual level and,
even more so, at the social level. One important aspect of competitiveness is trying
to surpass others. An individual may succeed in surpassing others but for the whole
society, an individual on average cannot surpass others.Much effort in achieving rela-
tive distinction, if spent on areas without significant external benefits, may thus be
largely wasted socially. (Thus, people should compete in areas with external benefits
such as contributions to knowledge and society.) Another aspect of competitiveness
is not being contented with one’s current achievement and wanting to do better.
While this may propel progress in objective terms such as production, it is likely to
be detrimental to contentment and happiness.3
Buddhism, Hinduism, and Taoism are more emphatic on the virtue of contented-
ness while Confucianism is, at least relative to the previous three, more emphatic on
the virtue of achievement. While Buddhism and Taoism are still believed in parts of
East Asia, their influence has largely waned, especially relative to the importance of
Buddhism and Hinduism in India.
It is true that we need some degree of competitiveness just to survive and a little
more to make progress. However, too high a degree of competitiveness may be detri-
mental to happiness. In fact, one of the reasons the East-Asians have a high degree of
2 On some regional evidence in China, see Yang et al. (2020). On the feasibility and importance of
environmental protection, especially using economical ones, see Guo et al. (2020).
3 On the positive and negative effects of envy and a distinction betweenmalicious and benign envies,
see J.C.K. Ng et al. (2020).
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subjective competitiveness may be due to the high degree of competitiveness that has
existed objectively for many generations. The competitive environment favors those
with a high degree of competitiveness which in turn increases the competitiveness of
the environment, completing a vicious cycle. However, the cycle is not unchecked
as excessive competitiveness also generates detrimental effects.
Thirdly, the educational method and general cultural influence of the East Asians
are also highly productive in competitive achievements (especially in formal exam-
inations) but likely detrimental to real creativity and personal and social happi-
ness. According to the 2015 report (the 2019 results are only forthcoming, as of
June 19, 2020) of TIMSS (Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study;
https://timss.bc.edu/timss2019/index.html), the East-Asian countries/regions (Main-
land China not included in the study) lead the world (49 countries tested) in both
math and science in student performance, with Singapore (618), Hong Kong (615),
Korea (608), Taiwan (597), Japan (593) at the top in math, and with a big gap of 23
points with the next country of Northern Ireland (570); this gap was the same as the
2011 report. In comparison, England scored 546 (just after Northern Ireland) and the
U.S. scored 539; the lowest score by Kuwait was 353. The corresponding figures for
science are: Singapore (590), Korea (589), Japan (569), Russia (567), Hong Kong
(557), Taiwan (555), U.S. (546), England (536), Kuwait (337) [The 2019 results are
now available from the site given above, with no substantial changes to the 2015
ones reported here, e.g. in maths, the top five are still the same countries/regions:
Singapore (625), Hong Kong (602), Korea (600), Taiwan (599), Japan (593), with
the top Singapore pulling ahead further.].
However, commenting on a previous similar report in 2000, Yuan Tzeh Lee (a
Nobel laureate and President of Academia Sinica in Taipei) said, ‘Most Taiwan
students are good in examinations. Their performance in science and mathematics
are good at the stage of high school. However, after graduating from high schools,
they become exhausted, as if going to retire … The educational system in Taiwan
is very repressive of curious students interested in pursuing creativity. This is very
bad.’ (My translation back from my Chinese translation of a report in China Times,
7 December 2000, p. 7.) At least to a large extent, this remark is also applicable to
other East-Asian regions and also with respect to happiness, not just with respect to
creativity.4
Fourthly and relatedly, East-Asian culture (especially its educational system) is
over-emphatic on conformity, order, and the collective interests to the detriment of
individualism, freedom, and hence happiness. It is true that individual freedom must
not be excessive either, as the welfare of others may be adversely affected by the
relentless and unrestricted pursuit of individual freedom. However, while the West
may be somewhat over the delicate balance to be too emphatic of individualism in
some aspects, the East-Asians are likely to err in the opposite direction by a wider
margin. An important explanation of this big difference is probably related to the
relative effectiveness of the legal system in the West which can be relied more to
4 See also Qu et al. (2020) on the happiness ‘cost of academic focus’ on Chinese school children
and their parents in America.
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control the excess of individual freedom. This means that, with the legal system
strengthened (as obviously very successful in regions like Singapore, Taiwan, and
Hong Kong, until the recent couple of years in the last one), East-Asians may move
towards the direction of freedom and individualism to increase happiness.
Happiness researchers remark: ‘… in the Latin nations, such as Colombia, there
is a tendency to view pleasant emotions as desirable… In contrast, in Confucian
cultures, such as China, there tends to be relatively more acceptance of unpleasant
emotions and relatively less acceptance of pleasant emotions… In China the ideal
level of life satisfaction was considered to be neutrality—neither satisfied nor dissat-
isfied’ (Diener and Suh 1999, pp. 443–4). Eastern researchers also agree on the
‘abstinence’ (禁慾) tendency of Confucianism. For example, ‘in Confucian culture
… abstinence is an important factor’ (Fu傅佩荣 1989, p. 51; my translation) and
‘hedonistic striving for happiness is regarded as unworthy and even shameful’ (Lu
and Shih 1997, p. 183; see also Fang 1980, p.153.). The three traditionally influential
religions/beliefs of Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism in China and other East
Asian countries, as also mentioned above, ‘all promote the reduction of material
desire to pursue happiness/well-being’ (Gao, et al. 2010, p. 1043. On the effects of
societal values on happiness, especially the relationship between income and happi-
ness, see Lim et al. 2019). How can one enjoy life happily if one is brought up to be
adverse to pleasant feelings? (One indication of the abstinence tendency is the high
average ages of first time in having sex for East-Asian countries/regions mentioned
in Sect. 13.1)
Fifthly, East-Asian culture is too emphatic on appearance, on not losing face and
less on the real content and true feelings. The importance of ‘face’ (面子; mian4
zi3; the numbers here refer to the tones) is well-known. The emphasis on outward
appearance in contrast to inner content may be ‘spotted’ (可窺一斑) in the example
of the styles of buildings. The Temple of Heaven (天壇) in Beijing is extremely
impressive looking from outside but rather ordinary inside. Most Western churches
look rather dull from outside but are well furnished and decorated inside. When my
father (born and grew up in China and lived in Malaysia for decades) first saw our
flat/apartment (rented) in Australia, he thought that the building (brick-veneered)
looked unfinished. When he went inside, he found it very comfortably furnished.
Many flats in East Asia have a very small bathroom and kitchen but relatively large
‘visitors hall’ (客厅) which is known in the West as the lounge room or living
room. This difference in the naming of the same room also betrays the difference in
emphasis between the East (to impress the visitors) and the West (for the comfort of
the family). To what extent is this a reflection of more visitors rather than a difference
in emphasis remains to be investigated.
For another example, when advising their children regarding marriage, most
Western parents put happiness first. In contrast, many East-Asian parents emphasize
the family backgrounds (门当户对) and other objective aspects. It is more important
to them (at least relative to people of the West) for the marriage to look good in
appearance than for the children to actually have a happy life.
Of course, happiness is also affected by biological factors. However, since they are
less amenable to policy influence (except in the future when genetic engineering may
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be safely used), they are not emphasized here. (On the use of brain stimulation for
pleasure and genetic engineering for our own transformation, see Chap. 12 above.)
While cultural differences are important, their role must not be exaggerated.
Cultural differences domake a difference as towhat factorsmay affect happiness (e.g.
Christopher 1999) but not with respect to the concept and ultimate value of happi-
ness as such. Moreover, there are largely universal factors determined by biology.
Thus, Maslow’s (1943, 1954/1970a/1987) need-gratification theory of well-being is
largely universal (Sect. 10.1 above). Also, I believe that, at the ultimate level, happi-
ness as the rational end (Chap. 5 above) is culturally independent. It may be thought
that my personal views on happiness are largely due to the influence of Western
culture. However, I can vouch that I was brought up in largely Eastern influence,
attending only Chinese schools and university in Malaysia and Singapore before
my time of post-graduate study. Even now, my cultural influences are more Chinese
than Western. For example, I still read most non-economics books and magazines in
Chinese and listen mostly to Chinese music. I can read and write in Chinese almost
twice as fast as in English.
Some researchers exaggerate the cultural difference. For example, Lu and Shih
(1997, p. 181/2) mention that ‘the word happiness did not appear in the Chinese
language until recently’, suggesting that the concept of happiness is alien to the
Chinese people until recently. This is certainly very misleading. It may be true that
themodern phrase for happiness in Chinese (快乐; kuai4 le4) appeared only recently.
However, the ancient words for happiness in Chinese (either kuai4 or le4) appeared
from time immemorial. For example, le4 appeared in such ancient expressions as
‘Friends coming fromafar, am I not happy?’ (有朋自远方来,不亦乐乎?) and ‘[I am]
so happy, no more thought of Shu’ (乐不思蜀), with the clear meaning of happiness.
I suggest that such primitive concepts as happiness are universal and should exist in
all cultures from time immemorial, probably not long after the evolution of homo
sapiens, if not earlier; likely advanced animals also have such concepts, even if they
may not be able to verbalize them.
13.3 Some Implications
As the study of happiness has made much progress (e.g. including a journal special-
izing on the study of happiness, the Journal of Happiness Study having produced 22
volumes with many issues each), the importance of happiness and the preliminary
results on the failure of higher income/consumption to increase happiness imply that
a lot more resources should be used for happiness study. How could the measures of
happiness be made more reliable and comparable interpersonally? (Chap. 6 above.)
Does the East-Asian happiness gap really exist? Are people of East-Asian origin
but living in the West also less happy? How could happiness be increased? Such
questions are very important but very much under-researched.
Despite the failure of higher incomes to increase happiness, I continue to believe
in the usefulness of economic growth. However, the direction of growth has to be
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appropriate. First, the protection of environmental quality has to be a top priority.
We want clean growth, not dirty growth. Secondly, we want growth that can really
increase our happiness. This includes less on largely mutually canceling competitive
private consumption and more on areas of public spending that can really increase
our welfare. Among others, this includes more public funding for research to find
out more. The desirability of higher public spending applies to many other areas
including environmental protection, public health, education, and research (More in
Chaps. 14 and 15).
Another implication is the need, both at the individual and the social level, to put
more emphasis on things that are much more important to happiness than money,
includinghealth, relationships, and spiritual fulfillment, as discussed in other chapters
of this book. In particular, for the developed parts of East Asia, more reflections on
the East-Asian happiness gap are needed. Perhaps it is desirable to realizemore about
the illusions of the irrational accumulation instinct, to resist more the temptations
created by the omnipresent commercial advertising, to reduce our competitive nature,
to divert competition from consumption to social contributions, and to make less
money in order to enjoy life more. East-Asians may not only achieve more happiness
this way, but also, by reducing and redirecting their lopsided growth, contribute to
a better global environment. (This touches on the issue of international cooperation
to address the problem of international competition, a negative-sum game, on which
see Ng and Liu 2003.)
However, there are still large parts of East Asia where the majority of people are
still very poor by any standard and where economic growth will likely increase the
happiness of people significantly. For purely economic development, more emphasis
to the development of such areas, including the western regions of China, may be
desirable. For the more developed areas of East Asia, factors really important for
happiness such as public health, the environment, and above all, the advance in
science, technology and knowledge in general, are more important than the purely
economic factors such as GDP.
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Chapter 14
Implications for Public Policy
Abstract The failure of higher private consumption to increase happiness signifi-
cantly due to environmental disruption, relative competition, adaptation, our mate-
rialistic bias, etc. are relevant for public policy, especially in making higher public
spending in the right areas like environmental protection, research, poverty elimina-
tion, etc. more welfare-improving than a ‘big society, small government’. Some soft
paternalistic measures such as nudging people to save adequately for old age may
also be needed in the widespread presence of imperfect rationality and foresight.
The policy implications of findings in happiness studies partly depend on our under-
standing of the reasons for these findings. Most economists focus on the important
role of relative standing. Thus, in his seminal paper, Easterlin (1974) uses it to
explain the failure of happiness to increase. Once over the subsistence level, happi-
ness depends more on relative than absolute levels of incomes, consumption, or other
objective variables.1 In fact, Knight et al. (2013) show that relative income was at
least twice as important for individual happiness as absolute income, even in rural
China where people were barely above the subsistence level. Studies in the West
show less dramatic results but still have relative incomes at least half as important
as absolute incomes. Frank (1999), Ireland (1998), and others correctly draw the
conclusion that this implies very high corrective taxes on incomes (Cf. Luo et al.
2018). In fact, all of the income taxes of most countries could be justified as correc-
tive taxes on the relative competition effects alone. If we add the very substantial
environmental costs of most production and consumption, general taxation is likely
to be below its optimally efficient level. Rather than imposing excess burdens or
distortionary costs, taxes are corrective and this efficiency gain could be increased
by increasing tax rates! This would stand traditional public economics on this aspect
on its head! (Yan et al. 2021.)
Another important factor accounting for the findings in happiness that appear
to be inconsistent with traditional presumption in economics is the importance of
1 For another explanation based on the role of cultural values, see Ahuvia (2002).
© The Author(s) 2022
Y.-K. Ng, Happiness—Concept, Measurement and Promotion,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4972-8_14
145
146 14 Implications for Public Policy
adaptation effects (people get used to their standard of living) and the underesti-
mation of these effects by most if not all people.2 There are also a host of other
results indicating that individuals are far from being perfectly rational. Moreover,
this imperfection does not just cause random biases on either side. Rather, partly
due to the nature of accumulation instinct and partly to nurture (peer pressure and
commercial advertising), there is a consistent bias towards excessivematerialism (Ng
2003). A distinction between utility (representing preference) and welfare (happi-
ness) is thus necessary (Chap. 2). Traditional welfare economics and cost–benefit
analysis are based on individual preferences or willingness to pay. When individual
preference and welfare systematically diverge, adjustments may be necessary even
in the absence of external effects.
A cost–benefit analysis aiming to maximize happiness (or welfare; the two terms
are used interchangeably) may be quite different from one aiming at net-income or
even preference maximization (including Pareto optimality in the sense of prefer-
ence). For example, if certain protection measure is shown to cost the economymore
than the total wages of the protected workers, most economists regard this as more
than conclusive proof that themeasure is inefficient. However, while this is inefficient
in terms of income maximization, it needs not be inefficient in terms of happiness
maximization. The protective measure may well still be inefficient in happiness
terms if unemployment will only increase very temporarily without the measure.
If displaced workers could get alternative jobs quickly, no protection is usually the
best choice. However, if prolonged unemployment will be involved, it may be worth
spending more than the total wages to protect the jobs. This is so because of two
results in happiness studies: 1. Unemployment causes a lot of unhappiness which is
ways beyond the mere losses in incomes (Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1998; see
also Sect. 10.3); 2. At least for rich countries, more incomes no longer contribute
to happiness at the social level in the long run (Chap. 7). It may thus make sense
to spend a lot of money at negligible marginal happiness to protect jobs that are
important for happiness. Economists’ case against protection has to rest more with
the working of the market to make unemployment temporary. This also implies the
higher importance of job search or transition assistance.
Consider issues like accidents/risk/security, health care, and the value of life.
Modern economics has replaced incomes-based analysis with willingness-to-pay
or preference-based analysis. If we ignore possible concern for others, ignorance
and irrational preferences, individual preference and welfare coincide and analysis
based on preference and that based on welfare are equivalent at the individual level.
At the social level, we then only have to take into account external effects and issues
of equality that economists are already familiar with. However, recent results in
happiness studies and behavioural economics suggest that individual choices often
involve imperfect information and/or imperfect rationality and this is so especially for
choices involving the future and changes in small probabilities. In combination with
the basis of excessive materialism/consumerism mentioned above, this may make
2 See Clark et al. (2008) for a survey; I discussed the happiness implications of aspiration and
adaptation in Ng (1978) and Ng and Wang (1993).
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people engage in excessive competition/consumption (to the detriment of health and
family life), under-save for old age (making compulsory superannuation possibly
sensible and actually practised in many countries), and also a host of other welfare-
reducing activities not warranted even at the individual level (before counting the
additional external costs through the environmental and relative-income effects).
Thus, asking people’s willingness to pay for a marginal increase in safety or a slight
reduction in the risk of a fatal accident may not give reliable values of life in the
sense of true expected welfare maximization.
On the one hand, such figures may be under-reported due to people’s pressure
for present consumption and hence under-rating the willingness to pay for safety.
On the other hand, these figures may be over-reported due to the innate irrational
fear of death (which has clear selection value but may be inconsistent with welfare
maximization). Thus, it is desirable to supplement the willingness-to-pay studies
with happiness studies. For expected welfare maximization,3 the value of life should
equal the total happiness of remaining life divided by the true happiness value of
a marginal dollar. Since this latter value is likely to be very low (if still positive)
even just taking into account the adaptation effect alone, the correct value of life
may be very large even at the individual level. At the social level, this is even more
so, as the true happiness value of a marginal dollar has to be further discounted by
environmental effects and the mutually offsetting relative-income effects. This may
partly explain the very large sums of money some decision makers at the social level
are willing to spend to improve safety that most economists regard as many times
beyond the efficient levels. While there may be some efficiency problems at the
public decision-making level, it may also be the case that economists should revise
their analysis to be more consistent with welfare maximization.
A particular area where very substantial adjustments are necessary is public
spending. Since government spending on public goods has to be financed from taxa-
tion and government spending may involve some unavoidable inefficiency, most
economists emphasize the excess burden of taxation and are in favour of lowering
government spending. Their favorite slogan is: Big society, small government. This
position ignores the probably greater inefficiency of private production and consump-
tion due to unaccounted-for environmental costs and the mutually cancelling effects
(at the social level) of competition for relative standing. In addition, if additional
private consumption no longer contributes to happiness at the social level, even if
the monetary costs of public spending are very high, but the ultimate happiness costs
may be zero. Thus, provided that the relevant items of public spending do contribute
to happiness ultimately, they may still be worth the high costs and some inefficiency
in public spending. In addition, there are also arguments (Kaplow 1996; Ng 2000)
that, even if we ignore these factors, the spending side tends to produce offsetting
effects to the excess burden on the taxation side, as discussed in the next chapter.
If individual choices are subject to high degrees of informational imperfection and
irrationality, does that mean that central planning is better than the market economy?
3 For the argument that this is the appropriate objective in the presence of risk/uncertainty, see Ng
(1984).
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Our experience gives a clear and resounding ‘No!’. Soviet Union, Eastern European
countries, and China all adopted central planning without success. Central planners
are also subject to imperfections in knowledge, rationality, and motivation. Much
government interventions especially nationalization in Western countries also do
not give an encouraging experience. We should not go back to central planning
and use inappropriate government intervention. These paternalistic measures not
only usually less efficient than the imperfect private market, they also temper with
individual freedom excessively. Nevertheless, while the government should not be
too paternalistic, some milder degree of so-called ‘soft paternalism’ or libertarian
paternalism may work to revise the mistakes of imperfect private decisions. This
is advocated by, among others, Richard Thaler (Nobel laureate in economics in
2017) and his collaborator Cass Sustein, including in their joint book called Nudge
(Thaler and Sustein 2009; updated edition). See also: Camerer et al. (2003), Lambert
(2017); for criticism/evaluation of soft paternalism, see: Qizilbash (2012), Rebonato
(2014), Fumagalli (2016), Epstein (2018); for welfare-improving measures beyond
soft paternalism, see Bhargave and Loewenstein (2015).
One very successful soft-paternalistic policy is nudging people to have more
savings. Under saving for retirement while in prime working ages is an important
problem in many Western countries. In the U.S. Congress, the rightist conservatives
and the leftist liberals united to push through the policy of ‘Save more tomorrow’. If
you ask people to save more right now, resistance is very high. Instead, people are
requested to agree now that, when their salaries increase next, they will save more
a proportion of the increase. This does not require people to cut down consumption
and hence winsmuch higher rates of acceptance. Apart from the U.S., other countries
including the U.K. and South Korea also accept some soft-paternalistic policies.
Another mild policy of restriction is for countries/states where legal gambling is
allowed, including Singapore and some states in the U.S., to allow people to apply
for restricting themselves or family members from entering casinos. In the State of
Michigan in the U.S., the person who first applied for such a restriction on himself
was also the first to be arrested for violating that restriction. After signing to restrict
himself, he could not control himself and sneaked into a casino to play blackjack.
After being discovered, hewas not only fined but his winning ofmore than a thousand
U.S. dollars was also confiscated.
Why do people restrict themselves? Studies show that emotion and reasoning are
handled in different parts in our brain.While one is calmly reasoning, onemay realize
that gambling is no good for oneself. However, when one is emotionally attracted,
reasoning may not be able to control your emotion.
If people have demand for restricting themselves, why could such restriction
not be supplied by the market? This is so because, in the absence of the power of
enforcement by the government, the emotional self will cancel the restriction by the
rational self. For example, in the eighteenth century, the romantic poet Samuel Taylor
Coleridge of the U.K. employed workers to prevent him to go into opium-smoking
houses. However, when he wanted to get in, he would warn the workers that, if they
prevented him, he would call the police to arrest them.
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Due to the widespread existence of laziness, procrastination, vulnerability to
temptations, and many other reasons of imperfect rationality, problems like obesity,
alcohol poisoning, inadequate savings, etc. are prevalent. Thus, if excessively illib-
eral policies are avoided, some soft-paternalistic measures may be considered to
help people to become healthier and happier. One simple policy is to impose much
higher taxes on those demerit goods like cigarettes, soft drinks and candies to reduce
their consumption. Apart from this consumption reduction effects, the extra revenues
generated could be used for poverty reduction and environmental protection.
In the light of recent results in happiness studies, Layard (2005) has convincingly
argued for the need to rethink public policy with respect to many areas including
work-life balance, family life, helping the poor, eliminating high unemployment,
mental illness, and community life. Here, I wish to mention a couple of areas of
public spending that are more likely to increase happiness than private competitive
spending.
First, in the light of the threatening effects of climate change and other environ-
mental disruption, public actions in controlling pollution both in the form of taxing
external costs and in abatement spending will likely be necessary to protect our
future. Economists are familiar with the desirability in principle of taxing external
effects in accordance to the damages inflicted. However, for environmental disrup-
tion that affects the long future, it is difficult if not impractical to estimate. Even if
this is so, for most cases where some abatement is desirable (true for most serious
environmental problems including climate change), it is desirable to tax disruption at
least at the marginal cost of abatement (which is easier to estimate than the marginal
damage of disruption). Such a tax will normally yield total revenue in excess of the
optimal amount of abatement spending (Ng 2004). However, due to the global nature
of some if not a large part of environmental disruption, international cooperation will
likely be necessary. (On ways to foster international cooperation and compliance,
see Ng and Liu 2003.)
If we proceed along an environmentally responsible path of growth, our great
grandchildren in a century will have a real per capita income 5 to 6 times higher than
our level now. Is it worth the risk of environmental disaster to disregard environmental
protection now to try to grow a little faster? If this faster growth could be sustained,
our great grandchildren would enjoy a real per capita income 7 to 8 times (instead of
5–6 times) higher than our level now. However, they may live in an environmentally
horrible world or may well not have a chance to be born at all! The correct choice is
obvious.
Easterly (1999) shows that, with economic growth, while some quality-of-life
indicators increase, others decrease. Rather, it is the advance in knowledge at the
world level that is more positively associated with higher values of quality-of-life
indicators. In addition, as knowledge is largely a global public good with long-term
benefits, it is likely to be well under-supplied. Thus, public investment in education
and research to promote the advance of knowledgewill most certainly yield very high
benefits. I also support Layard’s (2005, Chap.13) endorsement of the appropriate use
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of drugs to promote happiness.4 However, brain stimulation and genetic engineering
provide far more potential, as discussed in Chap. 12. Especially for those with some
understanding of economics, the case for higher public spending is pursued at a
deeper level in the next chapter, taking account of the argument of Kaplow, a well-
accomplished economist of the Harvard Law School.
References
AHUVIA, A. C. (2002). Individualism/collectivism and cultures of happiness: A theoretical conjec-
ture on the relationship between consumption, culture and subjective well-being at the national
level. Journal of Happiness Studies, 3, 23–36. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1015682121103
BHARGAVE, S. & LOEWENSTEIN, G. (2015). Behavioral economics and public policy 102:
Beyond nudging. American Economic Review, Papers & Proceedings, 105(5), 396–401.
CAMERER, C., ISSACHAROFF, S., LOEWENSTEIN, G., O’DONAGHUE, T. & RABIN, M.
(2003). Regulation for conservatives: Behavioral economics and the case for “asymmetric
paternalism.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 151, 1211–1254.
CLARK, A. E., FRIJTERS, P. & SHIELDS, M. A. (2008). Relative income, happiness, and utility:
An explanation for the Easterlin paradox and other puzzles. Journal of Economic Literature,
46(1), 95–144.
EASTERLY, William. (1999). Life during growth. Journal of Economic Growth, 4(3), 239–276.
https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009882702130
EPSTEIN,RichardA. (2018). TheDangerous allure of libertarian paternalism.Review of Behavioral
Economics, 5(3–4), 389–416.
FRANK, R. H. (1999). Luxury Fever: Why Money Fails to Satisfy in an Era of Excess. Free Press.
FUMAGALLI, R. (2016). Decision sciences and the new case for paternalism: Three welfare-
related justificatory challenges. Soc Choice Welf, 47, 459–480. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-
016-0972-1
IRELAND, Norman J. (1998). Status-seeking, income taxation and efficiency. Journal of Public
Economics., 70, 99–113.
KAPLOW, Louis. (1996). The optimal supply of public goods and the distortionary cost of taxation.
National Tax Journal, 49(4), 513–533.
LAMBERT, Thomas A. (2017). Symposium: Evaluating Nudge: A Decade of Libertarian Pater-
nalism: Foreward: From Gadfly to Nudge: The Genesis of Libertarian Paternalism, Missouri Law
Review. 82, Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol82/iss3/5
LAYARD, Richard (2005). Happiness: Lessons from a New Science. Penguin.
LUO, Yangmei, WANG, Tong, and HUANG, Xiting. (2018). Which types of income matter most
for well-being in China: Absolute, relative or income aspirations? International Journal of
Psychology, 53(3), 218–222.
NG, Yew-Kwang. (1978). Economic growth and social welfare: The need for a complete study of
happiness. Kyklos, 575–587. Reprinted in Easterlin, 2002, 66–77.
NG, Yew-Kwang. (1984). Expected subjective utility: Is the Neumann-Morgenstern utility the same
as the neoclassical’s? Social Choice and Welfare, 1(3), 177–186.
NG, Yew-Kwang. (2000). Efficiency, Equality, and Public Policy: With a Case for Higher Public
Spending. Macmillan.
4 ‘Ironically, what will in the end defeat the bad drugs, especially heroin and cocaine, will be the
new medical drugs that work better than they do. These new drugs will be safer and non-addictive.
Side by side with cognitive therapies, they will enable people whose natures are rough or whose
lives have been tough to become happier people’ (Layard 2005, p. 221).
References 151
NG, Yew-Kwang. (2003). From preference to happiness: Towards a more complete welfare
economics”, Social Choice and Welfare, 20: 307–350.
NG, Yew-Kwang. (2004). Optimal environmental charges/taxes: Easy to estimate and surplus-
yielding. Environmental and Resource Economics, 28(4), 395–408.
NG, Yew-Kwang & LIU, Po-Ting. (2003). Global environmental protection – solving the interna-
tional public-good problem by empowering the United Nations through cooperation with WTO.
International Journal of Global Environmental Issues, 3(4), 409–417.
NG, Yew-Kwang & WANG, Jianguo. (1993). Relative income, aspiration, environmental quality,
individual and political myopia: Why may the rat-race for material growth be welfare reducing?
Mathematical Social Sciences, 26, 3–23.
QIZILBASH,Mozaffar. (2012). Informed desire and the ambitions of libertarian paternalism. Social
Choice and Welfare, 38, 647–658. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0620-8
REBONATO, R. A. (2014). Critical assessment of libertarian paternalism. Journal of Consumer
Policy, 37, 357–396. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10603-014-9265-1
THALER, Richard H. & SUNSTEIN. Cass R. (2009). (updated edition). Nudge: Improving
Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness. New York: Penguin.
WINKELMANN, Liliana & WINKELMANN, Rainer. (1998). Why are the unemployed so
unhappy? Economica, 65, 1–15.
YAN, Eric, FENG, Qu & NG, Y.-K. (2021). Do we need Ramsey taxation? Our existing taxes are
largely corrective. Economic Modelling, accepted.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
Chapter 15
A Case for Higher Public Spending
Abstract Studies by psychologists, sociologists, and economists indicate that
increases in incomes beyond amoderate level are not related to happiness nor signifi-
cantly with the objective quality-of-life indicators (which increase with scientific and
technological breakthroughs at the global level). Yet everyone wants more money.
This may be explained by environmental disruption, relative-income effects, inade-
quate recognition of adaptation effects, and the materialistic bias due to our accumu-
lation instinct and advertising. These factors cause a bias towards private consump-
tion, making public spending, especially on research and environmental protection
(with their long-term and global public-good nature) well below optimal. This is
made worse by economists’ emphasis on the excess burden of taxation, ignoring the
negative excess burden on the spending side. As Kaplow argues, if taxes are raised
in accordance to the benefits of the funded public goods at the respective income
levels, no disincentive effects are involved.
We have discussed the failure of private consumption to significantly increase happi-
ness after a rather low level of biological necessity and comfort (Chap. 7) and
discussed some reasons and implications in other chapters. These naturally suggest
the question whether wemay be able to increase happiness more by increasing public
spending, at least in the right areas, as also discussed in the previous chapter.However,
the global trends in recent decades seem to be against public spending. The whole
world is marching towards the right, with the transformation of the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe, the drastic economic reforms in China, and the privatization,
liberalization, and (reversing the historical increasing trend) reduction in taxes (with
the Trump’s tax reduction in December 2017 being a recent important event) and
public spending in manyWestern countries.1 Much of these changes are applaudable
1 For example, the share of total general government outlays in GDP increased very substantially
over many decades to around 34% in the mid 1980’s (1985–1987) in the US but then declined
to 30.1% in 1999 and projected to decline to 29.4% in 2001. The corresponding figures for all
OECD countries (Australia in brackets) are: 38.3% (36%) in mid 1980’s, 37.8% (32.3%) in 1999,
and 36.9% (31.8%). (Source OECD Economic Outlook June 2000, p. 270.) The proportions have
however recovered somewhat in the last decade or so. Conceptually, there are valid arguments for
optimal public spending to increase in real per-capita incomes (Ng 2000b).
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and economists may feel proud for partially contributing to these changes. However,
this chapter argues that the reduction in public spending, especially in education,
research, and environmental protection is counter-productive. Imagine a trebling in
your income but without access to computers, television, phones, modern medical
facilities, etc., wouldn’t your welfare be reduced drastically? This may not be so
viewed in the narrow perspective of production and consumption especially in the
short run, but is almost certainly so viewed in the wider perspective of welfare (or
happiness) in the long run and at the social level. It is well known that public spending
has some efficiency problems but the probably much worse inefficiency of private
consumption has been largely ignored. This chapter attempts to provide a broader
and more balanced picture from an interdisciplinary perspective.
15.1 Economists Overestimate the Costs of Public Spending
For a dollar of public spending, non-economists typically cost it at one dollar.
However, economists typically cost it at well in excess of one dollar. An estimate by
a well-known economist (Feldstein 1997) puts it at $2.65. Though this is an extreme
estimate, on average the economists’ estimate is for a dollar of public expenditures
to be $1.30, a premium of 30%. Such high estimates of the costs of public spending
suggest that public projects should yield very high benefits before they are worth-
while to undertake; a benefit-to-cost ratio of 1.3, instead of one, has to be exceeded.
This conception probably partly contributes to the worldwide trend towards cuts in
public spending.
The costs of public funds include not only its direct cost (the amount of taxes
imposed) but also the costs of administration, compliance, policing, and distortion.
While the first three types of costs are substantial, they do not vary significantly
with the amount of tax revenue raised. Hence, concentrating on the marginal costs of
public spending, economists emphasize the distortionary costs or excess burden of
taxation due to the fact that taxes distort the free choices of individuals, especially in
discouraging work effort, i.e. the disincentive effects. At least since the time of Pigou
(1928), economists have emphasized that the benefits of public goods must exceed
their direct costs by an amount sufficient to outweigh the excess burden of taxation.
An authoritativemodern textbook by aNobel laureate puts the Pigovian principle this
way: ‘Since it becomes more costly to obtain public goods when taxation imposes
distortions, normally this will imply that the efficient level of public goods is smaller
than it would have been with non-distortionary taxation’ (Stiglitz 1988, p. 140). It
is known that this general rule is subject to qualifications due to the presence of
considerations like complementarity/substitutivity between public and private goods
(Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980; King 1986; Batina 1990; Wilson 1991; Chang 2000).
Specific cases or conditions under which the efficient level of public goods is not
affected have also been identified (Christiansen 1981; Boadway and Keen 1993;
Konishi 1995, Dahlby 2008, Chang et al. 2016, Burns and Ziliak 2017, Jacobs 2018).
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In contrast to minor qualifications and special cases, a whole scale onslaught on
the Pigou principle is presented by Kaplow (1996). He argues that public goods can
be financed without additional distortion by using an adjustment to the income tax
that offsets the benefits of the public good. The ‘preexisting income tax schedule is
adjusted so that, at each income level, the tax change just offsets the benefits from
the public good. By construction, an individual’s net reward from any level of work
effort will be unaltered; any reduction in disposable income due to the tax adjustment
is balanced by the benefits from the public good. Because an individuals’ after-tax
utility as a function of his work effort will thus be unchanged, his choice of work
effort − and utility level – will also be unaffected’ (Kaplow 1996, p. 514).
For example, if the benefit of a public good is proportional to the income level of
the taxpayers, it may be financed by a (or an increase in) proportional income tax.
The proportional income tax itself may involve a disincentive effect. However, the
tax plus the public good together involve no disincentive effect. Suppose that, for
each $100 earned, $20 have to be taxed. Is not the incentive to earn more income less
than the case where one can keep the full $100? This lower incentive may well apply
if the tax revenue is thrown into the ocean. However, normally the revenue is used
for public spending that the taxpayers value more or at least no less (otherwise the
public spending is inefficient even using the benefit/cost ratio of one). Suppose the tax
revenue is used for police protection of property whose benefits are roughly propor-
tional to the income level. Then, each individual may in fact has higher incentive to
earn the protected $80 than the unprotected $100.
While Kaplow’s argument has to be qualified in the presence of tax evasion,
heterogeneity of individuals at the same income level, benefits from public goods
relating to ability than to income, etc., its main thrust is valid (Ng 2000a). How then
do we reconcile Kaplow’s argument with the orthodox position of the high costs
of public spending? First, Feldstein (1997) obtains his high estimate of $2.65 by
including policy-intended effects as unwanted distortions. He emphasises that higher
tax rates may not only reduce the supply of labour and capital, but also change the
forms in which individuals take their compensation, including more on things that
are tax deductible. However, while correctly including tax-induced expenditures on
luxurious working conditions, he also includes other tax-deductible items like ‘char-
itable gifts, and health care’ as involving distortions. However, these items are what
the society/government want to encourage either on the grounds of external bene-
fits (e.g. the prevention of communicable diseases), poverty reduction, and possibly
merit wants (though the last ground is more controversial). Provided the extent of
tax-deductibility is not excessive, no net distortion is created. Or, the extent of the
distortion is offset by the benefits (Ng 2000a).
Secondly, Feldstein’s (1997) high estimate ignores the argument of Kaplow
(1996). Alternatively stated, while the cost of a dollar of public spending on the
revenue side may be much higher than $1, the excess may be largely offset by the
positive incentive (or negative disincentive) effects of the spending side. If the bene-
fits of the public spending are not positively correlated with income such that there
is no positive incentive effects on the spending side but only disincentive effects on
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the revenue side, there is a distributional benefit since the rich pay more and the poor
pay less (Kaplow 1996; Ng 2000a).
Since high tax rates also encourage tax avoidance and evasion and since some
higher benefits of public goods are related to unobservable earning ability than
observable income levels, the positive incentive effects on the spending side may
not completely offset the distortive effects on the revenue side, making a dollar of
public spending still in excess of a dollar taking both sides into account. However,
the considerations of the prevalence of environmental costs of most production
and consumption, relative competition, the failure of higher private consumption
to increase happiness at the social level, as argued in the previous chapters (and Ng
2003; Yan, et al. 2021), suggest that the cost of a dollar of public spending should
be significantly reduced (likely to well below one dollar and possibly towards zero)
or that the benefits of public spending should be significantly increased from those
normally estimated by economists.
The general taxes on income and consumption, though designed mainly for the
purpose of revenue raising, may in fact serve as rough counteracting measures to the
environmental disruption effects involved. Thus, far from being distortive, taxation
may be corrective; instead of imposing positive excess burdens or distortionary costs,
taxation may serve to improve efficiency. The relative-income effects also cause a
bias in favour of private spending or against public spending. In most estimates, the
marginal benefit of private expenditure is likely to be taken to include the absolute-
income or intrinsic consumption effects plus the internal or direct relative income
effect (as these two taken together constitute the worth of private consumption as
it appears to each individual), but not to include the negative external or indirect
relative income effects. This creates an over-emphasis in favour of private expen-
diture, leading to a sub-optimal level of public spending (Ng 1987a). Similarly, the
materialistic bias and the insufficient recognition of the adaptation effects suggest
that the opportunity costs of reducing private consumption due to a higher public
spending are not as high as most people believe.
In addition to the above considerations, there is another factor making the cost of
public spending lower than normally believed – the existence of burden-free taxes.
Whilemost economists realize that corrective taxes on, say, pollution involve negative
excess burden or positive efficiency gain, burden-free taxes are regarded as existent
only in fairyland. However, there are goods taxes on which create not only no excess
burden but no burden at all, even ignoring all the considerations above. These are
pure diamond goods or goods valued for their exchange values rather their intrinsic
consumption effects. People consume or hold these goods to show off their wealth,
to use them as stores of value or gifts of value. Cubic zirconia looks exactly like top
quality diamond but costs only a tiny fraction of true diamond. But no one gives his
fiancée an engagement ring of cubic zirconia. For such goods, it is the value (price
times quantity) that enters the utility function of the consumer rather than the quantity,
as posited in economic analysis.As prices increase due to higher taxes on these goods,
consumers may just spend the same amounts to buy the same values without real
losses. The revenues raised are pure gains, suggesting arbitrarily high taxes on them
(Ng 1987b).While many goods (most precious metals and stones, top brands of most
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goods especially conspicuous items like cars and wines) possess various degrees of
diamond effect, few if any good is a pure diamond good. Nevertheless, very high
taxes on mixed diamond goods are still efficient. Moreover, as consumers may wish
to consume the value (pure diamond) aspect of the mixed good so much (such as to
show off their wealth) as to incur negative utility on the intrinsic consumption aspect
(such as health-threatening excessive drinking), taxes on such mixed diamond goods
may actually make consumers better off (being able to show off to the same extent
without drinking to excess) (Ng 1993).
15.2 Specific Areas of Deficient Public Spending
In a lucid and compelling book, Frank (1999) detailed the enormouswaste of conspic-
uous private consumption (related to relative-consumption effects discussed above)
in the U.S. and discusses specific areas where additional public spending will clearly
generate welfare gains far in excess of the opportunity costs. ‘A century hence, those
who read the history of our time will be puzzled about the arguments we have used in
defense of cutting, or refusing to fund, so many clearly useful public programs. They
will wonder, for example, why we failed to replace our deteriorating municipal water
systems, thereby exposing millions of families to toxic levels of lead, manganese, and
other heavy metals. They will not understand why we didn’t adopt more stringent
air-quality standards, which would have prevented millions of serious illnesses and
many thousands of premature deaths; or why we didn’t hire more beef inspectors in
response to the growing threat from deadly E-coli 0157 bacteria. They will be puzzled
by our having spent so little to maintain our streets, highways, and bridges. And it
will not be obvious to them why, despite our considerable wealth, we failed to pay
enough to attract the best and brightest teachers for our public schools.’ (pp. 253–4).
‘A Rand Corporation study … estimated that every $1 spent on cocaine prevention
and treatment programs results in a $7 savings in law-enforcement and health-care
expenses. Yet consistently we say we cannot afford these programs’ (p. 62).
The above list can easily be expanded. For example, a few examples may be given
to indicate that a lot more research is needed to increase welfare.
• The very topic of the appropriate size of the public sector, regarded by Feld-
stein (1997) as the central public finance question, is much under-researched. For
example, few if any researchers relate the important issues of relative income and
happiness to this central question. While we have discussed this and other related
issues above, a lot more analytical and empirical studies are needed.
• While studies on the effects of specific drugs and ingredients have been done, it
seems that a general study tracing the different types of food, drugs, and activities
taken by a big enough sample of people (in hundreds of thousands) of different
ages and health conditions (not just those hospitalized) over a long period (at least
in decades) to discover the desirable and undesirable, short and long-run effects,
may be most rewarding. Though the study would be very costly, we would gain
158 15 A Case for Higher Public Spending
very useful knowledge on many thousands of things simultaneously. An analysis
suggests that ‘even after taking account of distorted incentives, the potential gains
to medical advancement are enormous… easily justify… expenditures far above
current levels’ (Murphy & Robert 2000).
• The stimulation of certain pleasure centres in the brain can relieve acute pain,
induce intense pleasure, and promote a sense of well-being without the unde-
sirable health effects of drug addiction and without the effect of diminishing
marginal utility. It can also be used as a primer such that someone who had never
experienced climax before consistently achieve climax in normal sex after the
brain stimulation helped to establish the pathway. This method has been known
for nearly seven decades (Olds & Milner 1954). Why has the method not been
perfected for common use in order to increase happiness, reduce depression, and
solve many social and mental problems? (See Chap. 12 above for more details.)
15.3 Concluding Remarks
From the various factors discussed above, the costs of public spending have been
grossly overestimated. While it is desirable to do away with the inefficiencies in
public spending if possible, even before this is possible, increases in public spending,
especially in education, research, and environmental protection, can still increase
our welfare. The recent trend of checking the growth in public spending may be
grossly inefficient. In fact, economic growth increases the optimal share of public
spending and that, without directly dealing with environmental disruption, economic
growth may reduce welfare even if the shares of public spending and environmental
protection are being optimized (Ng 2003).
In addition to the above considerations, public spending on research and environ-
mental protection is also likely to be grossly sub-optimal due to its long-term and
global public-good nature. Scientific advances and a cleaner environment benefit
the whole world for generations to come. Decisions taken by national governments
with relatively short time horizons results in sub-optimal spending in these areas
even before we consider factors accounting for the overestimation of the costs of
public spending discussed above (Sect. 15.1). This suggests the need for interna-
tional cooperation to increase funding for research and environmental protection. In
fact, the relative-income effects at the individual level discussed above also applies to
the national level, resulting in international competition for income growth, the bias
against public spending and the disregard to environmental degradation. This further
strengthens the need for international cooperation. The success of such cooperation
partly depends on the widespread appreciation of the interdisciplinary arguments
as discussed in this chapter and the rest of this book. (For a framework analysing
interdisciplinary factors affecting welfare or happiness, see Ng 2004, Chap. 12.)
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Chapter 16
Animal Welfare: Beyond Human
Happiness
Abstract For animals capable of affective feelings (enjoyment and suffering), we
should also be concerned with their welfare. Welfare biology studies at least three
basic questions: Which (species are capable of welfare)? Whether (their welfare
is positive)? How (to increase their welfare? As affective feelings entail energy
costs, species not capable of making flexible choices are not capable of affective
feelings. The fact that members of most species either starve to death or are eaten
before successful mating, their net welfare is likely negative. We could decrease
animal suffering by banning pointless cruelty and making the living conditions of
our farmed animals better (like increasing cage sizes of chicken farming). However,
the widespread reduction of extensive animal suffering including wild animals will
largely have to be left after our significant scientific/technological, economic, and
moral advances. Excessively strict guidelines on animal experimentation that inhibit
scientific/technological advancesmay thus be counter-productive in animal salvation
in the long run.
In our discussion of happiness, we have not covered two important issues:
1. On human happiness, we have not discussed the number of (human) individuals
enjoying happiness or suffering negative happiness.
2. We also have not discussed happiness beyond humanity, particularly the issues
of animal welfare/suffering.
The first problem is discussed in Appendix E. Here, we consider the second
problem.
When we lived in Hong Kong over 1997, we shopped in the Shatin and Taipu wet
markets often. We saw fish sellers cutting their life eels alive in halves, letting them
wriggling in pain. I guess this is partly to attract attention and partly to show that their
fish are very fresh. I argued with them, saying that the eels would be very painful. No
one challenge me on this. But one seller replied, ‘If I cannot sell my fish, I will also
be painful.’ It may be true that if only one seller cannot use this method while others
could, he may sell less fish. However, if this cruel practice is prohibited by law, all
fish sellers will still be able to sell their fish. Thus, such practices that inflict huge
suffering on animals with no or negligible benefits to humans, should definitely be
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prohibited with strong sanctions against violators. I wrote on this and also emailed
several relevant government offices in Hong Kong. Thus, I was happy to learn that
the Hong Kong authority recently issued guidelines for the humane killing of fish
for discussion. I hope that some good guidelines will soon be put into practice.
Though there is no such terrible cutting of life eels in halves in the West that I
know of, the practice of wiping horses in racing is also something that should be
banned. If all riders cannot wipe their horses, fair competition can still be carried on.
Why should we be concerned with animal welfare? As happiness is of intrinsic
value and the rational ultimate objective (Chap. 5), the increase in our morality
is ultimately reflected in our concern with the happiness of others. The degree of
our morality is mainly measured by how much we are willing to sacrifice our own
happiness to increase the happiness of others. The extent or scope of our morality is
mainly defined by the set of these ‘others’ whom we are concerned with.
In ancient times, apart from oneself and family members, most people perhaps
were mainly concerned with the bosses and the king/queen. After such movements
like the glorious revolution in 1688, democracygradually replaced imperial authority;
the scope of moral concern increased to all nationals, and then to all human beings.
This should increase further to all those with affective sentient feelings. This is likely
to be a subset of all animal species. Ignoring the possible existence of gods, ghosts,
and the like, there is no need to expand beyond this set, as plants and viruses are
likely not affective sentients. Some biologists extend the concern to all living things
inclusive of plants. This is excessive as life itself does not have intrinsic value. Thus,
plants have only instrumental values by contributing to the happiness of animals with
affective feelings.
Obviously, a Chinese individual will think that the morality of an English person
who is only concerned with all individuals in England is lower than that of an English
person who is not only concerned with all individuals in England, but also all indi-
viduals in the world, including the Chinese. Similarly, the morality of a person who
is only concerned with all human individuals is lower than that of a person who is
concerned not only with all human individuals, but also all animals with affective
feelings. For an individual English/Chinese person, he may think that, with the same
time and/or costs, it is more important to help one’s country folks than foreigners.
However, if we could helpmany persons in other countrieswith little costs, we should
not preclude this option. Similarly, some persons may think that it is more important
to be concerned with human welfare. However, if we could reduce animal suffering
a lot at little costs on humans, we should also not preclude this option. Thus, we
should not only be concerned with the welfare of other fellow human beings, but
also with animal welfare.
Using the highest standard ofmorality, itmaybe argued that, all affective sentients,
human or animal, should be equal; one welfare unit of any affective sentient, in itself
(not ruling out the appropriate consideration of indirect effects on others and in the
future) should have the same weight. While moral-philosophically valid, this highest
level of morality is difficult to achieve in practice. However, we should at least
have some degree of concern for animal welfare, avoiding unnecessarily inflicting
suffering on animals at the very least.
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Personally, I was very concerned with animal welfare long time ago. In 1995,
I published a paper in an A* journal called Biology and Philosophy, proposing a
field of study called ‘welfare biology’. Two decades later, a scholar interested in
animal welfare, Max Carpendale, interviewed me on the motivation and background
ofwriting that paper. After seeing the interview onCarpendale’swebsite, the editor of
an academic journal, Relations: Beyond Anthrocentrism, published the interview in a
2015 issue of the journal (Carpendale 2015). In 2018, 80,000 hours also interviewed
me on this and other issues. This paper on welfare biology seems to have attracted
more attention than most of my papers in economics.
There are three basic questions in economics: What (to produce)? How? For
whom? In my 1995 paper, I also raised three basic questions for welfare biology:
Which (species are capable of welfare)? Whether (their welfare is positive or nega-
tive)? How (to increase their welfare)? Next, I used Darwinian theory of evolution
and some basic economizing principle to help answer these basic questions, reaching
some conclusions (but far from complete).
First, it may be argued that species without flexibility in their behavior have no
affective feelings and hence are not capable of welfare or suffering. The generation
of affective feelings requires energy costs. Thus, these feelings must contribute to the
survival and reproduction fitness of the individual to avoid elimination from natural
selection. However, the feelings of pleasure and pain themselves do not contribute
to fitness. For example, when you see a tiger and feel terrified, this feeling alone
does not help you to survive. This feeling must affect your activities, like running
away or hide somewhere, to increase your chance for survival. Similarly, you feel
nice seeing a beautiful lady; this nice feeling itself does not increase your fitness. It
has to prompt you to mate with the lady to pass on your genes. If feelings of pleasure
and pain do not increase your fitness but are costly, they will be selected against and
hence cannot survive. They must affect your choices. For example, when seeing an
animal, whether you should catch and eat it, or run away to prevent being eaten by
it: the so-called ‘fight or flight’ decision is an important choice. The ability to make
such flexible choices depending on the conditions of the situation (like the size of
the animal, whether you have some weapon, etc.) which you may size up and decide
on the spot, is important for your survival.
Some behavioral patterns of animals are completely fixed by genetic programs
in advance. For example, a frog is born with the ability to jump around, swallowing
small flying objects, as this help it to eatmany insects and helps it to survive.However,
if you put a frog in a confinement with many insects that do not fly, the frog will not
be able to eat them and will starve to death. For another example, when we touch
some very hot thing, our arm will withdraw itself to avoid being burnt. This reaction
is automatic without thinking and is controlled by our spinal cord. If all the activities
of a species consist only of such pre-programmed fixed patterns, it does not need to
make flexible choices and hence it does not need affective feelings. Hence, natural
selection will ensure that species not capable of any flexible choice will also not be
capable of suffering and welfare. This helps us to answer the first basic question in
welfare biology: Which species are capable of welfare? Only flexible species are. If
we can establish that certain species completely lack flexibility, we may rule them
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out and not be concerned with causing any suffering on them. Though flexibility
or not is still not easy to establish, the existence of affective feelings is even more
subjective and difficult to establish. Hence, this first proposition in welfare biology
is helpful.
Only flexible species are capable of welfare; however, this does not necessarily
mean that we may rule out many species. The recently developed affective neuro-
science shows that all mammals, and likely most if not all vertebrates, have affective
feelings. In fact, ‘hedonic brain mechanisms are largely shared between humans and
other mammals’ (Berridge and Kringelbach 2011, Abstract). Moreover, a paper in
Science (Fossat et al. 2014) shows that even crayfish, which is not a vertebrate, has
worries. When confined to a space with no escape, a crayfish secretes a chemical
in its brain, a chemical we know that we will secrete in our brain only when we
are worried. This strongly suggests, if not proves, that even crayfish is capable of
worries. Also, arguably, worry is a higher form of unhappiness than just bodily pain.
Thus, many species are capable of enjoyment and suffering.
The second basic question in welfare biology is: Whether the (net) welfare of
animals are positive or negative? While not conclusive, my 1995 paper suggests that
the answer is likely to be negative. This is based on the following two points. The first
is based on the fact that, in most species, the number of offspring a mature female
typically has over the lifespan is in hundreds, thousands, or more. In equilibrium and
on average, only two of these many individual members will survive to adulthood
and have successfully pass on their own offspring. The overwhelming majority of
the others have a life of running away from predators in fear and finally got eaten or
starve to death. Some of them may manage to survive until adulthood and be able
to compete to mate. However, apart from the two lucky ones, the majority again
fail to mate. It is difficult to imagine that a life like this will have more pleasures
than pains. As there are many more unsuccessful than successful (in eventual mating
and passing on the genes) individuals, overall negative welfare is likely. The second
ground for this negative welfare conclusion is based on some economic-evolutionary
theorizing. While my original 1995 paper suggests likely negative welfare from this
ground, the issue is still being debated (Groff and Ng 2019).
According to happiness surveys, people in most countries are on average happy.
We are also an animal species; how come our welfare is not negative? Happiness
surveys are recent. If surveys were taken when we were still struggling on the life-
and-death line, with most children starving to death or eaten by animals, our welfare
would also likely be negative.
The third basic question in welfare biology is: How to increase animal welfare?
Answers to this question could be verywide-ranging.However, to focus on some easy
measures without too high costs, apart from banning pointless infliction of suffering
on animals like the cutting of life eels in halves as mentioned above, an obvious
area springing to mind is reducing suffering of animals we farm for food. We farm
chicken, ducks, pigs, lambs, cows, etc. and eat their meat. If they suffer negative
welfare in such a life, we are committing a double crime: make them suffer and then
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kill them for food.1 On the other hand, if we could improve the living conditions of
our farmed animals such as to increase their net welfare from negative to be positive,
eating farmed animals is not morally bad. If we do not eat them, they would not have
a chance of living at all. Then, there is no reason to be a vegetarian on moral grounds.
The health ground for being a vegetarian or even a vegan is of dubious validity, as
in our long history of evolution, we ate animals. The case for reducetarian (reducing
instead of stopping eating animal products) is more supportable; see https://www.
reducetarian.org/.
A simple way to reduce the suffering of our farmed animals is to increase their
cage sizes, especially for the factory farming of chicken. The objection to this by
producers that it would increase their costs and reduce their profits is based on
incorrect economics. Chicken farming is largely under condition of free competition.
Thus, in the long run, producers only earn normal profits. The institution of a drastic
increase in cage sizes may lead initially to substantial increases in costs. However, in
the long run, the increases in costs will be reflected in higher prices of chicken meat
and eggs. The producers will still be earning normal profits. However, consumers
will have to pay higher prices. Many of themwould be glad to pay higher prices if the
suffering of animals could be reduced substantially. For the majority of consumers
who tend to over-consume meat, it is likely that higher prices will make them better
off, just like a tax on cigarettes makes smokers better off (Gruber & Mullainathan
2005). For others, they still should pay higher prices, just like polluters should pay
for the harm of pollution. (For animal suffering reduction, see also Ng 2016, 2019b.)
It may be thought that while the rich could pay for the higher prices easily, the
poor will be harmed significantly. The issue of rich-poor or inequality is important
but should be addressed separately. A person is rich or poor depending on her total
purchasing power, not on the amount of chicken she consumes. Thus, we should
pursue equality at the general equality policy focusing on total purchasing power.
On specific measures including animal welfare or factory farming, we should follow
the principle of efficiency supremacy. In this way, we can achieve the highest degree
of equality at the same efficiency costs (Ng 2019a, Chap. 5).
For wild animals, we know even less. If my answer to the second basic ques-
tion is correct, their net welfare is negative. However, it is more difficult to reduce
their suffering (than that of our farmed animals). Some animal welfarists believe that
we should at least not encroach upon their territories, reducing their living space.
However, if their net welfare is negative, then while the contraction if their territories
may involve transitory increases in suffering, in the long run, with lower number
of individuals, their total suffering will also decrease. This is not clearly worse. In
any case, I believe that, in the very long run, we have a duty to help increase the
net welfare of even wild animals, hopefully to a positive level at least. Though not
immediately feasible, we should try at least after significant advances economically,
scientifically, technologically, and morally. Before this is feasible, we should try to
prohibit pointless cruelty and reduce at least the suffering of our farmed animals
as suggested above. Also, while we may have reasonable guidelines in experiments
1 Not to mention the betrayal of the trust on us we create for animals; see Cooke (2019).
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involving animals, we should not be too strict on this, as this would slow down scien-
tific and technological advances upon which the salvation of animals will ultimately
rely on.
References
BERRIDGE, Kent C. & KRINGELBACH, Morten L. (2011). Building a neuroscience of pleasure
and well-being. Theory, Research and Practice, 1(3).
CARPENDALE, Max (2015). Welfare biology as an extension of biology: Interview with Yew-
Kwang Ng, Relations: Beyond Anthropocentrism, 3(2): 197–202. Retrived from: http://www.led
online.it/index.php/Relations/article/view/884
COOKE, S. (2019). Betraying animals. Journal of Ethics, 23, 183–200. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10
892-019-09289-z
FOSSAT, Pascal, BACQUÉ-CAZENAVE, Julien, DE DEURWAERDÈRE, Philippe,
DELBECQUE, Jean-Paul & CATTAERT, Daniel. (2014). Anxiety-like behavior in crayfish is
controlled by serotonin. Science, 344(6189), 1293–1297.
GROFF, Z. & NG, Y-K. (2019). Does suffering dominate enjoyment in the animal kingdom? An
update to welfare biology. Biology & Philosophy, 34, 40. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-019-
9692-0
GRUBER, J.,&MULLAINATHAN,S. (2005).Do cigarette taxesmake smokers happier?Advances
in Economic Analysis & Policy, 5, 1–43.
NG, Yew-Kwang (2016). How welfare biology and commonsense may help to reduce animal
suffering, Animal Sentience, 2016.007. Target article for peer commentary. http://animalstudie
srepository.org/animsent/vol1/iss7/1/
NG,Yew-Kwang (2019a).Markets andMorals: JustifyingKidney Sales and Legalizing Prostitution,
Cambridge University Press.
NG, Yew-Kwang (2019b). Human superiority is obvious but does not justify cruelty. Animal
Sentience 23(36).
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
Appendix A
Resolving Some Moral Philosophical
Controversies
By taking psychological happiness in the sense of feeling good instead of life satis-
faction or ‘attitudinal’ happiness as of the ultimate value, many controversies in
moral philosophy may be resolved. Just consider one example to illustrate the point
here. Feldman (2004) advances an ‘intrinsic attitudinal hedonism’ theory of the good
life. Due to taking the attitudinal happiness or rather life satisfaction as the focus,
Feldman finds that the extrinsic satisfaction has to be excluded.
When a person takes attitudinal pleasure in some state of affairs, he may take this pleasure
in the state of affairs because he thinks it is related to some other state of affairs, and he takes
pleasure in that other state of affairs. The most familiar instance of this sort of thing is the
instrumental case. I take pleasure in the fact that the waiter is heading for our table. Why?
Because I think he is bringing beer and peanuts, and I take pleasure in the fact that I soon
will be enjoying them. … In cases like this, the person takes attitudinal pleasure in one state
of affairs in virtue of the fact that he takes pleasure in others. In such cases, I say that the
person is taking “extrinsic attitudinal pleasure.’ (Feldman 2004, p. 63).
According to Feldman, only the intrinsic attitudinal pleasure of enjoying bear
and peanuts is to be included, not the extrinsic one of anticipating the enjoyment.
The intrinsic versus extrinsic distinction becomes irrelevant if we dispense with the
‘attitudinal’ requirement and go for happiness in the sense of feeling rather than life
satisfaction. If the person also feels good when anticipating the enjoyment before
actually eating, that pleasurable feeling is also a part of his subjective happiness.
All actual positive feelings are to be counted positively and all negative feelings
negatively, whether extrinsic or intrinsic in Feldman’s sense.
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Happiness as the Only Intrinsic Value: Further
Opposing Arguments Considered
In commenting onhappiness economics in general andonLayard (2005) in particular,
Barrotta (2008, p.151) gives the example of the refusal of Freud to take drugs to reduce
very painful conditions due to his desire to have clear thinking. If the reason to prefer
clear thinking is to directly or indirectly contribute to his ownand/or others’ happiness
in the future (perhaps through contribution to knowledge), there is no problem (no
inconsistency with welfarism). If the clear thinking or autonomy does not contribute
to happiness of anyone any time, the rationality of preferring it at the cost of much
pain is questionable.
For another example,Benjamin et al. (2010, p. 3) find that ‘predictedSWB[subjec-
tive well-being, similar to happiness] and choice coincide in our data 83 percent of
the time’. Even for the rest, no conflict need be indicated as people could choose
more income but say that the shorter hours option gives more happiness because
the higher income could (or at least believed to) contribute to future happiness;
the framing of their main question on p.6 does not rule out this likely possibility.
Similarly, apparently non-utilitarian factors beyond happiness such as justice, rights,
freedom, prioritymay all be justified on the important effects on others and the future.
Consider this conclusion: ‘The evaluation of current mood is furthermore
proposed to be situation-dependent such that in congruent situations (e.g. a cele-
bration party) a positive mood leads to a positive evaluation of the positive mood
and increased happiness, in incongruent situations (e.g. a funeral) a positive mood is
evaluated negatively (Västfjäll and Gärling 2006) and thus paradoxically would lead
to decreased happiness’ (Gamble and Gärling 2011, 3rd page). Obviously, when one
laughs on something funny at a funeral, it is not that one does not enjoy the funniness;
rather, one is embarrassed by laughing at an inappropriate occasion. The reason for
this is again considering the effects on others and in the future. One then refrains
from laughing loudly in a funeral. This may reduce the positive enjoyment, and the
embarrassment further reduces the net evaluation. However, the positive mood, to
the extent it is felt, is still positive.
The point that negative feelings should count negatively in (net) happiness does
not mean that pain or sufferings are useless. In fact, the pain sensation when say our
fingers are burned triggers our withdrawal of our hand to avoid more damages and
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to teach us to avoid being burned in the future. However, the pain sensation as such
is of negative value. It is also questionable to say that ‘happiness and unhappiness
are not ends, but means, and quite possibly “aspects of mechanisms that influence
to act in the interests of our genes” (Nesse 2004, p. 1337)’ (Nes 2010, p. 375). The
problem of such statements is that they are based on confusing the (as-if) ends/means
of our genes with our own ends/means. We are the feeling selves, not the unfeeling
genes. It is quite true that our affective feelings were created/evolved to make us do
things that help to spread our genes. However, the spreading of the unfeeling genes
as such has no value. If the organisms that do have affective feelings have a lot more
pain/unhappiness than happiness/pleasure and this miserable situation has no hope
of being changed, the spreading of such genes is highly undesirable. Even for the
reverse cases of more happiness, the valuable thing is the happy feelings, not the
spreading of genes as such.
Consider the view ‘that well-being is not so much an outcome or end state as it is
a process of fulfilling or realizing one’s daimon or true nature’ (Deci & Ryan 2008,
p. 2, describing the eudamonic view of well-being of that issue of Journal of Happi-
ness Studies). If our true nature is interpreted as the biological one of survival and
reproduction, a similar confusion of the (as-if) ends of our genes with our own ends
may be involved. On the other hand, if our ‘true nature’ or eudaimonia are interpreted
to require some elements of virtue (as required from Aristotle to Waterman), then
the confusion is between happiness (that individuals and hence the society values
ultimately) and morality, as discussed above. A morally very virtuous person may
be very unhappy due to say sickness; a very happy person may be morally vicious
by intentionally causing harm on others. While his happiness is valuable in itself,
his causing of unhappiness on others may more than negate this. Again, once we
take adequate account of the effects on others and the future, there is no need to go
beyond the hedonic concept of happiness.
While many diverse desiderata (e.g. self-acceptance, self-determination, self-
realization, relatedness, relationship, capability and functioning, environmental
mastery, purpose) have been advanced by the believers in eudaimonia, let us consider
here the need for autonomy emphasized by a number of authors. We may well have a
natured and nurtured need for autonomy, as normallywewill survive and thrive better
with autonomy.Rationally, onemay value autonomyonly for its instrumental value in
contributing directly (through fulfilling our desire to be autonomous) and indirectly
(through its beneficial effects on other important things) towards our happiness. Thus,
if I weremad and allowingme to be autonomouswould cause great unhappiness upon
myself and others much more than the small good feelings of being autonomous, I
would not want to be autonomous.
For self-development, it could clearly be valuable now for its instrumental effects
in contributing to the future happiness of oneself and possibly also of others. The
fact that self-development is regarded as more important by younger people tends
to support this interpretation. For the last dimension of contribution to others, it is
also clear that if people find that happiness is the one that is valuable ultimately, then
contribution to others must also be contributing to their happiness ultimately for it to
be real contribution. Thus, provided happiness is taken to be net happiness counting
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positive affective feelings positively and negative ones negatively, and provided the
effects on others and in the future are not excluded, happiness needs only be of one
dimension. Ultimately, it is the only thing that is really valuable.
Viewing happiness as the only ultimately valuable thing also does not conflict with
the so-called ‘hedonic paradox’ that the intentional pursuit of happiness, especially
if narrowly and excessively focused on the pleasures of the flesh, usually leads to
unhappiness or less happiness (Veenhoven 2003; Martin 2008). To the extent that
this is true, it means that a good way to achieve happiness is not to have myopic
focus on the pleasures of the flesh in the short run, especially not excessively, but
to do things more meaningful in contributing to one’s own development and to the
goodness (which has to be defined in terms of the effects on happiness ultimately) of
the society in general. This does not negate the proposition that, ultimately speaking,
only happiness is valuable.
Accepting happiness as the only ultimately valuable thing does not rule out the
possibility that things other than happiness may be of interest for their instrumental
values to happiness or for other purposes. For example, Waterman et al. (2008) and
Huta and Ryan (2010) examine both ‘hedonia’ (similar to our concept of happiness
here) and ‘eudamonia’ (which goes beyond happiness to require some elements of
virtue) in affecting ‘intrinsic motivation’ or ‘motives for acting’. Obviously, as both
these factors do affect people’s motives for acting, it is useful in studying the effects
of both, even if one (like the present author) views virtue as ultimately being based
on the contribution to happiness, especially to the happiness of others.
A specific implication of using the enjoyment/suffering sense of happiness (espe-
cially in contrast to using life satisfaction) may be briefly mentioned. It supports the
Easterlin paradox (increases in incomes failing to increase happiness after a relatively
low income level; Easterlin 1974, Easterlin et al. 2002) the validity of which has been
questioned (Stevenson and Wolf 2008, 2013; Sacks et al. 2010; Angeles 2011). As
reported in Graham (2011), Kahneman and Deaton (2010), in a study of 450,000
respondents in a Gallup daily survey of U.S. respondents from 2008 to 2009, found
that hedonic wellbeing correlated less closely with income than did life satisfaction.
Both ‘correlated closelywith income (in a log-linearmanner) at the bottom end of the
income ladder, but the correlation between hedonic well-being and income tapered
off at about $75,000 per year’. (See Chap. 7 on further discussion of income and
happiness.)
Regarding things other than welfare as intrinsically valuable is of questionable
acceptability. For example, ‘Non-economic modes of valuing typically result in
intrinsic motivation. If one values an environmental good in itself or because of
esthetic, historical or ecological reasons (valuation), one is likely to protect it regard-
less whether doing so helps to achieve some other goal (motivation)’ (Neuteleers
and Engelen 2015, p. 259). In my view, esthetic, historical and ecological values
are valuable because they contribute to our welfare, not in themselves. If there is no
sentients to appreciate them, they have no values.
On the other hand, it is also incorrect to say: ‘If something has a price then it is
not intrinsically valued’ (Walsh 2015, p. 406). A pet animal has a price but also has
intrinsic values as it has affective feelings. I have intrinsic value, at least to myself
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and my family members. However, I also have a price. I am willing to sell myself if
possible, even for slavery, for say US $100 billion or higher. The extra money has
no value to me myself, as my marginal utility/happiness of consumption is virtually
zero. However, if I have a large sum of money like $100b., I think I could use it to
do a lot of good, and this could increase a lot of welfare of other people and animals,
such that even if I value the welfare of others and animals only at 1% of that of mine,
it may still be worth it for me to slave for the rest of my life, provided that if I have
at least 6 months to spend the money first. Arguably, I should be prepared to sell
myself for something less than $100b; that is just a price I am willing to accept, not
the minimum one.
In conclusion, despite the variety of objections to our central argument, I have
never come across one that truly negates it. Most arguments ignore some relevant
effects on others and in the future.
Appendix C
The Necessity of Cardinal Welfare for Rational
Agents/Organisms
Using indifference/preference analysis, economists generally believe that as long as
higher utility/welfare values are associated with higher preference levels, choices
in accordance with the maximization of utility will be the same as choices maxi-
mizing preference, with different cardinal indices for the utility function. In this
sense, utility needs only be ordinal. Does this mean that utility/welfare values need
not be cardinal for the maximization of utility/welfare to be consistent with fitness
maximization, even thoughfitness itself is cardinal?This appendix shows that, at least
when choices involving risk are involved, as almost always true in the real world of
uncertainty, welfare values for rational agents have to be cardinal and similar to
fitness values in their cardinality for rational choices to be consistent with expected
fitness maximization.
For simplicity, let us be content with the illustration of the central point that
can be seen to be applicable more generally. Consider that a rational organism (as
happiness studies are currently virtually exclusively concerned with Homo sapiens,
this rationality assumption is certainly valid) is faced with the choice between two
actions a and b, with two possible states of nature x and y with equal probability of
50% each (again purely for simplicity without real loss of generality). Let F(j, k) and
W(j, k) be the fitness and welfare values of actions j = a, b and states of nature k
= x, y respectively. Consider a specific case, without real loss of generality (since
it is obvious that the point made with the specific numbers here also applies more
generally) where.
(1) F(b, y) = 22 > F(a, y) = 20 > F(a, x) = 10 > F(b, x) = 5.
The maximization of expected fitness requires the choice of action a. IfW(j,
k) is equal to F(j, k) for all values of j, k, the required expected fitnessmaximiza-
tion choice will coincide with that of the maximization of expected welfare
values. As F is cardinal, so is W. However, if W(j, k) is made only having the
same ordinal ranking but not the same cardinal values as F(j, k), in general,
the maximization of expected welfare values by rational agents/organisms
(required to satisfy compelling rationality axioms; see Ng 1984) does not in
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general coincide with that of expected fitness maximization. For example if
we have.
(2) W(b,y) = 50 > W(a,y) = 20 > W(a,x) = 10 > W(b,x) = 5,
the ordering of the various welfare values for all the four outcomes under
consideration is exactly the same as that of the fitness values in (1) above.
However, expected welfare maximization in this case dictates the choice of
action b, contrary to the requirement of expected fitness maximization.
Obviously, in order that the maximization of expected welfare always
dictates the same action as that for expected fitness maximization, the welfare
values under different outcomes have either to be the same as the fitness values
or are some linear transformation of the latter, i.e. have to be not only having the
same ranking, but also having the same cardinal numbers unique up to a linear
transformation. This makes welfare values cardinal but not yet in a ratio scale.
For the latter (full cardinality), we need to pin point the point of zero welfare.
This is the point when an organism (individual) feels neither pleasure nor pain.
For most people, this is the case when the individual is not doing anything
enhancing or detrimental to fitness, directly or indirectly through expectation.
Why is a zero welfare value associated with zero implication for fitness?This is
so because it is costly (energy consumption) to produce either pleasure or pain.
Thus, activities with no implication for fitness should neither be penalized nor
rewarded. (For more details, see Ng 1995.)
Appendix D
A Problem in Happiness Measurement
This problem arises when only a fixed scale (e.g. from 0 to 10, or from 0 to 100) is
allowed for the range of happiness reported. Suppose that I am currently very happy
and report my happiness level as being 90 out of 100. Suppose my net happiness
amountwere to double (not to mention a three or fourfold increase) some years from
now (when I already report an index of 90). Using the scale of 0–100, I cannot
report my happiness as 180. I would probably report 95. However, this problem is
due to the confinement to the range 0–100. When people are confined to a scale of
0–10 or 0–100, people tend to use the scale somewhat between the normal numerical
scale and something like either the logarithmic or the Richter scale (used to measure
earthquakes; an increase by one signifies a tenfold increase). While different persons
may use the scale to represent different levels of happiness, personally I am inclined
to use a scale like the one in Fig. D.1, where the horizontal axis is the scale between
0–100 and the vertical axis is my cardinal amount of happiness over a certain period.
Such a scale allows the coverage of a larger range of variation of happiness amount
and also allows more significant differences over the non-extreme range. If one were
to use a normal numerical scale, it will appear as a straight line in Fig. D.1. Then
there are an upper and a lower bounds for happiness level beyond which one has to
use the same number 100 (for upper) or zero (for lower) even for further variations.
Strictly speaking, the non-linearity in the happiness scale makes the averaging,
summation, and multiplication of happiness indices (with life expectancy in partic-
ular) of questionable validity. This difficulty can be overcome if a linear scale is used
as could be obtained by using the method of happiness measurement based on the
number of just perceivable increments as discussed in Chap. 6. Before such more
reliable measures of happiness are used, existing measures may yet be used as the
best we have available. Moreover, the use of happiness measures unadjusted for the
non-linearity (see Fig. D.1 and the associated discussion above) may yet serves as a
desirable adjustment for those (e.g. Veenhoven and Kalmijn 2005 who propose the
measure of ‘inequality-adjusted happiness’) who wish to take into account of the
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Fig. D.1 Reported happiness levels may be non-linear
equality in the distribution of happiness level.1 Most happiness indices obtained in
actual surveys fall between 40 and 80 (for a scale of 0–100). Egalitarian adjustments
require counting the same increments of happiness indices at the high end (70–90) as
less important than those at the low end (40–60). As may be seen from Fig. D.1, the
needed adjustment to account for the likely non-linearity requires exactly the reverse
adjustment. Of course, the two opposite adjustments may not be exactly offsetting
to each other. However, they may be roughly or at least partly offsetting.
1 Personally, I do not believe in the relevance of equality in the ultimate objective. Inequality in
income is undesirable both because of the diminishing marginal utility/welfare of income and
because of the indirect undesirable effects of inequality in reducing happiness through for example
reducing social cohesion. Since happiness is already the ultimate objective, we can neither have
diminishing marginal happiness of happiness nor further indirect effects, except in an intertemporal
framework where the happiness in the future has not yet been accounted for. Either accounting for
this intertemporal effect or ignoring it, an objective function that is not linear in individual happiness
can be shown to violate some compelling axiom, i.e. treating a perceivable increment of happiness
as less important than a not perceivable one; see Ng (1975, 1984). Moreover, the argument for the
utilitarian social welfare function (Ng 2000b, Chap. 5) supports not taking into account inequality
in the ultimate objective. (These are briefly discussed in Sect. 3.) Also, Ott (2005) shows that higher
average happiness tends to go with higher equality in happiness.
Appendix E
A Solution of the Moral Philosophical Problem
of Optimal Population Size
In the main text, we have not considered issues when the population size or the
number of individuals is a variable. When population size may change, the most
prominent issue is: What is the relevant social welfare that should be maximized
when the set or just the number of individuals (to simplify the issue) is a variable.
Here, we have the centuries-old issue of average versus total welfare maximization
in moral philosophy. Should we prefer a society (or an alternative for the society)
with higher average (i.e. per-person) welfare, or one with higher total welfare (=
average welfare times the number of individuals concerned). Classical utilitarianism
goes for the maximization of total welfare. The problem of this is that it leads to the
so-called Repugnant Conclusion. As long as the number of individuals is increased
sufficiently to offset the decrease in average welfare, we have to prefer an alternative
with an average life barely worth living (with positive welfare but arbitrarily close
to zero).
The apparent dismal result of the Repugnant Conclusion leads many to go for
average welfare maximization. However, this option has a worse implication; it
violates the compelling Mere Addition Principle: The addition of additional happy
individuals (i.e. with positive net welfare levels) without decreasing the welfare level
of any existing person should be regarded as a good change. Obviously, if the average
welfare level of the additional individuals is lower than that of the existing individ-
uals, the larger population size leads to lower average welfare level, though the level
of total welfare may increase enormously. If we have to choose two alternatives (with
relevant ultimate outcomes all included; no relevant effects on the future left unac-
counted for) of: A. 1000 units of net welfare for 10 individuals only; B. 1100 units
of net welfare for these same 10 individuals, plus 990 units for an additional million
individuals, we have to prefer A, denying the additional one million individuals to
enjoy happy lives, even at a bonus of making the pre-existing 10 individuals also
happier, as the average welfare level is lower in B than in A. Clearly, this is bad
moral philosophy.
The above dilemma between average and total welfare maximization has troubled
the moral philosophy circles for centuries with no generally acceptable ‘solution’.
Some position between average and total welfare is also not an acceptable solution
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as it just means both the violation of the Mere Addition Principle to some extent and
having the Repugnant Conclusion in some degree. This population size dilemma
was perceptively discussed by Parfit (1984) in his very readable monograph. Parfit
believes that a Theory X that avoids the Repugnant Conclusion and satisfies theMere
Addition Principle as well as some other compelling conditions exists but he could
not find it. However, after reading Parfit’s beautiful discussion, I show that Theory X
does not exist (Ng1989).Any theory/principle thatmeets theMereAdditionPrinciple
and some compelling conditions (including Non-antiegalitarianism: A more equally
distributed welfare profile with no lower level of total welfare cannot be worse)
cannot avoid the Repugnant Conclusion. While this seems a devastating result in
the moral philosophy of population size, I also argue that the so-called Repugnant
Conclusion is not really repugnant (For support from 29 authors, see Zuber, et.al.
2021.). As well, I offer a way out. At the level of pure moral philosophy, especially
when we are comparing two alternative ultimate outcomes unrelated to our own
interest, we should morally use the principle of total welfare maximization, meeting
the Mere Addition Principle and other compelling conditions. However, for choices
that may affect our ownwelfare, wemay not be prepared to sacrifice our ownwelfare
significantly, even if this could lead to much larger increase in welfare of potential
people (people not yet born but could be born under some relevant alternatives).
Similarly, a rich person may agree that donating a high proportion of his wealth
will increase social welfare, but may only donate a very small proportion. This is a
question of ideal morality versus self-interest. (The rich person casemay also involve
the publicness aspect; if all rich persons donate, he may be glad to do so.) This is
my resolution of the optimal population dilemma in moral philosophy that I discuss
in some details in my 1989 paper.
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